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Abstract 
 
This study critically explores the meaning of difference in continental philosophy. 
Concomitantly, it reflects on the norm, with regard to, firstly, the authorities within the 
philosophical community who take it upon themselves to distinguish, on a “corporate” and/or 
intellectual level, between the normal and that which is different from the norm; secondly, the 
apparatus of limitation employed to constitute, legitimate and reinforce this distinction, 
alongside distinctions between the conventional and the peculiar, the traditional and the 
marginal, the philosophical and the non-philosophical, the essential and the secondary or 
supplementary, as well as, the same (or subject) and the other.  
 
The focus on these distinctions is narrowed to the field of phenomenology, more particularly, 
how the anthropologistic readings of Phenomenology of Spirit by the exponents of early 
French phenomenology not only add force to the canonical reception of Hegel as a follower of 
a philosophical tradition governed by solipsism and individualism, but also perpetuate two 
traditional concepts; to wit, otherness as something threatening that must be overcome and 
self-other relationships as inexorably violent. A reinterpretation of the dialectic of recognition 
reveals not only Hegel’s appreciation of the degree to which subjectivity is indebted to 
otherness, but also his notion of friendship as the reciprocal preservation of the other’s 
otherness. This notion of friendship is appropriated by Simone de Beauvoir, whose 
engagement with Hegel constitutes a radical departure from French phenomenology; by 
implication, normal practice. Beauvoir, both personally and in her work, confronts the 
philosophical community with the short-sighted, often destructive, ways in which it delimits 
the canon, particularly with regard to its “othering” of women and its disregard for the 
specificity of difference.  
 
In keeping with the anthropological spirit of the respective readings of Hegel, the study itself 
takes the form of an autobiography. It traces the intellectual journey of a non-Western, non-
white, non-male scholar, from her sense of not belonging in the world of continental 
philosophy, to her critical engagement with Hegel, mediated by Beauvoir. In the process it 
aims to show that otherness matters and how it matters. Furthermore, it calls for writing and 
reading differently so as to encourage non-hegemonic philosophy.               
 
Abstrak 
 
Hierdie studie is ‘n kritiese verkenning van die betekenis van differensie in die kontinentale 
filosofie. Gepaardgaande hiermee, word besin oor die norm, met betrekking tot, eerstens, 
diegene wat gesaghebbend binne die filosofiese gemeenskap, d.w.s. met ‘n self-opgelegde 
mandaat om te onderskei, op ‘n “korporatiewe” en/of intellektuele vlak, tussen die norm en 
dit wat afwyk van die norm; en tweedens, die begrensing bepaal, wat aangewend word om 
hierdie onderskeid, tesame met onderskeidings tussen die konvensionele en die eie, die 
tradisionele en die marginale, die filosofiese en die nie-filosofiese, die sentrale en die 
sekondêre of aanvullende, asook (die)selfde (of subjek) en die ander, te konstitueer, legitimeer 
en versterk.      
 
Hierdie onderskeidings word ondersoek binne die veld van die fenomenologie; in die 
besonder, hoe die antropologistiese vertolkings van Phenomenology of Spirit, deur die 
verteenwoordigers van die vroeë Franse fenomenologie, die kanonieke beeld van Hegel as 
aanhanger van ‘n filosofiese tradisie, wat deur solipsisme en individualisme aangedryf word, 
bekragtig en daarmee saam twee tradisionele konsepte bestendig, naamlik, andersheid as ‘n 
bedreiging wat oorkom moet word en self-ander verhoudings as noodwendig gewelddadig. ‘n 
Herinterpretasie van die dialektiek van herkenning openbaar nie net Hegel se waarneming van 
die mate waartoe subjektiwiteit afhang van andersheid nie, maar ook sy idee van vriendskap 
as die wedersydse behoud van die ander se andersheid. Hierdie nosie van vriendskap word 
toe-geëien deur Simone de Beauvoir, wie se inskakeling met Hegel radikaal afwyk van die 
Franse fenomenologie, dus ook van standaard praktyk. Beauvoir, beide in persoon en in haar 
werk, konfronteer die filosofiese gemeenskap met die kortsigtige, dikwels afbrekende, wyse 
waarop hul die kanon begrens, veral met betrekking tot hul “be-andering” van vroue en hul 
minagting van die spesifisiteit van differensie.  
 
In ooreenstemming met die antropologiese gees van die onderskeie vertolkings van Hegel, 
neem die studie self die vorm van ‘n outobiografie aan. Dit volg die intellektuele verkenning 
van ‘n nie-Westerse, nie-wit, nie-manlike student, aanvanklik vanuit haar gevoel van 
ontuiswees in die wêreld van die kontinentale filosofie, tot haar kritiese inskakeling met 
Hegel, bemiddel deur Beauvoir. Hiermee wil die studie wys dat andersheid saak maak en hoe 
dit saak maak. Voorts beroep dit op ‘n anderse skryf en lees om sodoende nie-hegemoniese 
filosofie aan te moedig.    
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Part 1 The Philosophical and the Personal 
 
 
 
… Beauvoir is obscene because she is ‘more’ than what is acceptable, and in being so, 
spills out of the frame that should contain her. 
Fraser (1999: 120)1 
                                                 
1 This study focuses on the crossing of boundaries. It locates Simone de Beauvoir and her work at the 
margins of philosophy, that is, the disorientating, alienating, uncomfortable space where the “inside” 
and “outside” of the discipline intersect. Through her resistance of systemisation and her transgression 
of certain philosophical conventions and through the excess and outrageousness that define her ethics, 
Beauvoir invites us to reconsider what we mean by limits – not least of all, the limits of philosophy – 
the exclusions that these limits imply, as well as the imperialistic assumptions that have historically 
informed such exclusions. In the attempt to remain faithful to Beauvoir’s challenge to the 
philosophical establishment, this work seeks ways, both in content and execution, to draw attention to 
the marginal. Thus, it highlights the work of a marginalised thinker (Beauvoir), and some marginal 
aspects of a major philosopher’s (Hegel’s) thought. Furthermore, it employs many – perhaps even an 
excess – of footnotes: a few, anecdotal; others, polemical; some supplementary; even ones that contain 
central suppositions, which, if ignored – as is usually the fate of things on the margins – will show the 
gaps in the “main” arguments. Many of these footnotes will be quite long and some may be 
inconveniently placed, which will not only disrupt the reading of the text but, in all likelihood, irritate 
the reader. Such irritation is sometimes a necessary means of shaking off the complacency that enables 
the discipline of philosophy to operate in a “mode of phantasmagorical hegemony” (Le Dœuff 1991: 
1).  
The structure of the study also defies more traditional ways of delimiting philosophical essays. Thus, it 
dispenses with chapters and offers three parts of varying lengths. For the sake of readability, the 
narrative will be punctuated by the ocassional heading and, upon the insistence of my supervisor, I 
conform to the convention of paragraphing and numbering the pages. Part 1 takes the place of an 
introduction. The bulk of it concerns what Derrida (1995: 217) would call the “apparatus of limitation” 
employed in a recent compilation dedicated to the history of phenomenology. Thus, it introduces the 
theme of limits, of boundaries, while it interrupts the border-control of the phenomenological 
movement. For the most part, Part 2 is a three-way conversation between Hegel, Alexandre Kojève 
 
  
 
 
2
a) Inside / Outside   
 
 
To belong, Zygmunt Bauman submits in Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi 
(2004), is the prerogative of someone for whom the notion of “having an identity” holds no 
peculiar meaning. At the start of his text, Bauman (2004: 12) reflects on one of the 
“peculiarities of [his] biography”, namely, his nationality. For the first forty-three years of his 
life he had been a Polish national; then, as a result of the purge of Polish Jews in March 1968, 
he became “a refugee, from a foreign country, an alien” (9); more recently, he had become a 
naturalised British citizen. Once he had been stripped of his Polish nationality and forced to 
flee his homeland, it became clear to him that he had believed himself to belong somewhere, 
that he had assumed his Polishness “matter-of-factly and without any soul-searching or 
calculating” (12). The experience of being uprooted, dispossessed and estranged from an 
existence – at least as far as his nationality was concerned – that he had taken for granted, 
meant that he would no longer fit in, he “was – sometimes slightly, at other times blatantly – 
‘out of place’” (12).  
 
Bauman (11-12) argues that “as long as ‘belonging’ remains their fate”, people take their 
identities for granted, they are self-certain. If prompted, they might describe themselves as 
regular, average, ordinary human beings. Above all, people who belong – who fit in – are 
normal. Contrastingly, the question of his or her identity, more precisely, the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Jean Hyppolite, which may result in a more than usually dense, even unruly, presentation, as their 
voices become entangled with one another. Part 3 is the most transgressive section of the study: it 
focuses on the work of someone, Simone de Beauvoir, whose philosophical credentials have always 
been in doubt; it deals with a subject matter – woman –  that philosophers have traditionally either 
ignored or disdained; it includes some of the “non-philosophical” genres in which Beauvoir writes; it 
underscores certain philosophical insights by way of actual events in her life; it reinforces Beauvoir’s 
habit of including many, often disparate, influences into the narrative, it mixes the often confounding 
vernacular of phenomenology with a more down-to-earth language that reflects the everyday 
experiences of many women; etc. Following Derrida, I (Swartz and Cilliers 2003:14) have previously 
argued against “complicating things for the pleasure of complicating”. I realise that rendering this 
work in the manner that I have will complicate things. However, in my opinion, it is philosophically 
consistent to present a work on transgression and on the importance of being different, differently.                                 
  
 
 
3
he or she differs from the norm, is a constant, sometimes upsetting and often irksome, 
preoccupation of one who does not belong. One who is always in some way or another out of 
place, who “sticks out” or whose presence (or absence) needs to be remarked upon – qualified 
– cannot but be preoccupied by his or her identity, for there “is always something to explain, 
to apologise for, to hide or on the contrary to boldly display, to negotiate, to bid for and to 
bargain for; there are differences to be smoothed or glossed over, or to be on the contrary 
made more salient and legible” (13). 
 
Taking her cue from Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1997), Rosi Braidotti (1994: 
147) asserts: “In the European history of philosophy … “difference” has been predicated on 
relations of domination and exclusion, to be “different-from” came to mean to be “less than”, 
to be worth less than.” Thus, it comes as no surprise that many of the newcomers to the 
community of continental philosophy, myself included, who have previously been excluded 
from a great number of interesting places and things based on peculiarities like our sex, skin 
colour, nationality, class, mother tongue, etc., seem fixated on our differences and anxious 
about our place – in the broadest sense of the word – in philosophy.  
 
On the surface, those within the philosophical community who take it upon themselves to 
organise and safeguard the canonF2F – the authorities “entitled to set apart the ‘inside’ from the 
‘outside’, those who belong from those who don’t” (Bauman: 10) – no longer prevent me 
from studying and producing philosophical works. Yet, notwithstanding doubts regarding the 
supposed homogeny of this community, even the most casual observer must concede that its 
foremost members – the small fraternity that constitutes the canon – are resolutely “Western”, 
“white” and “male”. Furthermore, I am not alone in finding the continued under-
representation at colloquiums, curriculum planning meetings, in classrooms, textbooks, 
philosophical dictionaries and journals of formerly excluded individuals disquieting.  
 
Reflecting on the engagement with the canon of the previously excluded – “non-Western”, 
“non-white” and/or “non-male” scholars – Andrea Nye (2004: xi) wonders if “[putting] on the 
language and manner of philosophy as tradition has defined it, is to lose oneself in the name 
                                                 
2 By the canon I mean those philosophers whose ideas and works form the corpus of philosophy and 
thus become the markers from which scholars take their philosophical bearings and by which the 
curricula of philosophy departments are delineated.  
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of an uncomfortable borrowed identity.”F3F I believe what Nye means by “tradition” refers 
precisely to those members of the philosophical community in charge of fixing the limits of 
philosophy, who have imposed on the canon the kind of “sanctimonious sacredness” 
(Braidotti: 29) that resists re-interpretation, reconstitution and redress. The discipline of 
philosophy is in itself not immutable. As Braidotti (24) notes, “the history of ideas is always a 
nomadic story; ideas are as mortal as human beings and as subjected as we are to the crazy 
twists and turns of history.” However, those who suffer “the mania of always wanting to be 
able to state the ‘great difference’ between philosophy and everything else” (Le Dœuff 
1991:171) encourage the notion of the canon’s immutability, with the implication that 
philosophy remains, as it has been since Plato, the prerogative of the privileged few.F4 
 
In response to my discomfort at this reinforcement of the status quo, the proprietors of the 
canon may exhort me to overcome my ressentiment and make proper use of the opportunities 
that have so generously been bestowed on the formerly excluded. For the very reason that my 
participation in the discipline of philosophy is now tolerated, that concessions have been 
                                                 
3 It could be argued that it is not only the previously excluded who experience a loss or compromise 
of whatever amounts to their personal sense of identity when they enter the world of philosophy. All 
non-canonical members of the philosophical community are expected to dress in, change into, 
simulate or acquire the language and manner of “Plato”, “Descartes”, “Kant” or “Hegel” or any of the 
other dead (for they are all, from Socrates to Derrida, long gone, yet kept alive by the custodians who 
will have us read and re-read no other, and only in ways sanctioned by the self-same custodians), 
white, Western males whose masterworks – those texts from which certain conventions, reading 
protocols and points of reference are gauged – are the points of departure from which are drawn the 
lines that enclose the canon. Accommodation in the philosophical community requires members to 
avoid or suppress that which is individual, specific and peculiar to them in order to become Platonic, 
Cartesian, Kantian, Hegelian, etc. Hence, Simone de Beauvoir (1984: 154) observes: “But is there not 
an absolute in the fact of being Descartes or Kant even if, in a certain manner, they are outstripped? 
They are outstripped, but the outstripper only moves on from what they have already contributed. 
There is a reference to them that is absolute.”       
4 Another implication of the supposed immutability of the canon is that its representatives, if they were 
alive, could never reinvent themselves – they could never be anything other than the official portraits 
proffered by the self-appointed stewards of philosophy. Later in this discussion I show how one of the 
quintessential canonical figures – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – suffers this very fate at the hands 
of one such steward, Dermot Moran.       
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made and the rules relaxed, the proprietors may very well have the expectation that I ought 
not to dwell on “the bunch of problems called ‘my identity’” (Bauman: 12), especially the 
problem of my difference from the norm, my otherness. They declare: “We will not abide by 
this idle chatter about otherness when we have so generously taken you into our home – we 
have shown our willingness to tolerate your otherness, but it would be most ungenerous and 
intolerant of you to always be playing this ‘otherness card’.”F5 
 
Yet, it remains disturbing that, interspersed among, or, more problematically, at the root of 
many of the noble ideas in canon’s masterworks, are Eurocentric, sexist, racist and classist 
assumptions too manifold to mention. The proprietors will undoubtedly agree that cultural 
imperialism, racism and sexism in philosophical texts are problematic; however, they are 
likely to ignore such attitudes as simply mistaken and separable from the “essential truth” of a 
philosophy.F6F  
                                                 
5 I am reminded of what Zygmunt Bauman writes about tolerance in his earlier text, Intimations of 
Postmodernity (1992). Bauman (1992: xxi) avers: “Tolerance requires the acceptance of the 
subjectivity (i.e. knowledge-producing capacity and motivated nature of action) of the other who is to 
be ‘tolerated’; but such acceptance is only a necessary, not the sufficient condition of tolerance. By 
itself, it does nothing to save the ‘tolerated’ from humiliation. What if it takes the following form: 
‘you are wrong, and I am right; I agree that not everybody can be like me, not for the time being at any 
rate, not at once; the fact that I bear with your otherness does not exonerate your error, it only proves 
my generosity’? Such tolerance would be no more than just another of the many superiority postures; 
at the best it would come dangerously close to snubbing; given propitious circumstances, it may also 
prove an overture to a crusade.”  
6 Take, for example, the following assessment of Aristotle in Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: a 
study in moral theory (2000). MacIntyre (2000: 159-160) notes: “What is likely to affront us – and 
rightly – is Aristotle’s writing off of non-Greeks, barbarians and slaves, as not merely not possessing 
political relationships, but as incapable of them. With this we may couple his view that only the 
affluent and those of high status can achieve certain key virtues, … craftsmen and tradesmen 
constitute an inferior class, even if they are not slaves. … This blindness of Aristotle’s was not of 
course private to Aristotle; it was part of the general … blindness of his culture. … Yet it remains true 
that these limitations in Aristotle’s account of the virtues do not necessarily injure his general scheme 
for understanding the place of the virtues in human life, let alone deform his multitude of more 
particular insights.” Now, in his Politics (2000), Aristotle depicts the citizen as the only fully realised 
human being; his humanity is constituted by his political engagement in the polis and only through 
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Indeed, as far as proprietors are concerned, the personal is not philosophical.F7F For example, 
the sexist attitudes in the work of, say, Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche may be formally 
condemned by the philosophical community, yet, in the general failure to connect this sexism 
to the central tenets of their work, the selfsame community not only condones bad scholarship 
but conspires with the proprietors of the canon to trivialise the disquiet felt by the targets of 
sexism.F8F  
                                                                                                                                                        
these public activities can he attain eudaimonia. Given that women, slaves, tradespeople, 
agriculturalists, minors and non-Greeks [ironic, since Aristotle himself was Macedonian rather than 
Greek] are excluded from the polis – based on his assumption of their inferior or lack of reasoning 
abilities and the presumed absence of certain key virtues (see Aristotle 2000: 25-53) – Aristotle’s 
philosophical analysis of politics, which is to him the culmination of ethics, narrows the definition of 
“citizen” to include only aristocratic, adult males: by implication no others are fully human. MacIntyre 
challenges Aristotle’s account of the virtues, but, crucially, not what he means by human life. In 
addition, with a relativistic flourish Aristotle’s particular imperialism is removed from his thought and 
assimilated into that which is outside [his] philosophy.           
7 Another example of the personal being seemingly disconnected from the philosophical is found in 
the fact that, notwithstanding Martin Heidegger’s Nazism, French scholars of the 1940s embraced 
Being and Time (1978) during and after the Occupation and appropriated it for their own brand of 
phenomenology. It is inconceivable to review the history of French phenomenology, from the early 
years of Levinas, Kojève, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to Derrida’s deconstruction, without reference to 
Heidegger; indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Being and Time remains one of the most 
celebrated texts in continental philosophy. I find it impossible to come to terms with the knowledge 
that I am carrying on a tradition of honouring the work of someone who was a member of the Nazi 
party for more than ten years.  
8 In these opening paragraphs, most examples of philosophy’s hegemony relate to sexist attitudes 
towards women. Let it not be supposed that I believe other instances of hegemony are less 
problematic; that women’s historical exclusion from and subjugation by the philosophical community 
ranks as the “worst” form of imperialism. With Simone de Beauvoir as my point of reference, it is 
inevitable that the discussion will underscore one peculiarity, namely sex, possibly at the cost of 
others. Given my own biography, it could be supposed that I have some kind of responsibility to write 
about particularly race and class differences. Perhaps I could have written a different study, if I had 
read, say, Frantz Fanon or Karl Marx before Beauvoir. I had not. To write about the meaning of 
otherness in the work of Beauvoir is to investigate a highly specific kind of othering based on sex 
difference.  
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The exclusion of the personal from the discipline of philosophy accounts for the scrupulous 
avoidance of personal pronouns; it also justifies the exclusion of types of discourse, such as 
what is commonly referred to as feminist theory, that reveal a proclivity for autobiographical 
narratives and personal anecdotes. To be sure, the canon is crowded with philosophers who 
have concerned themselves with the meaning of human being, but they have done so 
presuming to speak for and about all men (and occasionally also women) through the standard 
designation of Man. Certainly, we have had in philosophical thought, since at least the 
Heideggerian positing of a Dasein with Jemeinigkeit,F9F a notion of an individual subject who is 
particular and factical; yet, despite the attention to history, the concrete, minutiae, specificity, 
etc., where, or more precisely, who is this personal I to be found in Being and Time, in Being 
and Nothingness: a phenomenological study on ontology (1956)F10F or Phenomenology of 
Perception (2002)? This I is not “Heidegger”, “Sartre” or “Merleau-Ponty”; he is not a flesh-
and-blood subject with a peculiar history, particular habits, quirks, superstitions, dreams, etc. 
Instead, it is a cipher with hypothetical facticity in equally hypothetical situations.  
   
An effect of the marginalisation of the personal is that even those strands of philosophy 
fixated on the self – and I would venture that early French phenomenology, which will be the 
specific focus of this study, serves as a microcosm for a general self-absorption, more recently 
manifested by the relentless self-parody and self-reference in so-called postmodernist theory, 
that has permeated the canon of philosophy since Descartes posited his self-certain cogito – 
tend to invoke the self or the I as an assertion of sameness. 
 
Suffice it to say for now that early French phenomenology is premised on the assumption of 
an I that, if not self-positing (as is the case in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness), is driven by 
the desire to rid itself of self-externality. Following Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), I will show in Part 2 how this I supposedly attains freedom 
when it negates its being-other, when it absorbs or assimilates every other thing, including all 
other I’s. However, the conceit of an I who can will his own alienation, who can make himself 
a lack, who endows himself with the ability to humanise, or rather, as it is supposed, 
individualise the world, does not find its incarnation in a flesh and bone, historical, world-
conquering hero; instead, this I describes only the movement that makes everything and 
                                                 
9 See Heidegger (1978: 68).  
10 Henceforth abbreviated to Being and Nothingness.  
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everyone the same. Thus, rather than slating French phenomenology and its descendents for 
“monotonously intoning ‘me’, ‘me’, ‘me’” (Russon 2004: 62), it would be more exact to 
describe its self-absorption as the monotonous intonation of sameness. 
  
One reaction to this movement towards sameness has been a championing of Otherness that 
goes back at least as far as Levinas’ Time and the Other (1987)F11F and endures in the writings 
of “postphilosophers”, i.e. those who proclaim the end of philosophy, or hold the conviction 
that philosophy inhabits the realm of the postmetaphysical and the posthuman. Levinas’ 
valorisation of  the sex-neutral “feminine” as the counter to the absolute subject of idealism 
would reverberate in the late twentieth century appeal to the “becoming-woman” of 
philosophy, to multiplicity and the triumph of (non-specific) difference over identity.  
 
Those members of the philosophical community whose subjectivities have, at least 
historically speaking, never been in doubt, those who have been able to assume their place in 
the community matter-of-factly and without any soul-searching or calculating, are the very 
authorities who declare that all “grand narratives of legitimation, both epistemic and political” 
(Fraser and Nicholson in Nicholson 1990: 22) are passé. With staggering insouciance they 
declare that any interest in “identity politics” must be either wilfully anachronistic (although, 
of course, it is equally unfashionable to presume human will) or a sad nostalgia for “the 
Subject” that has been displaced, decentred, disowned, dead for at least forty years.F12F To ask, 
                                                 
11 In Part 3, I show Simone de Beauvoir’s (1997: 16) interpretation of “the feminine” in Time and the 
Other as an expression of male privilege or, more precisely, a male philosopher’s position of privilege. 
The gist of Beauvoir’s argument is that Levinas’ postulation of the absolute alterity of “the feminine” 
has both nothing to do with flesh and blood women and everything to do with the concrete subjugation 
of women.     
12 Regarding the death of the subject, Judith Butler (in Butler and Scott 1992: 14) rightly asks, which 
subject’s death has been announced? To this crucial question, I would add the following concerns: Are 
we to infer that there has only ever been one subject in philosophy, that this philosophical subject has 
always been, or rather, used to be – prior to its demise – comfortably housed at the centre of its own 
existence, self-certain and complacent? Can one, with absolute rigour, pinpoint the moment of this 
philosophical subject’s death – if it is in fact dead, given its constant resuscitation by those who 
remind us of its passing? To what extent does the philosophical subject resemble other subjects, 
particularly flesh-and-blood ones, each with his or her own peculiarities? Moreover, on whose 
authority is this death confirmed? In Patterns of Dissonance, Rosi Braidotti (1991: 122) submits: “In 
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“Who am I?” to concern oneself with the matter of not belonging, misses the point of our 
always already fractured, ruptured, displaced, multiple, differing, contingent and 
indeterminate selves. Indeed, Bauman (2004: 83) contends that the “provisional nature of all 
and any identity” and the notion “that nothing in the human condition is given once and for 
all” have been features of modernity from the outset. Bauman’s argument shows that perhaps 
the biggest irony of so-called postmodernist theory is the conceit that the postulation of 
fragmentation, of rupture and displacement is, both intellectually and ethically, an advance 
over such notions as “progress” and “linearity”!  
 
At any rate, since Being and Time, it has been rather fashionable to feel unruhig and 
unheimlich. Moreover, it is debatable whether anyone in this increasingly globalised world 
belongs anywhere; more likely the experience of not belonging is “nowadays quite common 
and on the way to becoming almost universal” (Bauman 2004: 12). Thus, if any and all 
“identity” is marked by rupture, contingence, multiplicity and indeterminacy and if disquiet 
and not-at-homeness is the default disposition of any and all posthumans, “what is the point 
… in going over and over an outdated question and talking about what happened the day 
before yesterday?” (Le Dœuff 1991: 5)F13 
                                                                                                                                                        
order to announce the death of the subject one must first have gained the right to speak as one; in order 
to demystify meta-discourse one must first gain access to a place of enunciation … the truth of the 
matter is, as I have argued elsewhere: one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully 
granted.” An almost verbatim argument appears in Braidotti’s Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and 
Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (1994). She welcomes the supposed death of the 
philosophical subject and the concomitant “crisis of philosophy” (Braidotti 1994: 29) in order to 
distance herself from the philosophical community, yet remain committed to the notion of subjectivity, 
specifically the enunciation of female subjectivity. 
13 In Hipparchia’s Choice: an essay concerning women, philosophy, etc. (1991), Michèle le Dœuff 
suggests that the question of women within the philosophical community elicits a certain kind of 
irritation among both male and female members. Le Dœuff (1991: 3-4) argues: “Many women feel 
resentful whenever any question related to the ‘position of women’ is raised in their presence, as 
though they suspected they were being dragged down again. Might not this reopening of a problem 
which no longer exists be an attempt to put them back in the psychological position of inferiority 
suffered by earlier generations of women? At the very least might there not be an unintended risk that 
they will be weighed down by a past which should not be theirs and loaded with the mental blocks of a 
now outdated situation? And decent men (the others hardly count) also feel attacked, thinking they are 
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Indeed, one may very well ask if the problem of exclusion is still relevant in these 
postmetaphysical times.    
 
As Bauman (77) cautions, the bunch of problems that relate to the experience of not 
belonging “can perhaps be wished away (and commonly is, by philosophers striving for 
logical elegance), but it cannot be thought away, and even less can it be done away with in 
human practice.” Those who have formerly been excluded from the philosophical community 
precisely because of the specificity of our otherness cannot through some force of counter-
reasoning undo those aspects of ourselves that stick out – our sex, colour of skin, scars of 
poverty and oppression. The call for multiplicity that overlooks the fundamental asymmetry 
in the relationships between the sexes, between races and nations, between classes, etc., 
signals the continued, albeit more subtle, discrimination of the formerly excluded. We can 
pretend that everyone belongs or that no-one belongs only if we deny this discrimination.  
 
Thus, for instance, Rosi Braidotti (1991: 121) finds that “only a man would idealise sexual 
neutrality, for he has by right – belonging as he does to the masculine gender – the 
prerogative of expressing his sexuality, the syntax of his desire; he has his own place of 
enunciation as the subject”. The “feminisation” of philosophy, the call for every and all 
members of the postphilosophical community to become-woman, is beset with “the worst 
prejudices of the patriarchal system and perpetuates some of its most ancient and theoretical 
habits” (Braidotti: 108), particularly, the inability “to resist the temptation, transformed into 
habit by thousands of years of patriarchy, of speaking women’s place” (142), “instead of 
accepting women’s right to speak in their own name” (122).             
 
Is it, therefore, any wonder to be perturbed by the double standard of otherness in these 
postphilosophical times? We are all urged to embrace our “irreducible alterity”, which means 
that we must adopt a notion of otherness beyond our specific differences; at the same time 
these specificities are the very things by which the formerly excluded are defined in the 
philosophical community – we are women philosophers or black philosophers or previously 
                                                                                                                                                        
reproached with the sins of their grandfathers.” Like Le Dœuff, I do not believe that the so-called 
woman question, especially as it pertains to philosophy, is a “question-which-has-already-obviously-
been-settled” (3).        
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disadvantaged scholars, etc. We ourselves must not express our specific differences but they 
are routinely used to keep us in our place: the margins of philosophy.F14F  
 
Now, I have been referring to the proprietors of the canon who take it upon themselves to 
determine philosophy’s borders, to set apart those who belong from those who do not, but 
who and where are they?  
 
Generally, one would expect to find them among the editors of philosophical journals, the 
authors of philosophical curricula, dictionaries, encyclopaedias, study guides, etc. In this 
study, I focus on commentators who suffer the delusion that they understand “better than the 
author what the meaning of the latter’s work is” (Le Dœuff: 171), those who resort to name-
calling, ad hominem arguments and indifference – that “formidable form of resistance” (42) – 
to exclude those who fail, in their estimation, to conform to the language and manner of 
philosophy as tradition has defined it, those who perpetuate philosophy’s hegemony by 
clinging to tired oppositions, by not re-reading canonical texts but merely rehashing 
conventional interpretations, even when these demand a reconsideration of contexts, concepts, 
methods, etc., and by ignoring or taking a facile approach to the history of philosophy.    
 
Next, I turn to one such commentator, Dermot Moran, whose Introduction to Phenomenology 
(2000)F15F rather fortuitously captures on various levels the twin problems of identity and 
                                                 
14 In these postphilosophical times, it has become de rigueur to position oneself “on the margins” of 
philosophy, as if the margins are somehow a “better” place from which to do whatever it is that 
postphilosophers do. In the same way that “otherness” is not something that one claims for oneself, but 
something that is conferred upon one, one cannot claim the margin for oneself; it is merely the place 
where those deemed not to “fit in” have been placed. As I have already suggested, those on the 
margins are usually treated with indifference by the proprietors of the canon. I am deeply mistrustful 
of anyone who professes to write from the margins if he or she has never been marginalised. By 
romanticising the margins, postphilosophers lose sight of the violence that begets such margins.        
15 Published by Routledge, Moran’s text is widely read by scholars of phenomenology and 
existentialism. It is bloated by the hyperbolical endorsements on its back-cover, e.g., “a clear, 
engaging, accurate introduction to phenomenology” and “the most accessible, the most scholarly, and 
philosophically the most interesting account of the phenomenological movement yet written.” Moran’s 
follow-up text, The Phenomenology Reader (2002), cites Inquiry’s estimation of Introduction to 
Phenomenology as “comprehensive”, “with attention to fine details” and, most especially, having the 
  
 
 
12
belonging. It introduces, firstly, the particular philosophical context from which this study 
emerges, namely, early French phenomenology, with its retelling of the spiritual journey that 
leads to self-certainty and its emphasis on the often violent relationship between the 
existential subject and others. It demonstrates, secondly, some of the mechanisms by which 
the limits of philosophy are fixed, by way of Moran’s presentation of the history of 
phenomenology solely as the history of Edmund Husserl’s influence.F16F It repeats, thirdly, the 
canonical estimations of two figures, Beauvoir and Hegel. In Beauvoir’s case, Moran 
contrives her exclusion through a rejection of the personal; in Hegel’s case, Moran assures his 
marginalisation by emphasising his canonical identity as philosopher of the Absolute. It 
renders, fourthly, the opportunity to think differently about the history of French 
phenomenology: to recognise other contributors; to reconsider key concepts such as freedom, 
transcendence, subjectivity and reciprocity and the dialectic of recognition; most crucially, to 
think differently about difference.   
 
 
 
b) Philosophy’s hegemony: a case study    
 
 
In his Preface, Dermot Moran (2000: xiv) says of phenomenology that “in its historical form 
it is primarily a set of people, not just Husserl and his personal assistants … but more broadly 
his students… and many others … who developed phenomenological insights in contact and 
in parallel with the work of Husserl.” In effect, Moran is suggesting that “Husserl” – “the 
father of phenomenology” – is, historically speaking, a composite of multiple individuals, 
among others, Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, Eugene Fink, Hedwig 
                                                                                                                                                        
quality of being comprehensible from “cover to cover without any prior knowledge of phenomenology 
or the history of twentieth-century European philosophy.” 
16 Now, it must be conceded that Moran somewhat compensates for the conceit of providing scholars 
with an introduction to phenomenology based solely on the phenomenologies or engagement with 
phenomenological texts of “in [his] opinion, the key figures in European thought” (3) by admitting 
from the outset, and frequently thereafter, the shortcomings of his project. Given such humility, one 
would have hoped for a more modest title to his text. 
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Conrad-Martius and Max Scheler. Historically speaking, suggests Moran, the phenomenology 
of “Husserl” is not “his” story.  
 
Suspending for a moment my suspicions about what “Husserl” and the other “key figures in 
European thought” – Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Jacques Derrida – signify, let us consider the composition of contributors of Moran’s analysis. 
Moran (3) offers the following caveat: “It is important not to exaggerate, as some interpreters 
have done, the extent to which phenomenology coheres into an agreed method, or accepts one 
theoretical outlook, or one set of philosophical theses about consciousness, knowledge, and 
the world.” Since the place of a philosopher in the philosophical canon is undoubtedly linked 
to the particular pigeon-hole to which his or her work is assigned, and since, with the 
exception of Edmund Husserl, none of the contributors to Introduction to Phenomenology is 
specifically labelled within the canon as phenomenologists but, instead, fall under such 
headings as “scientific experimental psychology” (Brentano), “existentialism” (Sartre), 
“deconstruction” (Derrida) and “hermeneutics” (Gadamer), by which norms are they included 
in Moran’s study?  
 
The answer lies possibly in the great pains to which Moran goes in order to assert one 
commonality among his chosen contributors; to wit, their connection, however tenuous in 
certain instances, to Husserl. Thus, we encounter Husserl’s “immediate inspiration” 
(Brentano), his personal assistant (Heidegger), occasional attendees of his classes (Gadamer 
and Arendt), those who wrote studies on Husserl (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) and his 
translator into French (Levinas). If the pre-requisite for inclusion is to be, in one way or 
another, engaged with the work of Husserl, why does Moran (18) merely mention in passing, 
for example, Ricoeur, Deleuze, Kristeva, Horkheimer and Adorno? What about Karl 
Weierstrass, Carl Stumpf, Karl Jaspers, Alfred Schutz, Raymond Aron and so many others? 
Introduction to Phenomenology creates the impression that the place of phenomenology in the 
philosophical canon will only ever be occupied by “Husserl” and certain “key” exponents 
identified by scholars like Moran, which reasserts philosophy’s hegemony. Such hegemony is 
particularly noticeable in Moran’s treatment of, respectively, Hegel and Beauvoir.  
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b.1) Moran’s disregard for Hegel’s contribution to French 
phenomenology  
 
 
Moran (6) indicates that although the phenomenological movement is founded by “Husserl”, 
phenomenology had been in use in philosophy since at least the eighteenth century. Recall 
that, notwithstanding his acknowledged debt to Husserl in Being and Time, Heidegger (1962: 
50) locates the term phenomenology even further back to the Ancient Greeks.F17F Now, in his 
own introduction to phenomenology, Herbert Spiegelberg (1984: 12) goes so far to suggest 
that, with Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel “certainly succeeded in elevating phenomenology 
to the rank of full philosophical discipline which made a lasting impression.” Not so, 
according to Moran (7), who submits that Hegel’s work “had little influence” and was 
eclipsed by the more “immediate” influence of Franz Brentano.F18F It is clear that Moran must 
be referring to the lack of acknowledgement of Hegel’s phenomenology in Husserl’s work;F19F 
however, he must concede at various points in his text,F20F that French phenomenology is 
imbued with the spirit of HegelF21F; indeed that it is founded on “the unquestioning ease with 
which it takes for granted that Husserl’s phenomenology belongs together with Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit and even originated from it” (Spiegelberg: 440-441). While half of 
Moran’s text focuses on key contributors to French phenomenology – including one who 
famously said: “We will never be finished with the reading or rereading of Hegel, and, in a 
                                                 
17 See also Moran (2000: 228).    
18 Moran’s statement is unintentionally ironic, given that Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit maintains 
a position of immediacy as the furthest removed from the actual! 
19 See Spiegelberg (1984: 13).  
20 See, for example, Moran (2000: 7, 409-410, 444-445, 468).  
21 Indeed, I would venture a more ambitious claim, the substantiation of which falls outside the scope 
of this essay, that the portrayal by Kojève of Hegel as a Heideggerian Marxist is possible only because 
Being and Time appropriates some of the themes already anticipated by Hegel, including, the return to 
Aristotle, the nature of the subject as being-in-the-world-with-others, the subject as always going 
“beyond itself” and death anxiety.   
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certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself in this point” (Derrida 1972: 
77) – Hegel merits only the most cursory reference.F22 
 
Moran’s disregard echoes the canonical estimation of Hegel. To be sure, in most respects, 
Hegel is the quintessential canonical figure – he is one of a small band of philosophers whose 
very name extends to his enduring influence, although, as the Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy (1994) points out, Hegelianism has become synonymous only with absolute 
idealism. “There will apparently, be no end to Hegel” (Barnett 1998: 2); however, only to the 
extent that Hegel remains what the canon has made of him; to wit, a philosopher traditionally 
situated within German idealism, and, as such, an heir to a Cartesian-Kantian transcendental 
philosophy governed by solipsism and individualism;F23F moreover, an apologist for Prussian 
militarism and “one of the fathers of modern totalitarianism” (Thody 1992: 166, footnote 52). 
Hegel’s entire philosophical output has been routinely reduced to his dialectic, which, in turn, 
has been simplified to a three-step formula involving a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. 
 
Ironically, the emergence of French phenomenology in the late 1930s and early 1940s reveals 
an appropriation of Hegel that deviates in some ways from the “canonical Hegel”. Initiated by 
Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel and Jean Hyppolite’s translation of and extensive 
                                                 
22 In Moran’s following text, The Phenomenology Reader (2002), the tendency to simultaneously 
acknowledge and dismiss Hegel’s contribution to phenomenology is repeated. Here, Moran and 
Mooney (2002: 10) note, without further discussion: “Although it has become usual to trace the 
origins of phenomenology back to Hegel, in fact the Hegelian version of phenomenology only came to 
be recognised by Husserl’s followers after the important lectures of Alexandre Kojève on Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit given in Paris in the 1930s.”    
23 I acknowledge that this essay reiterates an equally reductionist approach to, particularly Kant, Marx 
and Descartes, whose place in the canon is reduced to “I think therefore I am”. I claim no kind of 
moral high-ground within the hegemony of philosophy. This point needs to be stressed. Following 
Kristana Arp’s (2001: 119) description of “a type of faulty moral arithmetic”, I submit that the 
philosophical community’s loss of moral standing as well as intellectual integrity, through its 
discrimination and violence towards others (non-male, non-white, non-academic, non-affluent, etc.), 
do not accrue to the moral standing and intellectual integrity of such others. Baldly stated, my status as 
a “female”, “person of colour” from a “working-class” background and a “previously disadvantaged” 
school does not automatically make my participation in the discipline of philosophy less 
discriminatory or violent. Within a hegemony, everyone is compromised.       
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commentary on Phenomenology of Spirit, the “French Hegel” is “shorn of the Absolute” 
(Heckman in Hyppolite 1974: xxiii) and portrayed in opposition to Kantian transcendentalism 
and Cartesian solipsism. This other “Hegel” is re-imagined as a Marxist anthropologist with 
Husserlian and, more prominently, Heideggerian ties.  
 
The architects of the “French Hegel” appropriate Phenomenology of Spirit in ways that fixate 
on the supposedly inexorable violence of the self-other relationships. In Part 2, I show that 
this pre-occupation with conflict and domination discloses a residual Cartesianism: it is 
betrayed by Kojève’s over-estimation of the master-slave dialectical movement, implied by 
Hyppolite’s pre-occupation with the unhappy consciousness and, in addition, explicitly 
acknowledged by Jean-Paul Sartre in his critique of Hegel. At its core, therefore, the “French 
Hegel” does not offer a radical departure from the “canonical Hegel” – Hegel remains the 
philosopher of the Subject.                             
 
Irrespective of his canonical reputation and what early French phenomenology makes of him, 
my own reading of the initial dialectical movements of consciousness’ journey to Absolute 
Spirit yields the discovery that, for Hegel, otherness matters.F24F Contrary to the usual 
formulation of difference as the opposite of identity, which, I will show, is also assumed in 
the early French interpretation of the dialectic of recognition, Hegel posits difference as the 
precondition for identity. In this regard, his interest lies with the safeguarding rather than 
assimilation of difference. Moreover, for Hegel, the meeting of the subject and the other can, 
indeed, if one could extrapolate an ethics from Hegel’s texts, ought to be, a joyous occasion. 
 
I have identified three versions of “Hegel” – “Moran’s Hegel”, which is also the “canonical 
Hegel”, the “French Hegel” and another Hegel who highlights the importance of otherness, 
which I support. In Part 3, I explore a fourth incarnation of Hegel – “Simone de Beauvoir’s 
                                                 
24 Another kind of violence of which I am guilty pertains to my limited reading of Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Aside from some references to Hegel’s postulation of the family as the foreshadowing of the 
Absolute, I focus only on the first few dialectical movements of consciousness, up to the moment 
where Hegel indicates a glimpse of Spirit. Not all of the violence can be attributed to the scope of this 
study: the glimpse serves my purpose of extracting Hegel from his canonical reputation and French 
incarnation, but, as Beauvoir shows, it excludes some crucial insights regarding his concept of the 
universal individual.      
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Hegel” – for whom self-other relationships are not necessarily violent but can also take the 
form of friendship, of generosity and reciprocity, of solicitude in the fullest sense of the word. 
Part 3 demonstrates how Beauvoir’s Hegel avoids reductionism and endeavours to uphold the 
importance of being other; however, he ignores what is individual, personal and idiosyncratic 
about the concrete. In her analysis of the meaning of otherness, Beauvoir shows that, for all 
his concern with otherness, Hegel’s dialectic does not take into account a more peculiar other: 
woman.    
 
Now, in Part 2 it will become apparent that Hegel suggests three possible outcomes in the 
confrontation between two consciousnesses engaged in the dialectic of recognition; namely, 
death, the enslavement of one party or, ideally, reciprocity and mutuality. The “French Hegel” 
centres on the possibility of enslavement; concomitantly, the term reciprocity is inflected with 
violence: regarding the dialectic of recognition, reciprocity is synonymous with reactionary – 
the meeting between subjects is described as the action of the One followed by the counter-
action of an Other. I explain that, in Phenomenology of Spirit, this meeting is a double 
movement; thus, reciprocity means a mutual relinquishing of the original, delusional, 
solipsistic stance.  
 
However, in Part 3 I show how, for Beauvoir, Hegel’s call for reciprocity is based on the 
prior assumption of equality. Her study highlights the fact that, whatever the outcome, the 
precondition for participation in the struggle for self-recognition is that consciousnesses enter 
the dialectic as independent equals. Beauvoir contends that women do not meet this 
requirement; thus, their status as the “absolute other” comes without having participated in the 
dialectic. If the subjects too readily recognise themselves in the other and the other in them, if 
Hegel seems overly optimistic about the possibility of friendship between subjects, it is 
because they are not specifically different and also because of the male privilege at the heart 
of the dialectic of recognition.      
 
It is precisely the unconcern for flesh and blood difference that Beauvoir ties to the concept of 
oppression. As with the notion of freedom that will emerge from her analysis, which counters 
the desire to establish the ascendancy of the individual over the collective – it is others that 
liberate or oppress an individual – Beauvoir’s definition of oppression hinges on the 
assumption of intersubjectivity. However, her version of intersubjectivity deviates from both 
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the specificity-denying universal individual of Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as the French 
Hegel’s depiction of the social as the hell of other people, as the battle-ground for competing 
self-interest. For Beauvoir, the relationship between existents is defined by a permanent state 
of tension, and it is the differences between subjects that sustain this tension.  
 
In the final part of my study, I show Beauvoir’s elaboration of this necessary tension in her 
description of the erotic encounter between a man and woman. Here, Beauvoir re-imagines 
the notion of limit. Furthermore, in the erotic encounter the specificity of a self and an other is 
literally laid bare, which invites us to reconsider what is meant by reciprocity. Beauvoir 
offsets the sexist “Hegel” of Philosophy of Right (1967) and Philosophy of Nature (1970) 
with the other “Hegel”, who calls for reciprocity and generosity in the meeting between 
existents and perceives of mastery as destructive and self-subverting. She imagines a carnal 
situation between the couple that could embody the friendship between self and other 
suggested in the early parts of Phenomenology of Spirit, but without the compromise of 
specificity.  
 
To what extent does Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who was born on August 27, 1770, in 
Stuttgart, and died at the age of 61, in Berlin, resemble any or all of these incarnations of 
“Hegel”? To what extent is the writer of Phenomenology of Spirit, in addition to being “Hegel 
from Stuttgart”, also “Aristotle”, “Anselm”, “Goethe”, “Kant”, “Spinoza”, “Frege”, 
“Schelling”, German society on the brink of annihilation by Napoleon’s army, the “Hegel” of 
Philosophy of Nature and the “Hegel” of Philosophy of Right, etc.? What purpose is served by 
the partial identity endorsed by the canon? On whose authority does “Hegel: Idealist” become 
the official portrait of Hegel? Certainly, Moran presumes such authority. In the process he 
presents the history of French phenomenology, not as the emergence of a Hegel-Husserl-
Heidegger triad, alongside a varying commitment to Marxist theory, but as an elaboration of 
the influence of “Husserl”. 
 
 
  
b.2 Moran’s dismissal of Beauvoir 
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Consider the following passage at the start of Moran’s chapter on Hannah Arendt, who is, 
arguably, the boldest inclusion in the text, given her relative obscurity within the canonF25F in 
general and her indifference to Husserlian phenomenology in particular:F26F   
[The] best-known woman associated with phenomenology is undoubtedly Simone de 
Beauvoir (1908-1986), who studied philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and 
developed her philosophical outlook in close dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre. Though de 
Beauvoir does have interesting things to say about the relation of self and other, she is 
now primarily known, not as a phenomenologist, but on account of her ground-breaking 
book, The Second Sex, which is a social and economic history of women, and a classic of 
feminist studies.     
(Moran 2000: 287)         
According to Moran, it is certain that Beauvoir is the “best-known woman associated with 
phenomenology”. She is not (necessarily) best-known for being a phenomenologist, but she 
is, compared to other women “associated with” phenomenology, the most famous or most 
instantly recognisable. Now, inasmuch as Simone de Beauvoir never referred to herself as a 
phenomenologist and only reluctantly as an existentialist,F27F inasmuch as she never wrote any 
studies on Husserl,F28F inasmuch as she never once refers to Husserl by name in her most 
                                                 
25 In “How Feminism is Re-writing the Philosophical Canon,” Charlotte Witt, (at  
www.uh.edu/~cfreelan/SWIP/Witt.htm accessed 6 October 1999), explores the problem of women’s 
exclusion from the philosophical canon. The traditional assumption is that there are no women 
philosophers or, if there are any, they are unimportant. Witt points out, for instance, that The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1967) contains articles on over 900 philosophers but none on even the 
most easily recognisable woman philosophers like Hannah Arendt, Simone de Beauvoir and Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Incidentally, in the few lines devoted to Arendt in the Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy (1996), she is described as a “political philosopher”, which is ironic, given her own 
rejection of the term political philosophy inasmuch as it implies “the valorisation of ‘philosophy’ over 
the political realm” (Moran 2000: 290). Not a single one of Arendt’s ideas, not even her notion of “the 
banality of evil”, is mentioned in the entry – indeed, it seems her name is used for little else than a 
pointer to Jaspers and Heidegger.       
26 See, for example, Moran (2000: 289, 301).    
27 For evidence of such reluctance, see Beauvoir (1963: 547) and Beauvoir (1968: 44-46). 
28 In The Phenomenology Reader, Moran, in collaboration with Timothy Mooney, expands his list of 
“key figures in European thought” to include Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Ricoeur and – 
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famous text, The Second Sex, it would be quite logical for Moran, who seems to demand a 
Husserlian connection when assessing a contribution to phenomenology, not to rate Beauvoir 
as a phenomenologist.F29F  
 
What does Moran mean by “associated with phenomenology”, or, more specifically, what is 
the nature of such an “association”? Is it the “close dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre”, one of the 
chosen representatives in Introduction to Phenomenology? It will not be the first time that 
Beauvoir’s work in philosophy is conflated with the insights of Sartre. Indeed, the canonical 
                                                                                                                                                        
yes – Simone de Beauvoir. They do not seem entirely convinced that Beauvoir should be included in 
their compilation. Thus, Moran and Mooney (2002: 464) offer: “In her writings de Beauvoir rarely 
discusses phenomenology or invokes its terminology or techniques. Nevertheless, her existential 
descriptions do show some phenomenological tendencies. Her initial interest in Husserl was awoken 
by Raymond Aron, and she began reading Heidegger in 1939 and Hegel in the 1940s. She even 
translated part of Husserl’s lectures on time consciousness for Sartre. She was an early critic of 
Levinas, and reviewed Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.” As with his previous text, 
Moran implies throughout The Phenomenology Reader that there is only one way to “do” 
phenomenology: via “Husserl”. Even if they trivialise every single aspect of her engagement with 
French phenomenology, one would expect Moran and Mooney (given Moran’s labelling of The 
Second Sex as “a classic of feminist studies”) to acknowledge the significance of Beauvoir’s critique 
of androcentrism in philosophy. They do not; thus, one wonders why they go to the trouble of 
including two long extracts from The Second Sex. In passing, see Heinämaa (in Card 2003: 66-86) for 
a discussion of Beauvoir’s debt to Husserl’s phenomenology. See also Bergoffen (1997, e.g. 75-110) 
who insists on a Husserlian influence, particularly in The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) and The Second 
Sex, but, in my opinion overlooks and/or misinterprets Hegel’s influence on Beauvoir’s thought.          
29 Given that both Gadamer and Arendt were, phenomenologically speaking, much closer to the work 
of Heidegger, one could consider Beauvoir’s phenomenological credentials on the basis of a 
Heideggerian influence in her work. However, there is scant evidence of such an influence, though 
Gothlin (in Card 2003: 45-65) conjectures Beauvoir’s connection to Heidegger. Gothlin supposes that 
Beauvoir’s reluctance to admit her interest in Heidegger’s work stems from his Nazism as well as his 
criticism (in Letter on Humanism) of Sartre’s interpretation of Being and Time. My own research 
shows that Beauvoir’s explicit references to Heidegger in both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The 
Second Sex are few and far between and, in the case of the latter text, she tends to group together 
Heidegger and Sartre (e.g. Beauvoir 1997: 39, 66).     
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assessment of Beauvoir is, at best, as a “derivative thinker, a kind of footnote to Sartre” 
(Kruks in Fallaize 1998: 46) but, more commonly, as “the girlfriend of Jean-Paul Sartre”.F30F  
 
In recent years, Beauvoir scholars like Eva Lundgren (1996), Debra Bergoffen (1997), 
Kristana Arp (2001) and a few others have gone to great lengths to accurately situate 
Beauvoir within the philosophical canon, to show that Beauvoir was “a philosopher in her 
own right – on her own” (Bergoffen: 2).F31F Part of this process of challenging the canon’s 
                                                 
30 Moran and Mooney (2002: 463) claim that Beauvoir and Sartre were married (unsurprisingly, this 
fiction is not mentioned in the section on Sartre)! Margaret Simons (1990: 487-504) provides an 
inventory of commentators who offer the interpretation of Beauvoir as merely Sartre’s 
‘girlfriend/disciple’, including Walter Kaufmann, whose Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre 
(1956), is one of the most widely read introductions to existentialism. Feminist writers who have 
understood The Second Sex primarily within the framework of Sartre’s existentialism include those 
mentioned by Lundgren-Gothlin (in Fallaize 1998: 106-107, footnote 2) as well as Judith Okely 
(1986) and Mary Evans (1985). In the passage from Introduction to Phenomenology under discussion, 
Moran erroneously asserts that Beauvoir studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the prestigious 
training college that prepared Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite for their agrégation in philosophy. 
As a student at the Sorbonne, Beauvoir was allowed to attend a few of the lectures at the training 
college, but it emerges from an interview with Simons (in Fraser and Bartky 1992: 35-36) that she was 
not allowed to enrol at this prestigious institution because she was a woman. For a detailed account, 
see Moi (1999: 308),  Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 26) and Bair (1990: 269). I do not believe Moran’s 
biographical misrepresentations are inconsequential – they avert our attention from Beauvoir’s 
achievements – e.g., she was the youngest person to achieve an agrégation in philosophy and even 
obtained second place in the stringent oral examination, ahead of, among others, Jean Hyppolite – by 
overstating the romantic relationship with Sartre and belittling the fact that, since her earliest days at 
the Cours Désir girls’ school, Beauvoir’s formal education “was in every way inferior” (Lundgren-
Gothlin: 26) to that of her more celebrated male colleagues.       
31 It should be clear from my discussion that I do not share the opinion that someone can be a 
philosopher in his/her own right or on his/her own; besides, we are told at the onset of our schooling in 
the discipline of philosophy that it is a conversation that has been taking place over millennia. Debra 
Bergoffen’s concern that a preoccupation with Beauvoir’s philosophical influences will only lead to 
her further marginalisation within the canon is somewhat misplaced. If we are to gauge Beauvoir’s 
contribution to the conversation, we must identify those with whom she is conversing as well as 
decipher the philosophical language in which this discourse takes place. Such a method is entirely in 
line with Beauvoir’s own belief that one’s identity is irrevocably tied to the bond with others.   
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indifference to Beauvoir has been the project of releasing Beauvoir from the perceived weight 
of Being and Nothingness.F32F Perversely, fixating on the ways in which Beauvoir is not 
influenced by Sartre only ensures that he gets his foot in the door; that Beauvoir continues to 
be assessed with reference to Sartre.  
 
On the other hand, the canon does not usually assess Sartre on the basis of his relationship 
with Beauvoir. The entry for Beauvoir in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is uncommonly 
thoughtful insofar as it points to Beauvoir’s development of “a non-solipsistic, social 
existentialism, in which an individual’s freedom is achieved in communication with others 
equally free.” However, this insight is immediately followed by: “De Beauvoir’s long 
association with Sartre is not usually regarded as an example of this equality.” Not only is 
Beauvoir disparaged for having an unequal relationship with Sartre, but, since nothing further 
is said about her philosophical pursuits, it seems that the perceived inequality of the 
relationship is enough to summarily dismiss her contribution. Predictably, Sartre’s entry 
makes no reference to his romantic connection to Beauvoir.      
 
Notwithstanding the “interesting things” that Beauvoir had to say, which formerly, that is, 
before The Second Sex, connected her to phenomenology, she now warrants no more than a 
throw-away appraisal within that genre because The Second Sex is “a social and economic 
history of women, and a classic of feminist studies”. Let us ignore the fact that Beauvoir 
considered herself a “feminist” only some twenty years after its publication.F33F Let us ignore 
the fact that The Second Sex is the culmination of what Beauvoir (1963: 433) calls the “moral 
                                                 
32 A difficult task given Beauvoir’s own insistence, as recounted by Simon (in Fraser and Bartky 1992: 
27), that the only important influence on The Second Sex was Being and Nothingness. See also Bair 
(1990: 269-271, 381, 514-518). 
33See Beauvoir’s interview with John Gerassi, originally published in Society (1976), at 
Hwww.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/1976/interview.htmHl (accessed 21 June 2006), 
for an overview of her turn to feminism. See also Tidd (2004: 5), Simons (in Simons 1995: 247) and 
Bair (1990: 543-547). From all these sources it becomes apparent that, for Beauvoir, feminism is 
primarily a form of activism; thus, although she sets out in The Second Sex to understand the origin 
and perpetuation of and justification for women’s oppression, what made her a feminist were her 
activities in aid of oppressed women.  
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period” of her career, that it is a concrete elaboration of the ethics proposed in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity (1948), the little-known text that immediately preceded The Second Sex.F34F  
 
At bottom, regardless of anything worthwhile that Beauvoir might have said before, in and 
after The Second Sex, she is relegated to the gutter of the phenomenological movement 
because a “social and economic history of women” – suspending for a moment any doubts 
about the accuracy of this description of The Second Sex – does not properly belong within 
this genre, its rightful place is “feminist studies”. We can include “hermeneutics”, 
“deconstruction”, “Levinasian ethics”, even Arendt’s “political philosophy”, but we have 
reached phenomenology’s limit with Beauvoir’s text. The Second Sex is a book by a woman – 
and Moran takes care to remind us that Beauvoir is the best-known woman associated with 
phenomenology, a case upon whose sex needs to be remarked,F35F lest we women forget that 
“we have no legitimate place there, that we got in by accident, by mistake, by smashing the 
door down, thanks to patronage or as supernumeraries, in brief that we are not really there” 
(Le Dœuff 1991: 6) – who sets off her most famous text with the question: “What is a 
woman?”F36F   
                                                 
34 In the Introduction to The Second Sex, Beauvoir (1997: 28) proposes that “existentialist ethics” is 
the point of departure for her analysis of the relationship between man and woman. Now, it is possible 
that Beauvoir could be referring to Sartre’s early attempt at developing an existentialist ethics, 
published as Existentialism and Humanism (1966). Possible, but unlikely, given that Sartre merely re-
states his support of Cartesian rationalism in this text, given that he is not really concerned with the 
question of what one ought to do, since his primary concern remains the intentionality of the 
solipsistic consciousness. In Part 3, I show the extent to which Beauvoir distances herself from such 
preoccupation with the internal life of the subject. See also Gatens (in Card 2003: 269) and Arp 
(2001). 
35 Whatever is written in, say, Logical Investigations or Being and Time or Phenomenology of 
Perception, Moran does not relate what he reads in them to the fact that these texts bear the signatures 
of men. Moreover, male scholars of Husserl, Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty are not usually accused of 
“denying or repressing their masculinity” – the matter of their sex is not considered to have any 
particular bearing on the way they interpret texts – since “men can be self-evidently male and self-
evidently intellectual at the same time” (Moi 1999: 205) within sexist ideology. 
36 In Part 3, I show that Beauvoir’s interest in the question of woman serves a more fundamental 
concern: What does it mean to be other? Thus, in this study relating to “being other” in the 
philosophical community, I focus on someone who, both in her personal capacity and within the 
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The topic of woman is “irritating” (Beauvoir 1997: 13). Indeed, in the wider context of the 
philosophical canon, “any raising of ‘the woman question’” begets irritation, “especially 
because it is so particular” (Le Dœuff 1991: 3), and, as I have argued above, those who 
organise the canon avoid the particular at all cost. Hence, when a woman asks: “What is a 
woman?”, every aspect of her inquiry must be “sectioned off under a special heading (by 
women, about women, for women)” (Le Dœuff: 16). 
 
Hannah Arendt can be contained, without causing Moran irritation, in Introduction to 
Phenomenology. After all, contends Moran (317-318), for whom it is necessary to reveal 
Arendt’s “anti-feminist” stance, “she never contributed much to the analysis of gender”, “she 
has never been fully accepted by feminist critics” and she had “absolutely no time for 
superficial ideologies which wanted to claim a certain thinking as male and another kind as 
female [since] thinking as such was genderless.” I am not suggesting that Moran is wrong to 
acknowledge Arendt’s contribution to phenomenology, far from it. I am disturbed; however, 
that he includes Arendt’s perceived lack of raising “the woman question” under the heading 
of “Arendt’s contribution”. The subtext is, in my opinion: “Here is a woman philosopher, who 
had interesting things to say, but unlike other woman philosophers who also had interesting 
things to say, she at least had the good sense not to broach the topic of ‘woman’, and so I can 
tolerate her inclusion to the fraternity of phenomenology.”  
 
Since The Second Sex is “a classic of feminist studies”, one must by Moran’s reckoning 
presume that it contributes much to the analysis of gender, that Beauvoir has always been 
accepted by feminist critics and that she had all the time in the world for superficial ideologies 
which wanted to claim a certain thinking as male and another kind as female. Let us reflect on 
these presumptions. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular framework from which she explores the question of alterity, is considered by one of the 
border-controllers of the canon as philosophy’s “other”.   
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b.3 Counterpoints 
 
 
Firstly, the term gender was coined in the 1960s, by feminists from the English-speaking 
world (Moi 1999: 3) who wanted to distinguish between a person’s anatomically distinct 
characteristics (sex) and the series of cultural constructions ascribed to one’s sex.F37F The 
sex/gender distinction has been useful insofar as it highlights the culture/nature dichotomy 
underlying biological determinism, to wit: the justification for male dominance based on, for 
example, greater physical strength, is challenged on the basis that the existence of anatomical 
differences between male and female is a simple, descriptive “fact” that attains the meaning of 
dominator/dominated only within a value system delineated by a particular cultural 
framework. The challenge of the nature/culture dichotomy allows feminists to point out that 
the “natural fact” of being born with a vagina does not explain female oppression, any more 
than being born with a penis accounts for male domination. Instead, subordination 
materialises when these biological givens are interpreted by the normative (patriarchal) order 
in terms of gender constructs: “masculinity” and “femininity” are, respectively, culturally 
defined positions of domination and marginality.F38F  
                                                 
37 In a discussion of what constitutes “feminist theory”, assuming that we can, without equivocation, 
define such a term and thus know its limit; suspending any fears concerning the wisdom of using an 
umbrella term to signify a vast array of different, often disparate, theories, Dermot Moran is not alone 
in giving precedence to the issue of gender. Consider, for instance, Sondra Farganis’ (1994: 15-16) 
assertion of the primacy of gender in feminist theory. Farganis’ argument is an example of petitio 
principii; to wit, she holds that gender is the constitutive element of feminist theory because a theory 
would not be feminist theory without the central element of gender. Furthermore, Farganis executes a 
pre-emptive ad hominem strike against those feminists that consider gender to be one category among 
a number of variants, including sex, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, age, etc., used in discourse on 
women’s oppression. Apart from these fallacies, those who privilege gender as the site of oppression 
are susceptible to essentialising women’s bodies and invoking a mind/body dualism. For elaboration, 
see Moi (1999: 4), Probyn (in Rakow 1992: 88) and Flax (in Nicholson 1990: 39-62).     
38I take my cue from John Thompson’s (1990: 59) description of domination; to wit, “when particular 
agents or groups are endowed with power in a durable way that excludes, and to some significant 
degree remains inaccessible to, other agents or groups of agents”. Thompson describes power as “a 
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Now, given that The Second Sex was published some fifteen years before the emergence of 
the term gender, given that Beauvoir’s language does not differentiate between sex and 
gender, that even in recent times such a distinction has not been operative in French (Moi 5-6, 
footnote 7),F39F given that The Second Sex explicitly portrays the female body directly as a site 
of oppression, that, for Beauvoir, woman’s oppression takes place in but is not confined to the 
cultural sphere, given her postulation of the female body as always already subjected to 
taboos, laws and man-made mythology, given her critique of essentialising thought, biological 
reductionism and determinism, given the lack of agreement among feminist scholars 
regarding Beauvoir’s supposed contribution to the analysis of gender:F40F given all these 
considerations, it is possible to argue, without contradiction, that Beauvoir anticipates the 
need for a sex-gender distinction and pre-empts the pitfalls of such a strategy.      
 
A second question pertaining to Moran’s evaluation is whether or not Simone de Beauvoir, 
the author of the “feminist classic”, The Second Sex, has always “been fully accepted by 
feminist critics”. Such a consideration too readily homogenises “feminists” and too easily 
conflates “feminism” and “feminist theory”: since people who call themselves feminists rarely 
agree on the definition, raison d’être, contents, use of concepts, and many other aspects of 
feminism, including its relationship to feminist theory, no individual will ever be “fully 
accepted” in “feminist theory” or by the “feminist movement”. Moreover, can it be taken for 
granted that when someone raises questions about the concept woman that it becomes the 
prerogative solely of “feminists” to study and criticise her or his work?  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
socially or institutionally endowed capacity which enables or empowers some individuals to make 
decisions, pursue ends or realise interests”.   
39 Moi (1999: 5) knows very well that the absence of the word gender does not preclude one from 
conveying in any language, for instance, “one’s opposition to the idea that people in possession of 
ovaries are naturally unsuited to sports, intellectual work, or public careers”. In the case of Beauvoir, I 
am of the opinion that the absence of a sex/gender distinction is not merely based on semantics, but is 
instead, based on her rejection of essentialism in general as well as her preoccupation with ambiguity 
as a constituting feature of human existence, which includes a denunciation of dualistic thinking.   
40 See, for example, Young (2005: 25), Andrew (in Card 2003: 29-44), Gatens (in Card 2003: 273), 
Moi (1999: 3-120), Simons (in Simons 1995: 254) and Braidotti (1994: 261-263).   
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To be sure, quite a few feminist theorists have, since the start of the second wave, forged 
academic careers on the seemingly endless topic of the shortcomings of The Second Sex.F41F As 
shown in her memoirs, Beauvoir herself was not oblivious to the criticism levelled at her.F42F 
Among Beauvoir’s harshest critics is the generation of French feminists that emerged in the 
1970s, including, Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. In their early writings 
these intellectuals poured scorn on The Second Sex and referred to Beauvoir as their “sacred 
monster” (Bair 1990: 439), a relic from the first wave revived through the liberal feminism of 
particularly Betty Friedan, which they rejected.  
 
Thirdly, let us reflect on Moran’s insinuation that Beauvoir would submit to any “superficial 
ideologies which wanted to claim a certain thinking as male and another kind as female”. One 
must assume that Moran considers the distinction, made by Levinas and Derrida, between the 
phallogocentric, rational Subject of philosophy and the mysterious, unknowable, feminine 
Other to be of an order that is neither superficial nor ideological. Be that as it may, Beauvoir 
is not interested in putting forward such oppositions – it is, she would argue, precisely 
oppositional thinking that legitimises various practices of exclusion – therefore, she argues 
against the kind of thinking that reveals male privilege,F43F but also against the concept of 
l’écriture féminine or “feminine writing”.  
                                                 
41 See Pilardi (in Simons 1995: 29-43) for a compact discussion of the feminist reception to The 
Second Sex, particularly her excellent notes (39-43). See also Moi (1999: 106, 385), Fallaize (in 
Fallaize 1998: 7-13) and Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 219).           
42 See, for instance Beauvoir (1968: 199).   
43 Following Jean-François Lyotard, I could even suggest that Moran’s dismissal of the opposition 
between “male thinking” and “female thinking” is in itself an expression of masculine privilege. 
Lyotard (1989: 111) observes: “It is said that the femininity of writing depends on content. Writing is 
feminine, for example, if it operates by seduction rather than conviction. But the opposition of these 
two efficacies is itself probably masculine. To avoid such alternatives, you claim no assignable 
difference between feminine and masculine, in writing or elsewhere: but this neutralisation of the 
question is also very suspect (as when someone says that he’s not political, neither on the right nor the 
left; everyone knows he is on the right). It is a philosopher who is speaking here about relations 
between men and women. He is trying to escape what is masculine in the very posing of such a 
question. However, his flight and his strategies probably remain masculine. He knows that the so-
called question of a masculine/feminine opposition, and probably the opposition itself, will only 
disappear as he stops philosophising: for it exists as opposition only by philosophical (and political) 
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While the younger generation of French feminists who initiated l’écriture féminine – the same 
ones who disparaged Beauvoir and her work – “located women’s emancipatory potential 
outside the laws of the state, beyond the male-dominated systems of discourse and 
knowledge” (Brison in Card 2003: 205), Beauvoir challenges what she perceives to be the 
reinforcement of such oppositions as inside/outside, sameness/difference, philosophical/non-
philosophical, etc., since these effectively support hegemonic structures. In other words, the 
conceit of distancing itself from the phallogocentric language of philosophy through a 
celebration of “the feminine”– usually referred to as gynocentrism – renders l’écriture 
féminine vulnerable to an imperialism similar to that at work in the border-control of the 
philosophical canon.  
 
Beauvoir’s questioning of oppositional thinking must not be confused with the desire to be rid 
of difference; her disavowal of feminine writing does not signal a rejection of feminist writing. 
In her interview with Susan J. Brison, Beauvoir (cited by Brison in Card 2003: 193) asserts 
that women “certainly have new things to say, unique things, and that they must say them” 
and that “they should write feminist books, books that reveal women’s condition, that revolt 
against it and lead others to revolt.” To be sure, “every woman has the right to shout, but the 
cry must be heard and listened to” (193); however, l’écriture féminine speaks only to those in 
the know, that is, other highly qualified feminist theorists, whose “relentless theorising” 
(Brison in Card: 206), aimed at challenging the phallogocentrism within philosophical 
discourse, has a tendency towards self-enclosure. When Beauvoir dismisses the exaltation – to 
the point of being used as a basis for a different kind of writing – of menstruation, maternity, 
lactation, etc., it points not to a disavowal of female corporeality; instead, it signifies a 
rejection of “falling once more into the masculine trap of wishing to enclose ourselves in our 
differences” (Beauvoir cited in Bair 1990: 551).F44F  
                                                                                                                                                        
method, that is, by the male way of thinking.” Lyotard is suggesting that oppositional thinking is 
always already the language tool of the “masculine imperialist”.  
44 Such self-enclosure is particularly evident in the inscrutability of a great deal of feminine writing, 
particularly, according to Beauvoir, the work of Hélène Cixous. Nonetheless, I believe Beauvoir 
would strongly agree with Cixous’ (cited in Braidotti 1991: 215) argument: “What is the ‘Other’? If it 
is truly the ‘other’, there is nothing to say; it cannot be theorised. The ‘other’ escapes me. It is 
elsewhere, outside: absolutely other. It doesn’t settle down. But in History, of course, what is called 
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At best, the creation of neologisms through l’écriture féminine creates a new feminist 
vernacular, but, as such, it remains enclosed, localised, secondary in relation to the lingua 
franca of the philosophical canon. Thus, l’écriture féminine may even advance the agenda of 
those who depict philosophy “as a conversation among men”, who consider feminism to be “a 
thinking that happens outside the philosophical scene” (Bergoffen 1997: 33), that can be 
relegated to the “impotent fringes of ‘alternative’ thought, unable to effect changes in 
mainstream attitudes and beliefs” (Nye 2004: xi). Even a vociferous supporter of  l’écriture 
féminine like Rosi Braidotti (1991: 176) warns that “non-participation, in theory as in other 
fields, is politically dangerous, to the extent that it only confirms the patriarchal myth which 
associates women with the anti-social, the irrational, the immoral, the passive, the powerless, 
and reinforces one of the most enduring forms of women’s oppression.”  
I have in the preceding paragraphs considered Dermot Moran’s expulsion of Beauvoir from 
French phenomenology. Now, Rosi Braidotti takes for granted Beauvoir’s place in 
philosophy’s canon. However, it soon transpires that the price for this inclusion of Beauvoir is 
even worse than the obscurity to which she is condemned in Moran’s assessment. Not only 
does Braidotti erroneously dismiss her work as “humanism” and “Cartesianism”, she unjustly 
extends the charges of corruption and misogyny, by which she brands the discipline of 
philosophy, to Beauvoir’s work. As I show next, her disavowal of Beauvoir, as well as those 
who show a “stubborn fidelity to Beauvoir’s thought” (Braidotti 1991: 246),  brings to the 
fore a question regarding the problem of not belonging in the philosophical community; to 
wit: why participate in philosophy at all?                  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘other’ is an alterity that does settle down, that falls into the dialectical circle. It is the other in a 
hierarchically organised relationship in which the same rules, names, defines and assigns ‘its’ other.” I 
will not in this study pursue the matter of the similarities or differences between Beauvoir and the 
adherents of l’écriture féminine – see, for instance, Bergoffen (1997: 206-215) for some insight 
regarding the affinities between Beauvoir and Irigaray, and Moi (1999: 384-389) for an account of the 
differences between them.  
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c) Negotiating boundaries  
 
 
Philosophy is, for Rosi Braidotti, an unrepentantly male-orientated enterprise. Braidotti 
(1994: 217) declares: “No amount of inclusion of women into theory, politics, and society 
could palliate the effects of and compensate for the centuries of exclusion”. She exhorts 
feminists to reject these institutions, particularly the philosophical canon, in favour of an 
alternative discourse that is entirely woman-centred. Braidotti (29-30) accuses those who 
continue to work within the field of philosophy of colluding with a corrupt system: they 
reveal “a corporatist attachment to the discipline and a strong identification with its masters; 
many feminists work to preserve or even rescue the very idea that philosophy actually 
matters.”  
 
In particular, she identifies Simone de Beauvoir and those who are influenced by her as 
philosophy’s dutiful daughters and devoted mistresses. In her earlier text, Braidotti (1991: 
167) submits that “it is an incontestable historical reality that Beauvoir is the symbolic mother 
of the second wave of feminism, which in turn is American in both origin and style.” What is 
considered by Braidotti to be American about Beauvoir’s perceived brand of feminism is that 
its approach to imperialistic traditions supposedly calls for reform and reconciliation rather 
than fissure and radical separation. Thus, Braidotti (1994: 180) associates Beauvoir with a 
“benevolent liberalism which authorises us to believe that the female condition can possibly 
be ameliorated within the social and political structures that are in force; that all that is needed 
is a little collective good willF45F  … [which] is moreover a classical attitude, for it was already 
that of the feminists of the nineteenth century and early twentieth, who claimed the right to 
sexual equality and condemned the oppression of women in the name of all Humanity”.  
 
Tellingly, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1994) explains that “humanism is sometimes 
used as a pejorative term by postmodernist and especially feminist writers, applied to 
                                                 
45 Braidotti is not the only critic to interpret Beauvoir’s philosophy as a form of “ameliorism”. See, for 
example, Max Deutscher (2003: 182), who construes Beauvoir’s position as “yes, things are bad, but 
with a little good will on both sides a great deal can be achieved”. In Part 3, I show that, although 
Beauvoir’s philosophy is one of hope, these charges of ameliorism are unjust.       
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philosophies such as that of Sartre, that rely on the possibility of the autonomous, self-
conscious, rational, single self, and that are supposedly insensitive to the inevitable 
fragmentary, splintered, historically conditioned nature of personality and motivation.” Like 
Dermot Moran, Braidotti simply conflates the perspectives of Beauvoir and Sartre.F46F   
Regarding Simone de Beauvoir and Michèle le Dœuff, whose sympathetic reading of 
Beauvoir is dismissed as “neo-humanism” (169), Braidotti resorts to the kind of ill-considered 
name-calling of which I have accused Moran.  
 
I do not agree with Braidotti’s interpretation of Beauvoir.F47F I show in Part 3 that Beauvoir’s 
point of departure in The Second Sex is a denunciation of humanism. Indeed, I advance an 
interpretation of Beauvoir’s work as a sustained interrogation and rejection of the 
androcentric presumptions – and more generally, the hostility towards difference – that inform 
most philosophical accounts of what it means to be human. At no point in her text does 
Beauvoir explicitly state that both men and women should enjoy the same legal and political 
rights, but if she had, her argument would not be based, as is the case with equality feminism, 
on abstract humanism; it certainly would not be an affirmation of the “sameness” between 
men and women. At any rate, Beauvoir (1997: 26-27) asserts:  
People have tirelessly sought to prove that woman is superior, inferior, or equal to man. 
… If we are to gain understanding, we must get out of these ruts; we must discard the 
vague notions of superiority, inferiority, equality which have hitherto corrupted every 
discussion of the subject and start afresh. 
Throughout Part 3, it will become clear that Beauvoir’s perspective is far from the “classical 
attitude” described by Braidotti; indeed, as this citation suggests, Beauvoir’s concern is with a 
re-evaluation of values, including the value of equality.  
 
                                                 
46 See, for example Braidotti’s (1991: 267) uncritical fusion of their stances regarding Hegel’s 
dialectic of recognition.  
47 Braidotti (1991: 170) herself acknowledges that “Beauvoir’s thought needs to be reassessed”. 
Additionally, Braidotti (1994: 219) reconsiders: “The reformist work accomplished by women … is a 
reality that cannot be ignored today. In many subtle ways this type of promotion of women within the 
status quo is changing the structure of our society and its discursive practices.” Correspondingly, her 
stance on Beauvoir is more measured, even softened (e.g. 232-233).     
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Notwithstanding her misreading of Beauvoir, it does not follow that I can summarily dismiss 
Braidotti’s arguments regarding philosophy’s hegemony.F48F Braidotti (1994: 33) submits:  
Philosophy creates itself through what it excludes as much as through what it asserts. 
High theory, especially philosophy, posits its values through the exclusion of many – 
non-men, nonwhites, nonlearned, etc. The structural necessity of these pejorative 
figurations of otherness, makes me doubt the theoretical capacity, let alone the moral and 
political willingness, of theoretical discourse to act in a nonhegemonic, nonexclusionary 
manner.   
None of this contradicts what I have said at the start of this discussion. Indeed, Braidotti’s line 
of reasoning agrees with my own interpretation of Beauvoir’s ideas regarding the “othering” 
of women in various institutions, including philosophy.F49F Although her general view of self-
other relationships may be that we are not irredeemably doomed to violence and oppression, 
Beauvoir remains clear-sighted, both in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, about 
the tendency of the powerful to accrue rather than relinquish power, which is echoed in 
Braidotti’s scepticism regarding the possibility for reform.    
Significantly, Beauvoir herself refused the label of philosopher.F50F She distanced herself from 
the life of the philosopher-academic to become a writer-activist. Beauvoir (cited by Gerassi in 
www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/1976/interview.htm accessed 21 June 
2006) reflects: 
I had the luck to come from a sector of society, the bourgeoisie, which could … allow me 
to play leisurely with ideas. Because of that I managed to enter the man’s world without 
                                                 
48 For further analysis of feminist responses to the philosophical canon, all with specific reference to 
Beauvoir, read Gatens (1991, particularly 85-99), Farganis (1994: 14-99) and Langton (in Fricker and 
Hornsby 2000: 127-145).           
49 Braidotti (1994: 236) even attributes to Beauvoir the notion of the structural necessity of woman’s 
otherness to “uphold the prestige of the “one” of the male sex as the sole possessor of subjectivity”.  
50 Beauvoir studied, taught and wrote philosophy but insisted that she was a writer, not a philosopher. 
It must be said of her writing that it is neither “purely philosophical”, nor “purely literary”. Her self-
imposed status as non-philosopher can be traced to her belief that philosophers developed and wrote 
“systems” (e.g. Beauvoir 1963: 548 and Beauvoir 1968: 12), whereas Beauvoir’s texts resist 
systematisation. Thus, submits Le Dœuff (1991: 138), if Beauvoir “managed to produce a 
philosophical work, she did so indirectly, without explicitly occupying the position of philosopher. 
Discreetly.”      
  
 
 
33
too much difficulty. … I kept whatever was particular to womanhood to myself. I was 
reinforced by my success to continue. … I tended to scorn the kind of woman who felt 
incapable, financially or spiritually, to show her independence from men. In effect I was 
thinking, without even saying it to myself, “if I can, so can they.” In researching and 
writing The Second Sex I did come to realise that my privileges were the result of having 
abdicated, in some crucial respects at least, my womanhood. If we put it in class 
economic terms, you would understand it easily: I had become a class collaborationist. 
Well, I was sort of the equivalent in terms of the sex struggle. Through The Second Sex I 
became aware of the struggle needed. I understood that the vast majority of women 
simply did not have the choices that I had had, that women are, in fact, defined and 
treated as a second sex by a male-oriented society whose structure would totally collapse 
if that orientation was genuinely destroyed. 
This self-assessment is at the same time an indictment of the institutions at which Beauvoir 
wrote and taught philosophy. A life of academia afforded her the luxury and leisure of playing 
with ideas, but at the cost of being assimilated into the world of philosophy, which, for its 
pretensions “that it was the truth-seeker par excellence” (Kolakowski 2001: 121), still insisted 
on the fiction of women’s inferiority. Beauvoir argues that the measure of her success was the 
extent to which she managed to suppress her difference and partake of philosophy’s 
unconcern for the general status of women. Note also how she expresses that success in 
relation to men – success equals independence from men – thus confirming the traditional 
notion of men as the norm.  
 
Beauvoir describes the process of producing The Second Sex as the awakening of her feminist 
identity. She indicates two of the central aspects of this burgeoning identity: a confrontation 
with the particularity of being a woman and the recognition of her relationship with other 
women. Yet, in her text she conveys these “non-philosophical” concerns in the language and 
style of phenomenology. Beauvoir’s astuteness is in the realisation that only her philosophical 
credentials – for example, her critical engagement with Hegel and early French 
phenomenology – and precisely not her status as woman would allow her the attempt “to 
reach a reality beyond the dreams of philosophy, that of the concrete existence of women” (Le 
Dœuff 1991:170). Writing from this space that straddles both philosophical convention and 
dissidence reinforces her belief in the permeability of the boundaries between self and others. 
However, as we have seen, the “failure” to align herself with one at the exclusion of the other, 
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renders Beauvoir vulnerable to attacks on both sides of the divide – she is either too 
philosophical or not philosophical enough or too feminist or not feminist enough.     
 
One could view the example of Beauvoir as confirmation of the suspicion that, as far as the 
philosophical community is concerned, the previously excluded can never really belong – 
they remain perpetual newcomers who must justify their place by adhering to the norms of the 
canon. If they insist on challenging these norms, that is, in ways that are not always already 
indulged by the proprietors of the canon, they are relegated to the margins – if they are 
allowed to be there at all. One could also see the example as confirmation that philosophy and 
feminist theory are two mutually exclusive, even opposing, enterprises. From both 
perspectives, it becomes easier to abandon the very idea that philosophy actually matters, as 
Braidotti suggests; thus, easier to simply disengage from the discipline.F51F  
For Braidotti (1994: 242), change beyond mere ameliorism in institutions such as philosophy 
requires for “the newcomers to be able and to be entitled to redefine the rules of the game as 
to make a difference and make that difference felt concretely.” Undoubtedly because she 
rejects the notion of different-from as less than, Braidotti has a tendency to define different-
from as better than. From such a stance it makes sense to argue for the entitlement of 
newcomers and to suppose that “making a difference” amounts to the betterment of the 
institution of philosophy.  
 
What Beauvoir seeks, however, is precisely to get beyond the notion of entitlement, since it 
represents the language and manner of mastership. As such, it signifies a disregard for the 
bond between the subject and the other (thing, nature, existent); it discloses the logic of 
possession and clings to the habit of amassing power for oneself. In the interview with Brison 
                                                 
51 Philosophy matters to Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 8-9): “[The] desire to philosophise imposed itself on 
me with unfailing clarity, without bringing promises of salvation; it has withstood all difficulties, and 
indeed sometimes in the form of a disappointed love, for disappointment arises all the time.” For Le 
Dœuff, the challenge is always to temper her love with the sobering need to “think ill” of philosophy 
(1). I would also venture that, by the sheer volume of vitriol aimed at the canon, by the recurrent 
invocation of various philosophers and by her acknowledged debt to Gilles Deleuze, philosophy 
matters also to Rosi Braidotti. Despite their different stances, Braidotti and Le Dœuff have forged 
careers that are, to some extent, based on expressing their objections to the discipline. To find 
philosophy objectionable is not yet to disengage from it. 
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(in Card 2003: 190-191), Beauvoir argues that “the point is not for women simply to take 
power out of men’s hands, since that wouldn’t change anything about the world … [instead] 
it’s a question precisely of destroying the notion of power.” Her concern is not so much with 
empowering the subjugated; rather, to disarm the powers that be.F52F  
 
In the place of power, Beauvoir calls for collaboration, which Braidotti not only mistakes for 
ameliorism but also dismisses in favour of “violence” and “ruthlessness” (25). When Braidotti 
contends that we need “to redefine the rules of the game”, she does not dismiss the “game” – 
suggesting, thereby, that philosophy is an enterprise of winners and losers – only the rules, so 
that we can have new winners with different agendas.  
 
Regarding those of us already made vulnerable by the way we have been portrayed and 
treated by the philosophical community, how do we collaborate in a way that does not merely 
amount to “a compromise in which the other (as is always the case) in this or that way loses 
his or her singularity, identity, desire, and so on” (Derrida cited in Manoussakis 2004: 4)? If 
we disregard our own or others’ differences, we compromise ourselves, but we also 
compromise the discipline of philosophy inasmuch as the compromise of difference advances 
hegemonic thinking. How do we safeguard our differences, without recycling the power 
relations? How do we disarm the proprietors of the canon in order to render the borders of 
philosophy more permeable?  
 
Moreover, why would philosophy’s proprietors relinquish their authority to set apart those 
who belong from those who do not? Indeed, as I show in the discussion of Beauvoir’s The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, humans tend to increase rather than relinquish their power. We must 
heed also Nietzsche’s (1989: 72) observation: “As its power increases, a community ceases to 
take the individual’s transgressions so seriously.” From this perspective, those intent on 
disrupting the forces that maintain philosophy’s hegemony can never lose sight of the 
possibility that their resistance is nothing more than “a symbolic agitation” (Beauvoir 1997: 
19) sanctioned by the border-controllers.  
 
Following Kolakowski (2001: 105), who likens philosophy to Peter Pan – an arrogant, 
perpetual child, who nonchalantly takes to the air on happy thoughts and refuses to deal with 
                                                 
52 See Part 3 for a discussion of the concept of power in Beauvoir’s ethics.   
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change – one must ask if collaboration is even feasible. Certainly, in the apparent 
immutability of the canon, the posturing of proprietors such as Dermot Moran, the unchecked 
sexism, racism and other forms of imperialism of some of its central texts and the tendency to 
detach from the flesh and blood world, the world of philosophy does not seem ready to 
engage in acts of collaboration.    
 
The call for collaboration carries with it the risks of further exploitation, indifference, 
compromise and marginalisation. It seems that Rosi Braidotti seeks to avoid these risks by her 
insistence that philosophy does not matter, that the previously excluded are better off 
disengaging ourselves from such a hostile environment. However, cautioning against the 
disengagement that prevailed among French academics in the midst of the Nazi Occupation, 
Beauvoir (1948: 76) argues that “to put oneself “outside” is still a way of living the 
inescapable fact that one is inside”; is a way of “playing the occupier’s game”. Analogously, 
for women – or any of philosophy’s “others” – to take up a position of disidentifying 
ourselves from philosophy, is at once a confirmation of our place inside philosophy, as well 
as a tacit support of those who seek to purge philosophy of otherness, which is precisely what 
Beauvoir passionately opposes.  
 
Unlike Moran and Braidotti who operate on the conceit of clearly-defined boundaries between 
the philosophical and the non-philosophical, such boundaries are, for Beauvoir, always 
already permeable, which is precisely why she believes in the possibility of collaboration. I 
show in Part 3 how, following Hegel, Beauvoir’s emphasis on the bond between the self and 
the world shatters through the illusion of self-certainty of the Cartesian hero. The start of 
Beauvoir’s so-called moral period coincides with her initial reading of Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which, in turn, falls together with her awareness of the bond between herself and 
others. I cite from The Prime of Life (1963), in which Beauvoir describes this awareness as a 
“dissolvement”, a “fragmentation” and a “scattering” of her hitherto solipsistic self. 
 
Beauvoir’s appeal to collaboration is premised on the conviction that we cannot avoid each 
other; that our very humanity depends on our reciprocal recognition of one another. Her 
appeal to collaboration is also an expression of hope, specifically, the hope that self-other 
relationships need not be violent or hostile. Although she draws on Hegel’s postulation of 
friendship as the opposing consciousnesses’ reciprocal and generous giving back of the 
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other’s otherness, I show in the final part of this study how Beauvoir, through her depiction of 
an authentic erotic relationship between a man and woman, uniquely stresses self-
abandonment, which alone allows the subject to also generously receive his or her otherness.        
 
Beauvoir’s perspectives on collaboration and friendship can be made relevant to the problem 
of one’s place in the philosophical community. In the interest of collaborating with others, 
those who have historically never had cause to wonder about their inclusion in philosophy 
must question the preconditions and cost of their certitude. What, or who, entitles one to 
matter-of-factly and without any soul-searching or calculating participate in philosophy? If 
such entitlement is conferred by certain authorities or is guaranteed through one’s adherence 
to certain philosophical traditions, the assumption of self-assurance amounts to little more 
than bravado. Given that philosophy is, by definition, a conversation, given that it is not 
produced in isolation, only the naïvely solipsistic individual believes that she somehow 
entitles herself to address the philosophical community. In short, one can be certain of one’s 
place in philosophy only if one ignores the people and traditions to which one is beholden. To 
write philosophy is an appeal to be read by others. To write philosophy with self-confidence 
is to assume that one’s readers will either see things in the same light as oneself or will be 
brought to the same perspective through the force of one’s argumentation. The key concept 
here is sameness: the illusion of self-certainty can only be achieved and maintained if 
everyone thinks the same, if one avoids engaging with other perspectives.                                         
 
Since we start from the precarious position of having been “othered” by the canon, those of us 
who cannot assume our place in the philosophical community self-confidently and 
straightforwardly, are perhaps better able to collaborate with others, precisely because of our 
vulnerability and lack of self-confidence. This line of reasoning echoes Beauvoir’s (cited by 
Brison in Card 2003: 191) proposition that those without authority tend to escape its trappings 
– like self-importance and complacency. Since we have no authority, we have none to impose 
on others. This lack of authority will only be experienced as a crisis if we desire the same 
entitlement to which those who do philosophy self-confidently lay claim. When we overcome 
such desires, when we abandon the pretence of wanting to be philosophers “in our own right” 
or “on our own”, we no longer have to experience the world of philosophy as a hostile 
environment and our engagement with others in the philosophical community as a threat to 
our “singularity, identity, desire and so on”.  
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Indeed, we may come to realise, as Beauvoir (1948: 70-71) does, via Hegel, that: 
[At] every moment others are stealing the whole world away from me. The first 
movement is to hate them. But this hatred is naïve, and the desire immediately struggles 
against itself. If I were really everything there would be nothing beside me; the world 
would be empty. There would be nothing to possess, and I myself would be nothing. If he 
is reasonable, the young man immediately understands that by taking the world away 
from me, others also give it to me, since a thing is given to me only by the movement 
which snatches it from me.  
As I show at various points in Part 3, Beauvoir’s philosophy underscores the non-centrality of 
the “I”: singularity, identity, desire and otherness exist only in the fundamental relationship 
with others. Thus, the world of philosophy that threatens to assimilate my otherness is the 
very same one that confers this otherness onto me. The upshot is that my participation in the 
discipline of philosophy does not bring about the loss of “myself in the name of an 
uncomfortable borrowed identity”, as we have seen Andrea Nye supposes, because there is no 
“self” outside the bond: my singularity is actualised only in relation to the community.  
 
What is it then that does get lost through the stringent border-control of the philosophical 
canon? To my mind, it is philosophy itself that suffers a loss. In the movement by which 
philosophy encloses itself, refuses to recognise its underlying relationship to others (other 
disciplines, other ways of thinking, etc.), it turns against itself as well. By renouncing the 
“non-philosophical”, it renounces itself. Even adherents to the Aristotelian tradition of 
interdisciplinarity cannot quite abandon the idea of philosophy as the Virgin Mother of all 
other thinking disciplines – the thinking behind; therefore, prior to, all thinking. However, in 
the same way as the “pure I” must dialectically overcome its solipsism in order to continue as 
an aufgehobene self, the survival of philosophy calls for an overcoming of complacency and a 
commitment to others beyond self-interest, conceit and rigidity. In the same way that the 
“pure I” needs the other in order to outdo himself, the discipline of philosophy needs to not 
only engage with others but, perhaps more importantly, engage differently with others. 
 
One such “other” is Simone de Beauvoir, who does indeed, as Dermot Moran concedes, have 
“interesting things to say about the relation of self and other”, as this study sets out to reveal. 
However, when Moran adds “she is now primarily known, not as a phenomenologist, but on 
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account of her ground-breaking book, The Second Sex, which is a social and economic history 
of women, and a classic of feminist studies”, I am neither moved to prove or disprove 
Beauvoir’s status as phenomenologist, nor am I moved to confirm or deny the status of The 
Second Sex as a feminist classic. I have discussed Dermot Moran’s treatment of Hegel and 
Beauvoir specifically to show the apparatus of limitation at work. This study is a sustained 
questioning of the apparatus of limitation. It certainly does not propose to have Hegel and 
Beauvoir re-classified as phenomenologists, since it seeks to challenge such conventions as 
classifying, labeling, enclosing, etc. The fact that I do relate Hegel’s and Beauvoir’s 
perspectives to early French phenomenology does not signify a call for their assimilation to 
the phenomenological tradition. At most, the study is an appeal to go back to the text 
themselves: to reread Hegel and, perhaps for the first time, to read Beauvoir.  
 
If we are to generously receive the unique perspective that is disclosed in Beauvoir’s work, 
we cannot start by labelling or systematising it. Let us first ask: What interesting things does 
Beauvoir have to say? In other words, let us simply read her work. As I have mentioned, her 
compatriots discuss the topic of self-other relationships from the framework of what I shall 
refer to as the conventional French interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition. This 
conventional approach is marked by a preoccupation with intersubjectivity based on violence 
and domination, a failure to grasp the significance of Hegel’s attempt to break through the 
dualistic thinking that typifies German idealism, and ultimately, a reinforcement of the 
subject-object duality that Hegel seeks to overcome. My contention is this: if she has 
“interesting”, i.e., not conventional – different – things to say about the relationship between 
existential subjects, we will lose sight of the difference if we insist on categorising what she 
has to say.  
 
If we are to recognise the difference of Beauvoir’s perspective, we need to read her 
differently. We have to abandon the tired oppositions between philosophy and everything else, 
including literature, writing on the topic of woman, politics, etc. We have to anticipate that 
she will use the language of philosophy differently, that she will inflect clichés like 
“intersubjectivity”, “freedom” and “otherness” with different meanings. Crucially, if we are to 
read Beauvoir generously, let us read with abandon: that is, without self-interest, without 
domination, without the apparatus of limitation.    
  
 
 
40
Postscript  
 
 
Among other things, Phenomenology of Spirit describes the intellectual journey that Hegel 
undertakes to come to a new understanding of knowledge. As I point out in Part 2, Hegel 
believes that the experience of the philosopher en route to the Absolute is as important as the 
results yielded by his investigation. The exponents of early French phenomenology extend 
Hegel’s notion of absolute knowledge as self-knowledge by interpreting his multi-faceted text 
exclusively as a discourse on self-identity. From this point of departure, their interest in Hegel 
is confined to the relationship between the self and the other.  
 
The texts that Simone de Beauvoir produced during the 1940s reveal a similar preoccupation 
with the self-other relationship. One of the crucial differences between her exploration of this 
theme and those of her contemporaries is that she inserts her concrete self into the 
conversation. Thus, when Beauvoir (1997: 13) begins The Second Sex: “For a long time I 
have hesitated to write a book on woman”, she alerts her reader to the fact that her study of 
the problem of woman’s otherness has a distinctly personal spirit. The status of the “I” in 
Beauvoir’s opening statement is not the Cartesian I who stands apart from the concrete and 
the social; it is not an I stripped of facticity and peculiarity. Instead, it is a flesh-and-blood I 
with a particular history and a distinct relationship with the world from and about which she 
writes. In accordance with the respective readings of Phenomenology of Spirit considered in 
this study, I read Hegel’s text predominantly as anthropology. Following Beauvoir, I make 
“the bunch of problems called ‘my identity’” part of the investigation. It must be said, 
however, that during the course of this study, this I who is personally involved in the retelling 
of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition undergoes its own sublation.  
 
Recall in her interview with Gerassi, how Simone de Beauvoir sanctions herself for having 
been a sex-class collaborationist. I have often feared that my interest in continental 
philosophy compromises me as an intellectual-class collaborationist; that my own playing 
with ideas comes at the price of forgetting where I have come from and those I have left 
behind: those who could not obtain university scholarships, who did not complete their 
schooling because they lived the mantra that rang in my childhood ears – freedom now, 
  
 
 
41
education later – those who did not survive the detention cells, who could not or would not 
escape the ghettos. They are absent from the philosophical canon. Perhaps they are implied in 
the term Other, although Beauvoir’s analysis of otherness in the phenomenological tradition 
belies such a possibility. She shows that the fundamental hostility towards otherness or 
difference, initially posed by Hegel and then appropriated by early French phenomenology, is 
not sensitive to particular differences, most specifically in her account, sex difference, 
although there is nothing in her analysis that precludes us from expanding the particularity of 
otherness. The canon has not been set up to speak about me or to me although it presumes to 
speak for me by co-opting my specificity into the vague concept of the Other and by insisting 
that I take up the language and manner of the philosophical fraternity.  
 
Nonetheless, it is precisely in Beauvoir’s critical engagement with phenomenology that I find 
a key to my own relationship to the discipline of philosophy. To critically engage with the 
canon must not be confused with, for instance, Kojève’s masterly re-reading of 
Phenomenology of Spirit. To master a text is to act in self-interest, to take possession of it – 
“to make the text one’s own” – or assume the status of authority on the work. To critically 
engage with a text is, among other things, to remain open to, rather than delimit, its 
possibilities; to yield to, rather than reduce, the complexity and nuances of its arguments; to 
not mistake ambiguity for contradiction, difference for opposition or agreement for 
assimilation. In the ways that she creatively adopts phenomenology’s vernacular, its 
arguments and critical tools, Beauvoir uncovers a means to understand and enunciate, 
generally, the exclusion of difference and, from a personal perspective, my experience of not 
belonging. Crucially, Beauvoir demonstrates a constructive way of engaging with the canon’s 
masters – particularly in the way her emphasis on reciprocity and friendship in the dialectic of 
recognition releases Hegel, to some extent, from the constraints of his canonical reputation – 
that does not involve the compromise of her individuality.  
 
Beauvoir (1997: 171) believes that “true wisdom” demands an abandonment of possession, 
signified in Part 3 by Sartre’s rendering of appropriation as the deflowering of the female 
body,F53F and an embrace of the constant tension that marks relationships. Thus, to adapt her 
                                                 
53 Towards the end of Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre (1956: 738-765) links appropriation to 
possession. To possess is to strip the object of possession – in his account, the virgin-woman – of her 
independence, her otherness; that is, to assimilate the object into the world of the possessor. The 
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famous declaration, Beauvoir shows that one is not born, but rather becomes, a lover of 
wisdom. Whether one is the celebrated German writer of Phenomenology of Spirit or a novice 
from the Cape Flats, one’s recognition in the world of philosophy is a constantly negotiated 
matter. Recognition is an ongoing process of interacting – sometimes in amity and sometimes 
in enmity – with others. The experience of belonging (or not belonging) in the philosophical 
community comes down to one’s relationships with others in the community, not one’s sex, or 
skin colour or any other facticity. Of course, others can, and inevitably do, confer certain 
values to these facticities, which will influence how one is received. However, as Beauvoir 
proposes, values can and frequently must be re-evaluated. Recognition cannot be demanded. 
To belong, I have to open myself to others, in the full knowledge of the risks involved, rather 
than shut myself off from others. Instead of pre-empting or reacting to others’ violence 
through my own violent actions, I can adopt Beauvoir’s cautious hopefulness in our potential 
to outdo ourselves, to lose what is arrogant and selfish about us in our relationships with 
others. Only a life of critical engagement can begin to fulfil the promises of such hope.  
 
The three parts of this study represent my crossing from hostility to hope.    
 
As in the dialectic of recognition, the I that is initially revealed in Part 1, is the solipsistic 
subject who finds herself in an environment – here, the world of philosophy – not of her own 
making. My initial reaction is, following the first movement of the dialectic, and also my own 
violent past, to defend myself, to experience a certain hostility towards this foreign world.  
 
In Part 2, I take on the identity of one of the combatants in the struggle for recognition, who 
faces the choice between being assimilated by others into their personal vision or gaining 
mastery over them. I choose the path of mastery through disruption. We find different 
interlocutors – Kojève, Hyppolite and another version of Hegel – being made to converse at 
the same time.F54F They constantly interrupt each other, sometimes to show their agreement and 
                                                                                                                                                        
appropriator recreates the object, moulds it to become an extension of himself, to the extent that the 
thing ceases to exist beyond its being-possessed by the appropriator.         
54 As I point out in Part 2, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel is structured as a translation of 
Phenomenology of Spirit, with Kojève’s additional commentary in brackets. Kojève follows Hegel’s 
text very closely; to signify this, I allow their voices to blend together. While Hyppolite’s text, 
Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1974), systematically probes the 
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other times to radically differ with each other. The self-interest that drives this disorientating 
account is my desire to challenge an entire sub-genre, namely, early French phenomenology 
and, by implication, the canonical identity of Hegel. The conceit of Part 2 is that my version 
of the dialectic, which is limited to only the first few movements of Spirit, is a more faithful 
rendering of “Hegel”.  
 
However, I also contrive my own failure at mastery. On the one hand, the deliberate strategy 
of disorientating my reader through the mix-up of voices aims to show that there is not one 
easily identifiable “Hegel” – certainly as far as French phenomenology is concerned: “Hegel” 
is a conflation of the author of Phenomenology of Spirit and those who appropriate him. On 
the other hand, by getting entangled in complex arguments without, for instance, asserting my 
authority through paraphrasing and by drawing no discernable distinction between myself and 
the “Hegel” whom I frequently cite, I disappear from my own text, I am disseminated among 
these different voices.       
 
The beginning of this study depicts the self-centred individual concerned about her place in 
the philosophical community, while Part 2 portrays the extent to which the scholar becomes 
implicated in the violence of philosophical discourse that is based on the presumption of 
mastery (mastery over other texts, over the personal, over the marginal, over the flow of 
arguments, and so on). The person in Part 3 undergoes another transformation. Inspired by 
Simone de Beauvoir’s postulation of friendship, which seeks to disarm rather than contest the 
logic of domination – indicated by Hegel’s privileging of the universal over the particular and 
                                                                                                                                                        
dialectical movements that lead up to the Absolute, it presents itself as straightforward commentary 
rather than Kojève’s blend of translation and commentary. Given that certain aspects of Hyppolite’s 
interpretation of Hegel – crucially, his observations regarding the importance of otherness in the 
earlier movements of the dialectic – coincide with the voice of the “Hegel” that my own reading of 
Phenomenology of Spirit uncovers, I appropriate some Hyppolite’s commentary in support of my 
reading. However, I am always explicit about Kojève’s and Hyppolite’s departures from “my Hegel”. 
In defence of my seemingly confusing or arbitrary treatment of particularly Hyppolite’s perspective – 
it serves as both complement to my reading and object of critique, alongside the views held by Kojève 
– I show in Part 2 that there are internal tensions in Hyppolite’s commentary that would account for 
the ambiguity.              
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early French phenomenology’s over-emphasis of the master-slave dialectic – the I of Part 3 
forgoes the convention of mastering texts.       
 
I do not affix Beauvoir to the conversation among French phenomenology’s brothers in Part 
2. Instead, in Part 3, I relate Beauvoir’s ideas regarding self-other relationships in a very 
different sort of space. Part 3 is open to the multiple genres in which Beauvoir worked, 
including novels, memoirs, interviews and essays. It shows her critical engagement with 
various, often disparate, voices – Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Kojève and many 
others, including those from disciplines other than philosophy. It connects certain aspects of 
her personal history to her perspectives. It does not try to overcome apparent internal tensions 
in her work – for instance, to not reject the appeal to fraternity at the end of The Second Sex, 
but, instead, to off-set this appeal with her portrayal of an authentic erotic experience. It 
refrains from labelling her work, for instance, as “feminist theory” or “phenomenology” or 
“Sartrean” or “Hegelian”; firstly, in keeping with her wishes to not be systematised or 
assimilated; secondly, to remain open to interpretive possibilities that might otherwise be 
excluded. It does not try to order the different strands of Beauvoir’s outlook into some kind of 
final conclusion. 
 
The avoidance of the philosophical convention of pulling together the main themes of the 
study with a forceful summary is arguably the biggest risk to take in a format that is precisely 
set up to exhibit one’s mastery over texts. Recall Nancy Fraser’s observation at the start of 
this study: “Beauvoir is obscene because she is ‘more’ than what is acceptable, and in being 
so, spills out of the frame that should contain her.” To those who inhabit the world of 
philosophy in search of the certain, the orderly, the uncontaminated, I offer this disclaimer: 
This work sets out to preserve the images of fluidity, scattering and fragmentation, which, 
Beauvoir associates with her turn away from the Cartesian ego towards a life of engagement 
with others. Thus, whatever observations, deductions or inferences I make during the course 
of Part 3 will not come to rest in a final conclusion. Instead, Part 3 has a “cliff-hanger 
ending”, with Beauvoir escaping the hermeneut’s grasp through a disarming act of textual 
dexterity.                 
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Part 2 The “French Hegel” 
   
 
 
While there is no monadism in Hegel’s philosophy when he speaks of consciousnesses, 
nor any real risk of solipsism, the French existentialism of the 1940s seems to have taken 
shape as a subtle play with this risk, always brushed against, always a bit avoided, always 
basically caressed. 
Le Dœuff (in Simons 1995: 64)1 
 
 
 
a) Genesis of the turn to Hegel 
 
 
Early French phenomenology can be understood as a reaction of a generation of scholars to a 
French academic tradition that focused only on the inner life of the private individual, 
safeguarded from such harsh realities as economic depression and the rise of Fascism after the 
First World War (Kruks 1981: 3). French philosophy was dominated by “a Cartesian 
rationalism whose concerns focused on Kant and the philosophy of mathematics” (Barnett 
1998: 13). The bourgeois individualism in which their academic formative years were 
                                                 
1 In Part 2, I consider the contributions of Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite and Jean-Paul Sartre to 
the reception of Hegel in early French phenomenology. I posit that each underestimates or undermines 
Hegel’s efforts to escape the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm of the Subject. Kojève’s lectures, 
Hyppolite’s commentary and Sartre’s critique reveal a nostalgia for the lone, autonomous hero, for 
whom others are a hell that must be battled and who sets out to imprint his individuality on the world. 
I show that, in the dialectical movements on the journey towards the Absolute that Hegel describes in 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the subject overcomes his naïve solipsism, a consciousness closed off from 
the world, and affirms his fundamental bond with others.                
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steeped, explains Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964: 88-89) in Sense and Non-Sense, typically 
envisioned man as a cogito that was isolated from history and treated the social “like a thing”, 
in other words, “man” as some kind of abstract category outside and prior to society. Taking 
the cogito as the point of departure, freedom would consequently be conceived in ahistorical, 
abstract and resolutely individualist, even solipsistic, terms. What these young scholars had in 
common was the need to pursue alternatives to a teaching of philosophy that had become 
increasing irrelevant, unable to respond to the world around it. They were seeking a kind of 
philosophy that could engage in the “concrete” or, to use a term that would gain ground in the 
early 1940s, lived experience. The emergence of this philosophy of lived experience was 
shaped by two academic events: the introduction of German phenomenology2 and a revival of 
interest in the earlier works of G.W.F. Hegel, particularly Phenomenology of Spirit.   
 
Besides the prominence of Cartesian and Kantian schools of thought, the previous lack of 
interest in Hegel among French scholars could be attributed to a number of factors, to wit: in 
the unlikely event that there were French translations of Hegel’s writings available, 
particularly those earlier Jena texts, they were not part of the mainstream curriculum;3 
perhaps Hegel’s often obscure writing was considered too bewildering;4 the prevailing 
opinion of Hegelian philosophy was based almost exclusively on the later works, particularly 
The Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which confirmed 
to Hegel’s critics his German idealism – understood to be an “egological conception of 
ontology that reduces the other to the same” (Williams 1997: 38) and “an assertion of the 
primacy of subjectivity” (47), thus, precisely the kind of philosophy that was rapidly losing 
ground in French circles. There were no Hegelian schools in France, no mainstream courses 
devoted to Hegel and, with the exceptions of Jean Wahl’s 1929 text Le Malheur de la 
                                                 
2 This work will, for the most part, take for granted a prior acquaintance with the central contributions 
of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. 
3 Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 56) points to the “centralisation of the French educational system in which 
an elite school such as the Ecole Normale Supérieure could determine the point of departure 
[Descartes and Kant] for an entire generation of philosophers”.    
4 See Solomon (1983: 163-171) for a defense of Hegel’s obscure language, which suggests that Hegel 
is teaching his readers the “slipperiness” of philosophical language, that “concepts are always context-
bound” (166).      
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conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel5 and a number of articles by Alexandre Koyré that 
focused on the Jena writings, no serious work on Hegel had been produced. (Heckman in 
Hyppolite 1974: xxiii; Barnett 1998: 13)  
                                                
 
Then, in 1940, the “spirit of the time” – the Nazi occupation of France and another World 
War – brought about a swift about-turn to the reception of Hegel. Merleau-Ponty (64) 
captures that reversal: “But if the Hegel of 1827 may be criticised for his idealism, the same 
cannot be said of the Hegel of 1807.” He is of course alluding to Phenomenology of Spirit, 
which Hegel had written amidst the turmoil of his own world at war. Solomon (1983: 29-34) 
writes that “between the French Revolution and the march of Napoleon across the face of 
Europe … Hegel’s world was in a state of chaos” with the impending annihilation of a 
German society, which would make Hegel in 1806 a “citizen of a non-nation”. Scholars of the 
1940s could identify with the sense of loss, fragmentation, impotence and destruction that 
serves as the setting for Phenomenology of Spirit. Furthermore, they could be inspired by the 
“enthusiastic if also anxious optimism that permeates Hegel’s Phenomenology … [in which] 
Hegel, anticipating the obliteration of the world he knew, was already celebrating the birth of 
a new one” (Solomon: 34). Fundamentally, they found in Hegel’s emphasis of the bond 
between the individual, history and the social an antidote for bourgeois individualism.   
 
 
5 Jean Wahl taught many of the most important thinkers of this chapter in French philosophy, 
including Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean Hyppolite. Eva Gothlin (in Card 2003: 46) credits 
Wahl for his part in introducing French philosophy to existentialism. As the name suggests, Le 
Malheur de la conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel puts into focus the theme of the “unhappy 
consciousness”, which is the central motif of Jean Hyppolite’s interpretation of Hegel. Wahl rejects 
Hegel in favour of Kierkegaard. Thus, in Philosophies of Existence, Wahl (1969: 8) disagrees with 
“[some] philosophers of existence [who] would have us also mention the influence of Hegel.” Instead, 
he pits Hegel against Kierkegaard (e.g. pp. 14, 15, 17, 83) labelling Hegel “the enemy against whom 
the philosophy of existence rose up in protest” (8). Most of Wahl’s work remains untranslated, thus, 
this work cannot gauge the exact extent of his influence. Suffice it to say that Wahl is considered to be 
one of the “right Hegelians” (Heckman in Hyppolite 1974: xxix) who portrayed Hegel as the 
philosopher of the Absolute and, thus, did not play a prominent role in the subsequent restoration of 
interest in Phenomenology of Spirit.    
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A passage from Sense and Non-Sense portrays the sudden relevance of Hegel during the war 
years: 
The question is no longer limited, as it was in [Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason], to 
discovering what conditions make scientific experience possible but is one of knowing in 
a general way how moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences are possible, of describing 
man’s fundamental situation in the face of the world and other men, and of understanding 
religions, ethics, works of art, economic and legal systems as just so many ways for man 
to flee or to confront the difficulties of his condition. Experience here no longer simply 
means our entirely contemplative contact with the sensible world as it did in Kant; the 
world reassumes the tragic resonance it has in ordinary language when a man speaks of 
what he has lived through. It is no longer a laboratory test but a trial of life. To be more 
exact, Hegel’s thought is existentialist in that it views man not as being from the start 
consciousness in full possession of its own clear thoughts but a life which is its own 
responsibility and which tries to understand itself.  
(Merleau-Ponty: 65)  
This is the version of Hegel that emerges from the legendary lectures of Alexandre Kojève, or 
rather, “Alexander Kojevnikoff, Russian émigré and sympathizer with the Soviet Russia of 
Stalin” (Heckman in Hyppolite: xxiii). Kojève taught a course on Phenomenology of Spirit at 
the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes from 1933 until 1939. (Descombes 1986: 9-10) 
Jacques Derrida (1994: 72) notes that Kojève’s “neo-Marxist and para-Heideggerian reading 
of Phenomenology of Spirit … played a formative not negligible role, from many standpoints, 
for a certain generation of French intellectuals, just before or just after the war.” Such 
luminaries as Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas, Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre reportedly attended Kojève’s lectures. (Riley 1981: 15; Barnett 1998: 15; 
Moran 2000: 393; Lynch 2001: 33)6 These lectures were anthologised by Raymond Quéneau 
in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on Phenomenology of Spirit (1969).7  
                                                 
6 Heckman (in Hyppolite 1974: xxiii) goes so far as to suggest that Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Levinas and 
Sartre were the core of a group that would have extended discussions with Kojève after he had 
formally adjourned his lectures.          
7 Henceforth abbreviated to Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. 
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Kojève’s rendering of Phenomenology of Spirit combines Hegel with Marxism8 and the 
phenomenological existentialism of Martin Heidegger.9 It describes the journey of 
consciousness in a manner that links it to the process of history and to the relationships among 
consciousnesses, which serves as “an entirely new perspective for those working in a 
phenomenological tradition still essentially defined by a Cartesian understanding of 
subjectivity” (Barnett 1998: 17). Such was the influence of Kojève’s interpretation of 
Phenomenology of Spirit, that it became the conventional approach to Hegel in early French 
phenomenology. Particular to this approach is the tension between a rejection of Hegel’s 
idealism on the one hand, and on the other, the adoption of his master-slave dialectic on the 
basis of its reflection of the necessarily conflictual relation of the existent with the “other”. 
(Riley 1981: 20-21)  
 
Kojève’s contribution to the “French Hegel” is undisputed. However, it would be remiss to 
pay no heed to Jean Hyppolite’s share in the twentieth century understanding of Hegel. Unlike 
his contemporaries, Hyppolite studiously avoided Kojève’s lectures for fear of being unduly 
influenced (Heckman in Hyppolite: xxvi), as he was embarking on what would become the 
first complete and still standard French translation of Phenomenology of Spirit. His own 
lectures on Hegel at the Ecole Normale Superior would inspire another important generation 
of French philosophers, including Althusser, Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault.  
Hyppolite describes human reality in terms of intersubjectivity, thus, challenging the notion 
that Hegel, like Fichte and Schelling, is a philosopher of the Subject. In this regard, Hyppolite 
                                                 
8 Merleau-Ponty was “profoundly influenced” (Aron 1975: iv) by Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. In 
Adventures of the Dialectic, Merleau-Ponty (1973: 81) suggests that “there are other ways to interpret 
[Hegel]: he could be, and we think he must be, made much more Marxist”, which is precisely what 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel offers its scholars. However, it can be argued that Kojève also 
makes Marx more Hegelian. Thus, Bloom (in Kojève 1969: viii) describes Kojève as “a Marxist who, 
dissatisfied with the thinness of Marx’s account of the human and metaphysical grounds of his 
teaching, turned to Hegel as the truly philosophic source of that teaching.” For Kojève, Hegel’s text 
shows the origin of oppression, which the historical materialist account of Marx and Engels fails to 
locate: the meeting of consciousnesses that is marked by conflict and domination. 
9 Thus, the individual depicted in the passage from Sense and Non-Sense, cited above, is Dasein: the 
existent who concerns himself with the Seinsfrage. At least part of the answer to the question of being 
that Hegel provides, suggests Merleau-Ponty via Kojève, is that man is Mitsein. 
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(1974: 77) argues that, unlike his compatriots, Hegel does not start with the I = I equation, 
that “we must begin not with the cogito but with the cogitamus” (322), in other words, for 
Hegel, self-consciousness is not presupposed but will emerge through the relationship 
between consciousnesses.10 While both Hyppolite and Kojève underscore the significance of 
the social, Hyppolite does not focus on the master-slave dialectic as the defining stage in 
consciousness’ journey to self-certainty. 
 
For the sake of expediency, I shall not repeat Hyppolite’s entire analysis in a separate section, 
but instead integrate his commentary into my comparative analysis of the first few dialectical 
movements of Phenomenology of Spirit and Kojève’s interpretation thereof. I find many 
points of agreement between Hyppolite’s commentary and my own reading of those 
dialectical movements, but I also show instances where his analysis tends to converge with 
Kojève’s emphasis on the need for violence. The one aspect of Hyppolite’s commentary that I 
do discuss separately is his preoccupation with “unhappy consciousness”, which ultimately 
confirms his adherence to the conventional interpretation of Hegel.     
 
In addition, I discuss Sartre’s critique of Hegel. Sartre endorses the notion of an unmediated 
Subject. Most often, he disregards the social dimension and intersubjectivity, but when he 
does attend to the relationship between consciousnesses, Sartre’s analysis repeats the 
Kojèvean emphasis on the necessarily conflictual relation of the existential subject with the 
other. 
 
The largest part of Part 2 is devoted to an analysis of Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel. I will demonstrate the bias in Kojève’s presentation of Phenomenology of Spirit: he 
omits the Preface, Introduction and the first movement of consciousness on its journey to 
Absolute Knowledge. Kojève also disregards important passages where Hegel accentuates the 
mutuality of recognition. Consequently, Kojève casts the dialectic of recognition “as much 
more confrontational, one-dimensional, and uni-directional than in fact is the case in Hegel’s 
story” (Lynch 2001: 33-34). Kojève reads Hegel in order to justify his Marxist agenda, 
resulting in an over-emphasis of “sameness”, which will not only lead to a recycling of the 
                                                 
10 See also Solomon (1983: 438-439). 
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conflict and domination that mark the master-slave dialectic, but once again portray Hegel as 
a prime example of German idealism with its penchant for “the primacy of subjectivity” 
(Williams 1997: 47). 
 
Before we turn to Kojève’s lectures, I think it is important to highlight certain themes that 
emerge from those opening chapters of Hegel’s text not acknowledged in Introduction to the 
Reading of Hegel.  
 
 
  
b) Lost in translation  
 
 
As is customary, Hegel wrote his preface to Phenomenology of Spirit upon completion of his 
text.11 In this section, Hegel (1977: 1-2) starts on a rather discouraging, even hostile, note:  
For what might appropriately be said about philosophy in a preface – say a historical 
statement of the main drift and the point of view, the general content and results, a string 
of random assertions and assurances about the truth – none of this can be accepted as the 
way in which to expound philosophical truth. Also, since philosophy moves essentially in 
the element of universality, which includes within itself the particular, it might seem that 
here more than in any of the other sciences the subject-matter itself, and even in its 
complete nature, were expressed in the aim and final results, the execution being by 
contrast really the unessential factor. … Furthermore, the very attempt to define how a 
philosophical work is supposed to be connected with other efforts to deal with the same 
subject-matter drags in extraneous concern, and what is really important for the cognition 
of the truth is obscured. The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of 
truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either 
accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not 
                                                 
11 See Hyppolite (1974: 51-56) for a contextualisation of how the Phenomenology of Spirit was 
conceived. 
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comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, 
but rather sees in it simple disagreements. 
From the outset, he dispels any expectation that the Preface will introduce his book, stating its 
aims and locating its relationship to other texts that have studied the same subject-matter. In 
fact, Hegel implies that, not only is his preface superfluous as an opening to Phenomenology 
of Spirit, but it “may even be an obstacle on our way to it” (Solomon 1983: 238). 
 
On one level, Hegel’s defensiveness pre-empts his critics’ suggestion that his text does not 
address what he had originally set out to achieve: since the opening paragraphs challenge the 
relevance and truth claims of prefaces, there is no reason to believe that Phenomenology of 
Spirit will abide by the goals12 of introducing Hegel’s philosophical system and serving as the 
first part of his Wissenschaft. On another level, Hegel already demonstrates the workings of 
his Science, the goal of which is to “lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual 
knowing” (Hegel: 3). Philosophical Truth – Absolute Knowledge – can only emerge from a 
comprehensive system because the “Absolute” or “Spirit” is “essentially a result, that only in 
the end is what it truly is” (11). Philosophy moves in the “element of universality” – it deals 
with general principles – however, encapsulated in the universal is every single particularity. 
A comprehensive approach to truth is beyond a simple opposition between “truth” and 
“falsity”; indeed, particular points of philosophical views cannot be said to be “false”. 
 
To be sure, argues Hegel (22-23), it is possible to “know something falsely”, which “means 
that there is a disparity between knowledge and its Substance”. This disparity is not, however, 
some kind of failure; indeed, “this very disparity is the process of distinguishing in general, 
which is an essential moment [in knowing].” In turn, this distinguishing makes identity 
possible, “and this resultant identity is the truth”. Crucially, “it is not truth as if the disparity 
had been thrown away, like dross from pure metal, not even like the tool which remains 
separate from the finished vessel”. For Hegel, the True is the substance, and, as I discuss 
below, the substance is the subject. In turn, the subject is negativity; thus, if the false is “the 
negative of the substance” (22), the false is negative negativity, or the Other. The disparity or 
“distance” between knowledge and its Substance, i.e. the subject, is the Other. Put differently, 
self-knowledge is mediated by an other. Hegel (23) continues:  
                                                 
12 For elaboration, see Hegel (1997: 43-45).   
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Yet we cannot therefore say that the false is a moment of the True, let alone a component 
part of it. To say that in every falsehood there is a grain of truth is to treat the two like oil 
and water, which cannot be mixed and are only externally combined. It is precisely on 
account of the importance of designating the moment of complete otherness that the terms 
‘true’ and ‘false’ must no longer be used … to talk of the unity of the subject and object, 
of finite and infinite, of being and thought, etc. is inept, since object and subject, etc. 
signify what they are outside of their unity …  
To use a more contemporary formulation, the subject is always already other: the positing of 
an ‘I’ is simultaneously the positing of a ‘not-I’; equally, a ‘not –I’ designates both itself as 
well as an ‘I’.   
 
Truth, writes Hegel (22), is “not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made”, 
but rather a progressive enfolding and unfolding of the entire (Western) philosophical 
tradition. The concept of “progression” or “development” (Bildung) may create the 
impression of a straight line moving ever-closer to the end of history where philosophical 
truth is to be found, akin to a stepladder that traverses our partial truths en route to a heavenly 
Absolute Form. Hegel’s (2) own metaphor for Bildung is quite different:   
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the 
former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up 
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it 
instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one 
another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them 
moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is 
as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.             
From this image of the growing plant we gauge Hegel’s teleology, with its acknowledged 
debt to “Aristotle [who] defines Nature as purposive activity” (12). The transitions from bud 
to blossom to fruit are teleologically necessary insofar as the purpose of each stage is the 
actualised plant. The bud cannot be defined as “plant” – definition presupposes actualisation – 
but is rather a potential-to-be-plant and, as such, a necessary part or moment towards 
actualisation. So, while it may seem that with every new development, the previous phase is 
summarily replaced, hence, the stage closest to actualisation is “more important” or “truer” 
than previous stages, it must be taken into account that all stages have a common purpose and 
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on this basis an equal value.13 It is important also to note Hegel’s suggestion of a mutuality 
and lack of conflict between particular forms, since these are central themes that will be 
discussed in much more detail during the course of this analysis.  
 
Since the “True is the whole” (11), are we to deduce from the above that Philosophical Truth 
is the end result of a synthesis of all philosophies through the ages, all equal and necessary, 
none brought into conflict with one another? It would be a mistake to label Hegel a relativist, 
after all, he posits Absolute Knowledge, unmediated, all-encompassing truth that cannot be 
transcended, that has no antithesis and is self-certain. Equally, it would be a mistake to equate 
Hegel’s call for the conservation of the philosophical tradition – the very next sentence after 
the plant metaphor criticises the “new philosopher” who shows his lack of understanding in 
his rejection of philosophical systems (2) – with an appeal to what one might call a “fusion of 
horizons”. The possibility of a fusion is based on an appeal to consensus and convention, 
which Culler (1994: 153) correctly associates with “acts of exclusion”. Hegel does not want to 
exclude any philosophy since the point of Absolute Knowledge is to be all-inclusive. 
 
Consider the following two passages from the Preface 
The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding 
is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros 
and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. Subject and object, 
God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as 
familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. 
(18) 
The study of philosophy is as much hindered by the conceit that will not argue, as it is by 
the argumentative approach. This conceit relies on truths which are taken for granted and 
which it sees no need to re-examine; it just lays them down, and believes it is entitled to 
                                                 
13 In his Politics, Aristotle (2000: 105-106) uses the example of sailors with their varying functions – 
oarsman, look-out man, pilot, etc. – but common definition based on common purpose: safety in 
navigation. Throughout his analysis, Solomon (1983: e.g. 24, 174-175 and 178-179) links 
Phenomenology of Spirit to various texts by Aristotle; notably, he excludes the Politics, in which 
Aristotle posits a master and slave. Below, I consider briefly the similarities and differences between 
Aristotle’s slave and the heroic slave of Kojève’s master-slave dialectic.        
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assert them, as well as to judge and pass sentence by appealing to them. In view of this, it 
is especially necessary that philosophising should again be made a serious business.  
(41) 
In both of these passages, Hegel asks the philosopher to “make strange” the truth claims and 
concepts adopted by particular philosophies. He warns against taking for granted that different 
positions are implicitly joined through an adherence to certain norms and a supposed shared 
understanding and use of certain key concepts. Hegel’s insistence on strangeness has two 
unexpected consequences for those who insist that he is the philosopher of the Same: making 
strange what is considered familiar takes into account differences and multiple perspectives; 
furthermore, making viewpoints “strangers” to one another not only confirms their 
distinctiveness but also, as estrangement suggests, evokes rupture. 
 
Recall also that Hegel in his plant metaphor describes the forms as “fluid” – not solid or rigid, 
but fluctuating, i.e., varying erratically, which signifies change and being or becoming 
different. We find in this description an appeal to the slipperiness of philosophical concepts 
and an apparent rejection of dogma. However, Hegel also writes that the fluid forms are 
“moments of an organic unity”. Would not the fluidity of the forms resist organisation into a 
harmonious system? How could unstable forms become oneness?  
 
The ambiguity suggested by these questions is one of many in Hegel’s text, but it is, 
according to Hyppolite (1974: 49-50), “the central problem of Hegelianism”, to wit, “to think 
universality through particularity and particularity through universality”, in other words, the 
dialectic of universal individuality.14 It falls outside the scope and ambition of this work to 
explain in detail the dialectic of universal individuality. What is important to note is that the 
“French Hegel” of the 1940s is defined by the manner in which scholars deal or do not deal 
with Hegel’s ambiguity. Those who dismiss Hegel define him as the absolute idealist; thus, 
they interpret Phenomenology of Spirit as simply a grandiose treatise on the Absolute. Those 
who appropriate him tend to omit the Absolute, or, at best, argue that another, more 
“Heraclitan Hegel” is the “true” Hegel of Phenomenology of Spirit, only to re-introduce the 
                                                 
14 It will become apparent that Hyppolite dismisses the dialectic of universal individuality owing to his 
preoccupation with “unhappy consciousness”.    
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theme of his idealism in their criticism. Heraclites, it will be recalled, defines the arché as: 
“Everything changes”. Solomon (1983: 14-16) describes Hegel as “Heraclitan”, inasmuch as 
Spirit is described by Hegel (6) as “never at rest but always engaged in moving forward.” 
This, Solomon argues, points to a Hegel that in effect posits an unreachable Absolute and, 
therefore, no end to philosophy. Of course, Heraclites is also famous for his proclamation that 
‘War is the father of all’, that, as Guthrie (1997: 43) explains, “all things live by conflict, 
which is therefore essential to life … [and] whatever lives, lives by the destruction of 
something else.” The implication is that a version of Hegel as a philosopher of change is 
based on the assumption of the inevitability, even necessity, of violence and conflict, which is 
precisely, as I will show, the connection between Kojève, Hyppolite and Sartre.    
 
Be that as it may, Hegel warns us in the opening pages about the “impossibility” of 
introductions, since the stating of aims is already an assertion of the result. He continues that 
“the result [is not] the actual whole, but rather the result together with the process through 
which it came about” (2). Thus, The Phenomenology of Spirit describes a journey en route to 
the Absolute: “the prize at the end of a complicated, tortuous path and of just as variegated 
and strenuous an effort” (7). One cannot begin with Absolute Knowledge, it is acquired 
gradually. Knowledge in its first phase is sense-consciousness – phenomenal or empirical 
knowledge – that must, “in order to become genuine knowledge … travel a long way and 
work its passage” (15). The point of departure is consciousness. 
 
In the Introduction, Hegel outlines the development of consciousness from sense-certainty to 
Absolute Knowledge. Consider the following extract from this outline:   
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time 
relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness; and the 
determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of something for a consciousness, is 
knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-another from being-in-itself; whatever is 
related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing 
outside of this relationship; this being-in-itself is called truth. … Now if we inquire into 
the truth of knowledge, it seems that we are asking what knowledge is in itself. Yet in this 
inquiry knowledge is our object, something that exists for us; and the in-itself that would 
supposedly result from it would rather be the being of knowledge for us. What we 
asserted to be its essence would be not so much its truth but rather just our knowledge of 
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it. … But the dissociation, or this semblance of dissociation and presupposition, is 
overcome by the nature of the object we are investigating. Consciousness provides its 
own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of 
consciousness with itself; for the distinction made above falls within it. … [In] what 
consciousness affirms from within itself as being-in-itself or the True we have the 
standard which consciousness itself sets up by which to measure what it knows. … If we 
designate knowledge as the Notion, but the essence or the True as what exists, or the 
object, then the examination consists in seeing whether the Notion corresponds to the 
object. … ‘Notion’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself’, both fall within 
that knowledge which we are investigating. … [What] consciousness examines is its own 
self… For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the 
other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness 
of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this 
consciousness is itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know 
whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not. The object, it is true, 
seems only to be for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it; it seems that 
consciousness cannot, as it were, get behind the object as it exists for consciousness so as 
to examine what the object is in itself, and hence, too, cannot test its own knowledge by 
that standard. But the distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in 
the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. … If the comparison shows that 
these two moments do not correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness 
must alter its own knowledge to make it conform to the object. But, in fact, in the 
alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters too … for it essentially belonged to 
this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to 
be the in-itself is not an in-itself, or that it was only an in-itself for consciousness. Since 
consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the object 
itself does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that 
for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing is not only 
a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is. 
Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which 
consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is 
precisely what is called experience.  … [Consciousness] will arrive at a point at which it 
gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it, 
and some sort of ‘other’, at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence … 
[which] will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself.    
(Hegel: 52-57) 
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Consciousness is consciousness of something, which signifies “the moment of the distinction 
between subject and object” (Hyppolite: 84).15 More precisely, consciousness distinguishes 
between knowledge, or the “Notion” of something (what the object is for consciousness) and 
truth (what the object is in itself).  
 
The first phase of knowledge relates to the immediate; in other words, the object of 
knowledge is simply what is given and nothing more. Sense-certainty has the appearance of 
being absolutely true, since it “has the object before it in its perfect entirety” (Hegel: 58). 
Consciousness in this phase has the particular form of a “pure I”, since it has not yet started to 
reflect on the object, or, in Hyppolite’s (85) words, “it does not develop as consciousness 
which represents objects to itself diversely or compares them among themselves.” Since 
consciousness’ knowledge does not extend beyond the fact that the object ‘is’, sense-certainty 
can be considered to be “the most abstract and poorest truth” (Hegel: 58). Sensuous certainty 
cannot know more than “the this, the here, the now” (Hyppolite: 90), for as soon as it 
classifies these notions, e.g., the chair, my office, this morning, we are no longer within the 
realm of immediacy. Classification presupposes comparison, which in turn points to a 
mediated object. Classification also suggests activity; instead of the passive behaviour of this 
‘I’ whose knowledge of the object can have no content beyond an affirmation of its existence.      
 
Now, from the passage cited above, it is consciousness that posits knowledge and truth and 
draws a distinction between them. Accordingly, the truth of knowledge (i.e. knowledge in 
itself), lies in the knowledge (what knowledge is for consciousness) of knowledge. Hyppolite 
(22) explains: “By designating what for it is the truth, it gives the criterion of its own 
knowledge.” The entire investigation of the object, knowledge, takes place within 
                                                 
15 Presumably, then, Hegel may also posit the “unconscious” as a moment “before” the “I” expresses 
itself as such, that is to say, “before” the I becomes aware of itself in relation to things that are not-I, a 
moment that is not marked by intentionality. To be sure, Hegel does not expound on this theme, but 
certainly Kojève makes it impossible to consider this aspect of Phenomenology of Spirit, since he 
collapses “the unconscious” into the first movement of consciousness. I look at the implications of this 
below. For further discussion of the “unconscious” in Hegel’s philosophy, see John Russon’s (2004: 
184-209) defence of the thesis that the “subterranean, the non-reflective, the embodied” is central to 
the dialectic.         
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consciousness; therefore, consciousness of knowledge cannot be separated from knowledge 
itself. Consciousness and the object are simultaneously mediated: “‘I’ have this certainty 
through something else, viz. the thing; and it is, similarly, in sense-certainty through 
something else, viz. through the ‘I’” (Hegel: 59). Put simply: Consciousness is held to be 
consciousness of something, the object. While the object has an independent existence – it is 
“in-itself” – consciousness knows the object only as what it is for consciousness. So, the 
object is at once separate from and related to consciousness and consciousness distinguishes 
itself from the object but, since the distinction takes place within consciousness, the object is 
simultaneously assimilated into consciousness. Two important implications can be deduced 
from this.  
 
Firstly, consciousness itself is the measure of whether or not its knowledge of the object 
corresponds to the truth of the object. Since the object is assimilated into consciousness, any 
changes in the knowledge of the object imply that the object itself has changed. A changed 
object contradicts the original positing of the True, i.e., the object-in-itself. Hyppolite (23) 
explains: “In testing out its knowledge of what it took as the in-itself, what is posited as being 
the absolutely true, consciousness discovers the latter to have been in-itself only for it.” This 
discovery is based on experience.  
 
Hegel refers to experience as a “dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on 
itself”. The dialectical movement consists of “the negation of the preceding object and the 
appearance of a new object, which in turn engenders a new knowledge” (Hyppolite: 24). In 
this regard, the dialectical movement of consciousness refers to Hegel’s central term 
“aufheben” (to “sublate” or “supersede”). Inwood (1992: 283) illustrates three main aspects of 
the definition of aufheben, namely, (1) to raise, lift up; (2) to destroy, cancel; (3) to keep, 
preserve. Combining Inwood’s (284) suggestion that Hegel uses the term in all three senses, 
as well as Williams’ (1997: 310) definition of aufheben, we may deduce the following: for 
one to preserve something involves removing it from its immediacy, from its being-in-itself, 
while at the same time mediating (or reflecting) it, and, by being mediated, it enters into union 
with one, its opposite. As a union, both the one and its opposite are transformed and preserved 
on an elevated level.  
 
 61
In our example, consciousness enters into a dialectic with knowledge; it will in other parts of 
Phenomenology of Spirit enter into a dialectic with nature and with other consciousnesses. 
Knowledge is no longer in-itself; it is for-consciousness, so consciousness and knowledge are 
related to but also distinct from one another. Through this relationship both consciousness and 
knowledge become something else. What they were before is negated through their union. 
However, the negation is not an absolute negation. Instead, the negation is partial, it is a 
determinate negation: it means to overcome while preserving what is overcome. The changed 
object, knowledge, is not a new object that has been discovered. Properly speaking, it is no 
longer an object inasmuch as object is something “contraposed” (Hyppolite: 24) to 
consciousness. Rather, the changed object contains also the dialectical movement in which the 
annihilation of the “original” object took place – the new True arises from the previous 
movement. 
 
In this regard, Hyppolite (65) suggests that Hegel’s method of dialectical movement makes 
his system “truly organic” – recall the plant metaphor, above, in which the developmental 
phases form an “organic unity” – since every new transition carries also within it the previous 
phase, enriched with a “more concrete meaning”. The way that Hyppolite uses “concrete” 
here is precisely not synonymous with “specific” or “particular” but instead means “actual” or 
“existing”: every new dialectical movement brings us closer to the actual, or fully completed 
Absolute. The Absolute is no longer a becoming, it is fully actualised potential. Thus, Hegel 
proposes that the first phase of the “dialectic of experience” (Russon 2004: 21), namely, 
empirical knowledge, is the most abstract form and Absolute Knowledge is the embodiment 
of the concrete!  
 
Empirical knowledge is superseded, but not on the basis of Cartesian doubt. For Hegel, there 
is an object, a world or nature. He dismisses the “conceit which understands how to belittle 
every truth, in order to turn back into itself and gloat over its own understanding, which 
knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego instead of any 
content” (Hegel: 52). To be sure, consciousness will learn as each dialectical movement 
unfolds that what it considers initially to be true, turns out to be illusory.  However, as 
Hyppolite (12-13) shows, Hegel does not take as his point of departure the Cartesian principle 
of universal doubt. Universal doubt is a function of philosophical thought, which Hegel 
“contraposes [to] the concrete evolution of a consciousness which progressively learns to 
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doubt what it previously took to be true”; consciousness’ “road of doubt is the actual route 
that consciousness follows … [it] is its own itinerary, not that of the philosopher who resolves 
to doubt.” The crucial implication of Hegel’s emphasis on the concrete experience of doubt is 
that it does not start from the general doubt over the existence and independence of things 
outside of consciousness: to reiterate the point made above, for Hegel, there is a world and it 
exists independently of consciousness.  
 
Hyppolite (67) offers that the consciousness posited by Hegel “is not experienced as an I in 
the reflection of scientific thought, but in its impulses and their actualisation, in the movement 
of its desires.” This movement of consciousness’ desires will be discussed at length when we 
consider Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. For him, and indeed all the French scholars of that 
era, this is the central movement because of its focus on the struggle for self-recognition. In 
the dialectic of experience, this self-consciousness as desire will in its turn be superseded by 
reason, though reason in itself is also posited, according to Hyppolite, as a “concrete given” 
(68), “a kind of materialism” (69).16       
For Hegel (56), the arisen is a “movement and a process of becoming”. The movement 
continues ceaselessly until “knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge 
finds itself”, in other words, when knowledge is True, and “short of it no satisfaction is to be 
found at any of the stations on the way” (51). As long as the dialectic of experience continues, 
consciousness is never at peace, it is constantly compelled to go beyond itself.17 Moreover, 
with every transition it must face, annihilate, the shortcomings of its knowledge.   
 
This brings us to the second implication of the union between consciousness and the object of 
knowledge; namely, the process of being conscious of the object implies that consciousness is 
also conscious of itself; consequently, scrutinizing the object implies self-scrutiny. Hegel 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately, it falls outside of the scope of this work to give an account of the subsequent 
movements and thus to come to grips with the exact nature of Hegel’s assumed absolute idealism. 
Incidentally, Kojève (1969: 210) also acknowledges the significance of the concrete in Hegel’s text.  
17 The description of consciousness as always going “beyond itself” will be echoed in the postulation 
of Dasein as a “projecting” (Heidegger 1978: 185) or a “Being-towards-possibilities” (188), and will 
feature also in early French phenomenology, including Sartre’s postulation of human reality as 
“transcendence”. 
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posits consciousness in relation to an other – whether it signifies the object, or nature or other 
consciousnesses – and, whatever knowledge is gleaned from this other, is also a self-
knowledge. Indeed, as Hegel (9-10) asserts in the Preface: “In my view, which can be 
justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and 
expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.” His perspective indicates 
not only that the subject and object of knowledge cannot be separated, but also that Absolute 
knowledge is self-knowledge.18 Thus, Hyppolite (20) concludes, “we discover in the various 
objects of consciousness what consciousness is itself”. Furthermore, the idea of the subject 
and object constituting one another – the other is for-consciousness as much as consciousness 
can only be consciousness of an other – resonates with those philosophers of existence who 
posit Dasein, or the existent, as Mitwelt and Mitsein.  
 
Above, I allude to the violence that accompanies the transitions that consciousness undergoes 
on its path to the Absolute. During the course of every transition, consciousness dialectically 
overcomes itself; it never experiences satisfaction or tranquillity. Hegel (51) writes:                       
When consciousness feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat from the 
truth, and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing. But it can find no peace. If it 
wishes to remain in a state of inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its 
own unrest disturbs its inertia.  
Hyppolite (149) suggests that the “attributed adjective which recurs most frequently in 
Hegel’s dialectic is disquiet [unruhig]. This disquiet is symptomatic of the unremitting 
annihilation of what had previously seemed familiar to the subject, “the loss of our familiar 
foundations and guarantees within experience” (Russon 2004: 21). The journey to the 
Absolute is hampered by consciousness’ feelings of anxiety and also “despair” (Hegel: 50).19  
                                                 
18 For Hyppolite, the postulation of absolute knowledge as self-knowledge puts Hegel on the path of 
Husserlian phenomenology. See Hyppolite (9-10) for some interesting observations on this theme.   
19 The influence on Heidegger, and, by association, also French phenomenology, is evident. In Being 
and Time, Heidegger (1974: 234) submits that “anxiety is Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-
world”; that in anxiety one feels unheimlich. What consciousness hopes to hold on to if it remains inert 
is what Heidegger (233) calls “tranquillised self-assurance”, translated by Sartre as “bad faith”. Of 
course, in Hegel’s postulation of the journey towards the Absolute, there will be a point where there is 
no longer a distinction between the Notion and the object, in, other words, where our knowledge of the 
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Moreover, since the substance is also the subject, these feelings point to the breaking down of 
self-identity. In fact, the dialectic of experience shows that the subject “is” not (yet) of the 
order of “is”: whatever “self” is recovered at the end of a dialectical movement is an 
aufgehobene self and, thus, related but not identical to its former self and, once again, 
subjected to the next sublation. The dialectic of experience means that the subject is nothing 
but perpetual movement and nowhere but in motion.  
 
Phenomenology of Spirit can be read simultaneously on three levels. It is a phenomenology: a 
description of the journey of Spirit as it traverses the various developments of consciousness. 
It is an epistemology insofar as it charts “the detailed history of the education of 
consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” (Hegel: 50); in other words, a treatise on 
philosophical development that follows the progress of the philosopher, having taken into 
account the history of philosophical thought and then coming to a new, comprehensive 
understanding of knowledge, including the relationship between knowledge and truth and the 
relationship between knowledge and experience. On this point, Hyppolite (52) considers 
Phenomenology of Spirit as Hegel’s way of expressing or reiterating the history of his 
personal philosophical journey. Finally, it is an anthropology, a discourse on self-identity, or 
a “kind of auto-biography” (Solomon: 197) in which the individual comes to understand 
himself, particularly with regards to his relationship with others.20 Crucially, this refers not to 
a single individual, since Hegel considers the particular as “incomplete Spirit” (16), but rather 
to the “universal individual”.  
 
Let us now turn to the first of the “anthropologistic readings of Hegel” (Derrida 1982: 117), 
namely, Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
object and the object itself are one and the same, or Absolute Knowledge. This is exactly the point 
where early French phenomenology will not follow Hegel.   
20 The male-identified pronouns are deliberate, indeed, one could simply substitute “universal 
individual” with man – for reasons that will become clear in Part 3.      
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c) Kojève’s lectures on Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
 
 
c.1) Desire of Desire  
 
 
The first noticeable aspect of Kojève’s analysis is the title of the opening chapter, In Place of 
an Introduction, witty in its veiled reference to Hegel’s assertion in the Preface of 
Phenomenology of Spirit of the impossibility of introductions. Secondly, there is an opening 
quote from Karl Marx; to wit, “Hegel … erfasst die Arbeit als das Wesen, als das sich 
bewährende Wesen des Menschen”, which foreshadows Kojève’s agenda of portraying 
Hegel’s text as the victorious journey of the labouring slave. Thirdly, as I have previously 
mentioned, Kojève dispenses with the first chapters of Hegel’s text.  
 
Kojève reveals from the outset that his reading of Hegel will have an anthropological spirit. 
Indeed, Kojève’s (1969: 3) translation with commentary of Section A (Independence and 
dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage) of Chapter IV (The Truth of Self-
Certainty) of Phenomenology of Spirit, begins with the following commentary:21 
Man is Self-Consciousness. He is conscious of himself, conscious of his human reality 
and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially different from animals, which do not go 
beyond the level of simple Sentiment of self.  
Kojève (4) contends that self-consciousness is the “very being of man”, therefore, whatever 
comes “before” self-consciousness cannot signify being (hu)man. He is not at all interested in 
                                                 
21 Kojève sets out to translate Hegel’s text to his class and provide commentary that is indicated by 
brackets. All my citations from Phenomenology of Spirit come from Miller’s English translation, the 
paragraph numbering of which corresponds to the paragraph divisions in Hegel’s original German 
text.  
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the first dialectical movement; thus, he ignores the “pure I” that is posited in the first stage of 
consciousness’ development and the transition that must take place before that consciousness 
becomes self-consciousness. Instead, he bases his analysis on “the why or the how of the birth 
of the word ‘I’, and consequently of self-consciousness – that is, of the human reality” 
(Kojève: 3). From this perspective, Kojève downplays the importance of the three 
subdivisions of consciousness; to wit, sensation, perception and understanding, in order to 
present a self-consciousness that hinges on what he coins “anthropogenetic desire”.  
 
Kojève commences with the second movement of Hegel’s dialectic – when consciousness is 
transformed to self-consciousness – and, thus, with an already constituted human subject: to 
be fully human, Matthews (1996: 113) correctly reads into Kojève’s position, entails being 
conscious of oneself as a human being. Kojève (1969: 37) asserts  
To reach [Self-Consciousness], one must start from something other than contemplative 
knowledge of Being, other than passive relation, which leaves Being as it is in itself, 
independent of the knowledge that reveals it. Indeed, we all know that the man who 
attentively contemplates a thing, who wants to see it as it is without changing anything, is 
“absorbed,” so to speak, by this contemplation – that is, by this thing. He forgets himself, 
he thinks only about the thing being contemplated; he thinks neither about his 
contemplation, nor – and even less – about himself, his “I,” his Selbst. The more he is 
conscious of the thing, the less he is conscious of himself. He may perhaps talk about the 
thing, but he will never talk about himself; in his discourse, the word “I” will not occur. 
For this word to appear, something other than purely passive contemplation, which only 
reveals Being, must also be present. And this other thing, according to Hegel, is Desire, 
Begierde, of which he speaks in the beginning of Chapter IV. 
Here it seems as if Kojève follows Hegel in asserting that consciousness starts when “I” is 
expressed for the “first time”. Kojève describes the man who contemplates, i.e. sense-
certainty, as being “absorbed” by what he contemplates, he “loses himself” in the object. At 
the level of consciousness, man is merely a “knowing subject” (3): consciousness is directed 
towards and wholly absorbed in its objects without a sense of having a subjective experience. 
Man who is “absorbed” by the object that he is contemplating can be “brought back to 
himself” (3), his “I” can occur, only by a desire. When man desires something he is moved to 
say “I want ...” Desire is my desire. Hence, it is “as ‘his’ Desire that man is formed and is 
revealed – to himself and to others – as an I ...” (4). To desire something is to be conscious of 
it as different from oneself: as other, as an object, “an external reality … which is not he but a 
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non-I” (37), distinguishable from oneself as subject. Self-consciousness, or being aware of 
oneself as subject distinct from an object, is attained through desire. The very being of man, 
writes Kojève (4), meaning, man as self-conscious being, implies and presupposes desire.    
 
However, I must interject. The “I” in Hegel’s first dialectical movement is not absorbed by 
the object; instead, this I’s point of view is that of the pre-Socratic Parmenides. For 
Parmenides, Guthrie (1997: 49) reminds us, “only the mind can reach the truth, and the mind 
– so [Parmenides] proclaimed with the simple arrogance of the first of all abstract thinkers – 
proves incontrovertibly that reality is utterly different.” Consciousness in the first movement 
posits itself as subject and the object as something alien from or other to it. It is not 
consciousness that is absorbed in the object, but rather the object that is assimilated by 
consciousness – more precisely, the “object” is an abstraction of consciousness, it has no 
bearing on the actual existence of the object but only on what it is for consciousness. What the 
subject loses is his solipsistic self when he becomes aware of the fact that both he and the 
object are mediated. I would submit that, by not drawing a clear distinction between the 
unconscious and sense-certainty, Kojève’s Hegel loses its sharp criticism of the Cartesian ego, 
the “pure I” that supposedly comprises our essential identity.  
 
Certainly, Hegel (102) acknowledges at the end of his discussion of the first dialectical 
movement:  
It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-
consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness. The 
necessary advance from the previous shapes of consciousness for which their truth was a 
Thing, an ‘other’ than themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a 
thing possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is the truth 
of those shapes. But it is only for us that this truth exists, not yet for consciousness. 
The “us” that Hegel is referring to in this passage signify the philosophers, who embark on a 
phenomenological investigation of Spirit – they know that consciousness is also self-
consciousness; consciousness, however, becomes aware of itself at the end of the dialectical 
movement with the object, when its naïve solipsism is sublated.22  
                                                 
22 Hyppolite (1974: 65) is in agreement with Hegel’s depiction of consciousness and self-
consciousness as two separate movements.        
 68
 
Hegel (62) writes: “Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is 
neither in the object nor in the ‘I’…” Hence, when Kojève refers to the self being “brought 
back to himself”, it does not carry the same meaning as the aufgehobene consciousness in 
which the subject and object, consciousness and its other, are reconciled, instead, it is the 
subject who frees himself from the object through an act of negation. By equating being 
human to self-consciousness and not acknowledging the first dialectical movement, Kojève is 
in effect positing an unmediated “I”, which is precisely what Hegel does not do. 
 
Early in the chapter entitled, Self-Consciousness, Hegel (105) does indeed state that “self-
consciousness is Desire in general.” Whereas the first shape of knowledge – consciousness – 
was directed at an other, i.e. the sensuous world, the next shape, self-consciousness, is self-
knowledge (104-105). Since it is the form of consciousness that poses itself for itself, in other 
words, since the I is simultaneously the subject and object, self-consciousness is “the 
motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’” (105). 
 
However, the abstraction I = I is not the essence of self-consciousness, “it does not have the 
form of being” (105). Otherness does have the form of “a being”. Hegel (105) writes that 
“self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and 
is essentially a return from otherness.” The sensuous world – otherness – is the essence, the 
starting point for self-consciousness. Hence, the world of consciousness, the first movement 
of Spirit’s journey, is preserved for self-consciousness. It is preserved, not as a being-in-itself, 
a givenness that consciousness contemplates, but “as an object that must be negated in order 
that through this negation of the being-other self-consciousness establishes its own unity with 
itself” (Hyppolite 1974: 158). In other words, whereas the truth in the first movement lies 
within the object, the truth in the second movement resides with the I of self-consciousness. 
The phenomenal world no longer exists in-itself, its being is appropriated by the self of 
consciousness. Thus, what Hegel means by desire is “this movement of consciousness which 
does not respect being but negates it, appropriating it concretely and making it its own” 
(Hyppolite: 159). It is only at this point that Hegel’s discussion meets up with Kojève’s 
analysis. 
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Kojève (38) writes: “The human I must be an I of Desire – that is, an active I, a negating I, an 
I that transforms Being and creates a new being by destroying the given being.” Desire moves 
man into action; action emanates from desire. All action is “negating”. This is because the 
gratification of a desire entails the destruction or, at the very least, transformation of the 
desired object. To sate my hunger, for instance, the food must be destroyed or transformed; 
thus, an act of negation. This negating act, by destroying the given from what it was to 
something “other”, destroys an objective reality and brings about in its place a subjective 
reality. In the example of an I who gratifies my desire to eat, I create my own reality by 
overcoming or superseding a reality other that my own. I transform or assimilate or internalise 
an “external” reality into my own reality. Self-certainty, in other words, the gratification of 
desire, is attained by removing the other, put differently, by destroying the otherness of the 
other. The object of desire – the food that I want to eat – is not posited in itself, I remove its 
independence through my consumption. 
 
As self-consciousness, consciousness now has a “double object”: firstly, the immediate object 
of the first dialectical movement that has for self-consciousness the character of negativity, 
and secondly, itself, which is “present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object” 
(Hegel: 105). Now, Hegel suggests that, in itself, the object that is for self-consciousness 
characterised by negativity, has “returned into itself”. This reflection back onto itself means 
that the object can no longer be defined simply as a sensuous object perceived by 
consciousness: “the object has become Life”. Put differently, “the object of immediate desire 
is a living thing” (106). If the given object was the truth of consciousness in the first 
movement, life is the other or the truth of self-consciousness in the second movement. To 
desire life is to wish for self-preservation, to wish to live.  
 
At this point, I must interrupt Hegel’s train of thought to show how Kojève interprets self-
consciousness’ relationship to the living thing. Kojève makes much more of the notion of 
“immediate desire”, which he translates as animal desire, than is found in Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Animal desire is a necessary but not sufficient condition of self-consciousness. 
(Kojève: 4, 39) Whether to sate hunger, to quench thirst or provide shelter, animal desire 
negates a natural given and through this negation, the animal “raises itself above this given” 
(39). However, by eating the fruit, drinking from the river and nesting in the tree, the animal 
does not truly surpass the natural given: “the animal raises itself above the Nature that is 
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negated in its animal Desire only to fall back into it immediately by the satisfaction of this 
Desire” (39). The I that is formed by such satisfaction is a “‘thingish’ I, a merely living I, an 
animal I” (4). This “animal I” attains merely “sentiment of self” but not yet self-
consciousness. Kojève continues that an animal “cannot say ‘I…’ … because [it] does not 
really transcend itself as given – i.e., as body; it does not rise above itself in order to come 
back toward itself; it has no distance with respect to itself in order to contemplate itself” (39). 
 
To desire the “given being”, the sensuous world, is to enslave oneself to it, and, as such, to be 
thing-like. But to desire non-being is to transcend the given, to realise one’s autonomy, to be 
self-conscious and thus, to be human. The desire for non-being is the desire that is directed 
“toward another Desire, another greedy emptiness, another I”: “man must act not for the sake 
of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing)” (40). 
Kojève counterposes animal desire with what he calls “anthropogenetic” or “humanising” 
desire. 
 
For Kojève, there are two important implications derived from anthropogenetic desire. Firstly, 
self-consciousness emerges from a social reality (5-6). What it means to be fully human 
entails being a member of a society of other human beings. Man, explains Kojève, can appear 
on earth only within a herd: human reality can only be social. (6) However, for a “herd” to 
become a society, the desires of each member must be directed toward the desire of the other 
members. In Matthews’ (1996: 114) words, “these members of society desire each other’s 
desire as the desire of another human being.” Secondly, all anthropogenetic desire, the desire 
that generates self-consciousness, is a function of the desire for recognition. In point of fact, 
Kojève expresses the function of human desire in far more malevolent terms than mere 
acknowledgment of the self. At the end of his introduction to anthropogenetic desire, Kojève 
(40) states that the purpose of human desire is for man “to make the other recognise his 
superiority over the other.”              
 
Let us return to Hegel’s discussion of life as the object of desire in the second movement of 
consciousness. In this opposition, self-consciousness is for itself, it claims for itself “the 
individuality which maintains itself at the expense of the universal” (Hegel: 108), in other 
words, it severs its relation to universal life and claims to be independent of it. However, the 
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independence of self-consciousness implicitly affirms the independence of its object. As 
desire, as the negation of being, self-consciousness will “learn through experience that the 
object is independent” (Hegel 106). How does this experience unfold? Hyppolite (162) 
ventures that it emerges from the “continuous reproduction of desire and of the object” in 
which the specificity of these desires and objects is not as crucial as what their monotonous 
reproduction reveals: the necessity of the object of desire.  
 
Consider Hegel’s (109) elaboration:    
Certain of the nothingness of this other, [self-consciousness] explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby 
gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit 
for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner. In this satisfaction, however, 
experience makes it aware that the object has its own independence. Desire and the self-
certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty 
comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there 
must be this other.  
Since self-certainty comes from superseding the object, there must be an object – an other – 
for this supersession to take place. In the act of negating the object, self-consciousness is, 
therefore, simultaneously restoring it. Hence, self-consciousness, by producing the object 
again, is unable to supersede it and the other’s independence is reaffirmed. Since the object is 
independent, desire can be gratified only if the object itself brings about the negation within 
itself. Hegel (109-110) concludes: “Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being 
so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness” (109-110). Moreover, this 
independent object “posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness” and, as such, is a 
“living self-consciousness” (110). Life is no longer “only the element of substantiveness, the 
other of the I” (Hyppolite: 163), but becomes for self-consciousness another self-
consciousness. Through experience, self-consciousness learns that it attains the satisfaction of 
its desire only in another self-consciousness. Hegel (110) writes that a “self-consciousness 
exists for a self-consciousness” and, as such, we catch a glimpse of the “Notion of Spirit” 
encapsulated in the union: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.        
 
In his translation and exposition of Phenomenology of Spirit, Kojève omits the first quarter of 
part A (marked 178-184), except for the first sentence of the paragraph (marked 178). That 
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first sentence Kojève (9) translates as: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself in and by 
the fact that it exists (in and for itself) for another Self-Consciousness; i.e. it exists only as an 
entity that is recognised.”23 What Kojève does not include in his commentary is that this 
recognition must be viewed as a mutual recognition, that neither consciousness can attain 
complete self-consciousness without the recognition of the other. Regarding the mutuality of 
recognition, Hegel (111-112) submits: 
Now this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in 
this way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of the 
one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the 
other as well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing 
in it of which it is not itself the origin. The first does not have the object before it merely 
as it exists primarily for desire, but as something that has an independent existence of its 
own, which, therefore, it cannot utilise for its own purposes, if that object does not of its 
own accord do what the first does to it. Thus the movement is simply the double 
movement of two self-consciousnesses.  
The movement of superseding the other independent being, in order to become certain of itself 
as an essential being by one self-consciousness, is both its own action as well as the action of 
the other. Simply put, while the subject sets himself up as the essential, distinct from the 
other, which he poses as the object, the inessential, the other consciousness sets up a 
reciprocal claim. (111-112) For Hegel, recognition depends on reciprocity, which in turn 
involves free and independent agents that must renounce coercion. True recognition involves 
the reciprocal mediation of free and independent self-consciousnesses; thus, self-
consciousness gratifies its desire only in another self-consciousness that is equally essential. 
Hegel (112) concludes the section (that Kojève omits) by pointing out that these two 
consciousnesses “recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another.”  
 
Kojève disregards this notion of the mutual recognition of consciousnesses. He resumes his 
translation and commentary from the point (marked 185) where Hegel explains how the 
process of reciprocal recognition appears to self-consciousness. “At first,” writes Hegel (112-
113), “it will exhibit the side of inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term 
                                                 
23 In Miller’s translation, Hegel (111) writes: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by 
the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”  
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into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognised, 
the other only recognising.” Now, this dialectic of self-recognition takes place in the “being 
[or immediacy] of Life”, thus, the two self-consciousnesses are for one another like ordinary 
objects. More, precisely, self-consciousness assumes for itself the status of an individual, 
absolutely certain of its own self through the exclusion of everything else. What this simple 
being-for-self experiences as “other” is for it “an unessential, negatively characterised object” 
(113).  
However, this other is also a self-consciousness. So we have a confrontation between two 
individuals, for themselves absolute certainty and for each other no more than an ordinary 
object. While each of the two individuals may be certain of his own self, his self-certainty 
does not yet have the status of truth, since neither are certain of the other. Kojève’s (11) 
description of this dilemma is revealing:  
The “first” man who meets another man for the first time already attributes an 
autonomous, absolute value to himself: we can say that he believes himself to be a man, 
that he has “subjective certainty” of being a man. But this certainty is not yet knowledge. 
The value that he attaches to himself can be illusory; the idea that he has of himself could 
be false or mad. For that idea to be truth, it must reveal an objective reality – i.e., an 
entity that is valid and exists not only for itself, but also for realities other than itself. 
The individual, suggests Kojève, must find the private idea that he has of himself, his 
subjective certainty, objectively recognised. Tellingly, in this citation, Kojève describes the 
concept of recognition in terms of a single, “first” man desiring self-acknowledgment. In the 
same vein, Kojève (11) writes: “[For] man to be truly “man”, and to know that he is such, 
must, therefore, impose the idea that he has of himself on beings other than himself: he must 
be recognised by the other (in the ideal, extreme case, by all others).” 
 
Hegel (113) argues that the truth of self-certainty is “possible only when each [of the two 
individual self-consciousnesses] is for the other what the other is for it, only when each in its 
own self through its own action, and again through the action of the other, achieves this pure 
abstraction of being-for-self.” Recall the citation where Hegel is explicit about the mutuality 
that marks the movement of the dialectic for recognition: it is the double movement of the two 
self-consciousnesses, not the action of one of the parties. Hyppolite (166) correctly sums up: 
“I am a self-consciousness only if I gain for myself recognition from another self-
consciousness and if I grant recognition to the other.” Indeed, Hegel (111) is adamant: 
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“Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought 
about by both.” 
 
However, having already disregarded Hegel’s call for mutuality in recognition, Kojève’s point 
of departure in the dialectic of recognition is precisely this action by one side only – the 
solitary man shaping the world, both natural and human, according to his view of himself. 
From this perspective, it will become clear that Kojève does not sufficiently appreciate the 
importance Hegel attaches to otherness. This failure is particularly noticeable in his treatment 
of the life and death struggle, to which we now turn.    
 
 
 
c.2) Life or Freedom    
 
 
Since self-consciousness sets out to present itself as the “pure abstraction of being-for-self”, 
in other words, as the negation of the immediate object, i.e., Life, it needs to demonstrate that 
it is “not attached to life” (Hegel: 113). Kojève (12) paraphrases: “[To] be for oneself, or to be 
a man, is not to be bound to any determined existence … not to be bound to life.” Negating 
life is the double movement of both self-consciousnesses. For each other, these self-
consciousnesses are merely living things. Thus, each seeks the death of the other and, by 
implication, both stake their own lives. In order to “raise their certainty of being for 
themselves to truth” (Hegel: 114), these two self-conscious individuals engage in a life-and-
death struggle.  
 
What Hegel writes next, if taken out of the context of a dialectical movement, will be for 
Kojève the raison d’être of humanity; to wit: 
And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that 
for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the immediate form in 
which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is 
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nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only 
pure being-for-self. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognised as 
a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-
consciousness. Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other’s 
death, for it values the other no more than itself, its essential being is present to it in the 
form of an ‘other’, it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality.       
Kojève presents this moment of the Kampf auf Leben und Tod as the essence of human life. 
For him, “human reality is created, is constituted, only in the fight for recognition and by the 
risk of life that it implies”, thus, the “truth of man … presupposes the fight to the death” and 
“human-individuals are obliged to start this fight” (Kojève: 12). Elsewhere, Kojève (41) 
asserts that “human, historical, self-conscious existence is possible only where there are, or – 
at least – where there have been, bloody fights, wars for prestige.” Kojève believes that this 
imperious desire to be recognised, not merely to survive, is what separates man from beast. 
To be human is based on the willingness to seek acknowledgment of one’s humanity at the 
cost of all else, including self-preservation. Put differently, humanity is founded on the 
disavowal of animal desire in favour of anthropogenetic desire in order to affirm one’s worth 
as a human being.  
 
Since the self is mediated by an other, freedom is won only by ridding oneself of “self-
externality”. This means, that man must overcome the situation of self-estrangement, or, as 
Kojève (13) puts it, being “outside of himself”. The life and death struggle is the means by 
which the self compels the other to “give him back to himself”, that is, to recognise him. 
Kojève argues that true human freedom is acquired by two things: Fighting and Work. It will 
become clear that both of these imply acts of negation; indeed, at one point, Kojève (209) 
affirms: “Freedom = Action = Negativity.”  
 
Regarding the life and death struggle, man asserts his freedom by, not only seeking the death 
of the other, but also putting his own life on the line.24 A number of important interrelated 
implications arise from these sentiments. Firstly, if the mark of freedom is the self’s negation 
of his “being-other”, freedom equals the motionless tautology I = I. More precisely, if the 
                                                 
24 Hyppolite (170) concurs: “Man rises above life … he is capable of risking his life and thereby 
freeing himself from the only slavery possible, enslavement to life.” 
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denouement of the life and death struggle is the actual death of the other, the self would be 
nothing more than an abstraction of the order of self-consciousness casting itself as “self-
equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else” (Hegel: 113). Secondly, life – the 
other – is cast, not simply as the opposite, but rather, as the absence of freedom. Thus, a 
binary opposition is created: Man is self-consciousness, i.e., being-for-itself, transcendence, 
freedom and non-man is the in-itself consciousness that does not transcend his immediacy 
because of his attachment to life. Thirdly, the emergence of man signifies the death of nature, 
put differently, being truly human “is” to be non-natural, separated from the concrete and the 
given – in short, to be an idea(l). Thus, we find ourselves returned to the hallowed realm of 
the Cartesian cogito.  
 
Crucially, there are two aspects of Hegel’s analysis that contradict the assumption of the life 
and death struggle as the true meaning of humanity. Throughout Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel is careful to distinguish between how consciousness experiences the various transitions 
of Spirit and how the philosopher reads the situation. We have seen that consciousness 
assumes the truth of something only to be proven wrong through experience. Since the 
philosopher knows, with the benefit of analysing consciousness’ journey in its entirety, that 
this “first meeting” between two self-consciousnesses does not constitute the Absolute, there 
is every reason to believe that consciousness is once again mistaken about what is, for it, the 
truth. Sure enough, consciousness is about to learn that “[this] trial of death, however, does 
away with the truth which is supposed to issue from it, and so, too, with the certainty of self 
generally” (114). 
 
Furthermore, Hegel’s analysis has hitherto yielded only one essential feature, albeit in 
different guises: a self inexorably related to an other. Recall that the self forces the other to 
engage in the life and death struggle as a means of ridding himself of otherness – to assert 
himself rather than being mediated by another. Although desire will not explicitly recognise 
an other, there would be no desire without an other: “its very nature, therefore, is such as it 
requires an other” (Russon 2004:62). A call to fight is a tacit acknowledgment that the self 
and other, who is also a self, constitute each other.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1964: 68) explains: 
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We cannot be aware of the conflict unless we are aware of our reciprocal relationship and 
our common humanity. We do not deny each other except by mutual recognition of our 
consciousnesses.  … [My] consciousness of another as an enemy comprises an 
affirmation of him as an equal. … By myself I cannot be free, nor can I be consciousness 
or a man; and that other whom I first saw as my rival is a rival only because he is 
myself.25   
When two self-consciousnesses that have privately assumed for themselves the status of self-
certainty face off, their meeting has a double significance. On the one hand, the self has “lost 
itself, for it finds itself as an other being” (Hegel: 111), put differently, he is for-an-other and 
an other is for-him. On the other hand, the self has superseded the other insofar as he sees 
only himself in the other and “does not see the other as an essential being” (111). Thus, “the 
other appears as the same, as the self, but the self also appears as the other” (Hyppolite: 168).  
 
Consequently, anthropogenetic desire brings about self-negation as well. If all self-
consciousnesses in the process of becoming self-certain try to satisfy their anthropogenetic 
desire through the life and death struggle, the fight would unavoidably end in the death of one 
or both of the adversaries. While the death of these adversaries would confirm that neither 
held a life without self-recognition in high regard, death only brings about the negation of 
consciousness.  
 
Hegel (114) writes that, in the event of the actual death of one or both combatants, “the two 
do not reciprocally give and receive one another back from each other consciously, but leave 
each other free only indifferently, like things.” Now, this citation needs to be qualified. The 
notions of the self “losing itself” or “receiving the self back from an other” imply a prior 
moment when the self was self-equal, when he was unmediated. However, such a reading 
seems to contradict the earlier suggestion regarding the centrality of otherness in Hegel’s 
analysis; to wit, the self cannot “be” without an other. If the self is “lost in the other”, he has 
always been “lost” – there could not have been a moment when the self was free of the other. 
                                                 
25 In Part 3, I show that this prior assumption of equality, which Merleau-Ponty correctly finds in 
Hegel’s portrayal of the struggle for recognition, seriously under-estimates how human society is 
always already organised to treat certain types of otherness as inferior.     
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The journey to the Absolute is, among other things, about self-knowledge and what the 
initially narcissistic self will come to know is that the “self” that is “returned” to him in the 
reciprocal recognition of two selves, is an aufgehobene self, the consciousness that he is and 
has always been this self-other union. Notwithstanding the ambiguity, the fact of the matter is 
that that “self” and “other” are couched in oppositional terms before they are reconciled, or, 
more precisely in Hegel’s case, the single consciousness comes to understand and embrace 
the knowledge, gained only after experience, that he was always both self and other. In short, 
knowledge is (still) the prerogative of the cogito.  
 
Is this our cue to tremble at the implied Subjectivity of Hegel’s dialectic? I concur with 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1964: 79-80) statement: “No man can reject the cogito and deny 
consciousness, on pain of no longer knowing what he is saying and of renouncing all 
statements, even materialist ones.” Be that as it may, it must be apparent by now that 
Phenomenology of Spirit is written in the language of the philosophy of the Subject precisely 
in order to subvert that very philosophy. At every turn, Hegel challenges the presumed 
absolute status of the “I”. Indeed, earlier, Hegel (110) states that a self-consciousness “is just 
as much ‘I’ as ‘object’ [that is to say, other].” Instead of an “exclusive parochial identity” 
(Williams 1994: 55), Hegel posits intersubjectivity based on reciprocity and mutuality 
between self and other.  
 
When he moves from reciprocal recognition to an account of lordship and bondage, which I 
will discuss below, he specifies that the respective viewpoints of the master and slave are only 
opposed extremes. Thus, I concur with Lynch’s (2001: 38) assessment that Hegel posits the 
dialectic of master and slave to demonstrate that each represent “one-sided and incomplete, 
and thus illusory, versions of [the process of mutual recognition].” I believe Hegel turns the 
discussion to the master-slave dialectic precisely because he needs to show that, even in 
unequal relationships, the domination of the other is self-subverting. Hegel does not ascribe a 
higher moral status to either the master or the slave. His point of departure regarding self-
other relationships is the senselessness and immorality of both lordship and bondage. 
 
However, when the dialectical movements through which consciousnesses pass are described 
unilaterally, that is, only from the perspective of a single subject who is perpetually yearning 
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to be only for-itself, the urge to oppress the other seems inevitable. This is precisely what 
happens in Kojève’s analysis. Lynch (43) correctly observes: “As the translation and 
commentary proceed, Kojève’s emphasis moves further and further away from mutual 
recognition.” Having expressed these caveats, let us take up again the matter of the futility of 
the life and death struggle. 
 
The first moment shows that the two self-consciousnesses can be self-certain only insofar as 
both remain alive. For both adversaries to die; indeed, for one of the members to die, 
consciousness would be left without the desired recognition. A struggle to the point of actual 
death is self-subverting. The man, who has been defeated and killed, argues Kojève (8, 14), 
does not recognise the victory of the conqueror; thus, the victor’s certainty of his being and 
his value remains subjective and unconfirmed. Kojève (15) suggests that while it is no good 
for the man to kill his adversary, he needs to “dialectically overcome” – to enslave – him. 
 
To overcome dialectically is Kojève’s term for aufheben. Aufheben is closely related to 
Hegel’s postulation of a negation – not the absolute negation indicative of a self-
consciousness’ previous guise as a being-for-itself through the exclusion of everything that is, 
for it, other and, therefore, inessential – but a partial, determinate negation. To overcome 
dialectically means to overcome while preserving what is overcome. Kojève (180-181) 
describes the threefold meaning of “overcome dialectically” in the following way: Firstly, to 
overcome or annul the fragmentary, relative, partial, or one-sided. Secondly, to preserve or 
safeguard the essential, in other words, those multiple aspects of the absolute revealed in each 
thesis and antithesis. Thirdly, to sublimate or raise to a higher level of knowledge and 
actuality, which, in turn, means a step closer to Truth.  
 
Thus, to secure the recognition that would confirm the certainty of one’s own being and value, 
entails a struggle that does not end in death (absolute negation) but one in which both 
adversaries survive in a biological sense, but one emerges as the victorious master and the 
other as the vanquished slave. It is to this master-slave dialectic that I now turn. 
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c.3) Master and Slave 
 
 
Kojève (41) describes the transition from the fight to death to the master-slave dialectic thus:   
One must suppose that the Fight ends in such a way that both adversaries remain alive. 
Now, if this is to occur, one must suppose that one of the adversaries gives in to the other 
and submits to him, recognising him without being recognised by him. One must suppose 
that the Fight ends in a victory of the one who is ready to go all the way over the one who 
– faced with death – does not manage to raise himself above his biological instinct of 
preservation (identity). To use Hegel’s terminology, one must suppose that there is a 
victor who becomes the Master of the vanquished; or, if one prefers, a vanquished who 
becomes the Slave of the victor. 
The experience of the life and death struggle teaches consciousness that its life is as essential 
to it as unmediated self-consciousness. After all, self-recognition is the ultimate prize because 
of the willingness to pay the ultimate price of sacrificing one’s life. In the first movement, the 
immediate self-consciousness assimilated life in its positing of itself as “pure I” or “isolated I” 
(Kojève: 15). The experience of the life and death struggle leads to the “dissolution of that 
simple unity” (Hegel: 115), so that life as self-consciousness’ other is preserved in its 
otherness. Through this separation two consciousnesses emerge: a pure, independent self-
consciousness – the master or lord – and a thinglike, dependent consciousness – the slave or 
bondsman.26  
                                                 
26 In the margins of his analysis, Hyppolite (174: footnote 6) suggests a fuzziness attached to Hegel’s 
depiction of the master: the master believes that he is “immediately for-itself” that is to say, 
unmediated by another. Given that the movement of self-consciousness hinges on mediation, the 
master would thus have to be God. Perhaps in his notion of himself as unmediated being-for-self, this 
consciousness assumes godlike status, but, as I show, he only concretely becomes a master through the 
mediation of the slave. The master is master only because the slave recognises him as such. If the 
master is constituted by the slave, does the inverse follow? Kojève (25) explicitly states that there is no 
slave without a master; the master is the “catalyst of the historical, anthropogenetic process.” If not for 
the forced labour carried out by the slave in the service of the master, he too would act in his 
“immediate interest” (26) (like the master) and forfeit the opportunity of discovering his humanity. 
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The master is the adversary to whom self-recognition still weighs more than self-preservation, 
the self “who negates life in its positivity” (Hyppolite: 171). The slave is described, by 
Kojève (16), as “the defeated adversary who has not adopted the principle of the Masters: to 
conquer or to die.” Findley (in Hegel 1977: 521) elucidates: “The demotion of another self-
consciousness so that it does not really compete with my self-consciousness, now takes the 
new form of making it thing-like and dependent, the self-consciousness of a slave as opposed 
to that of a master.” Owing to his fear of death, by remaining alive, he is an object that exists 
for another. For the sake of self-preservation, the slave lives as a commodity or the property 
of the master. In his dependent state and servitude, the slave has life for his essential reality; 
his existence is bound up in thinghood in general. For the master, things are objects of 
consumption – merely a means of satisfying his desire. The slave prepares and arranges these 
things for the enjoyment of the master; indeed, the slave, by means of his labour, represses his 
desire to be recognised by the master who objectifies him. The master not only exists for-
itself, but, moreover, gains the necessary mediation to set himself up as victorious self-
consciousness through the recognition of the slave. In other words, the master is “no longer 
merely the Notion of such a consciousness [that exists for-itself]” (Hegel: 115), but its 
actualisation: he is self-certain. Kojève (16) suggests that the slave is an “immediate” and 
“bestial” being, whereas the master is “already human” insofar as his self-certainty is 
mediated or “objectivised” by another’s recognition. Thus “being human” means having the 
necessary mediation between self-consciousness and life, and this is achieved through the 
slave – an intermediary who is both self-consciousness and given-being.  
 
From the perspective of the master, his desire was to gain recognition and, indeed, both he 
and his slave consider him to be master. Hence, the master’s human reality and dignity is 
confirmed and his freedom recognised. His freedom is constituted by two things. Firstly, 
while he enjoys the slave’s recognition, he does not afford the slave the same recognition. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Still, it would be incorrect to say that the slave is mediated by the master, inasmuch as the slave 
recognises but is not recognised in return. The whole point of slavery is the absence of independence. 
As I have already mentioned, Hyppolite suggests that, strictly speaking, the slave is not the slave of 
the master; rather, he is enslaved to (his) life. This notion of slavery, as it will become apparent, points 
to the slave’s death anxiety, and, as such, the slave enslaves himself. Ultimately, Kojève’s resolution 
to the master-slave dialectic makes the same point: the slave is a slave, not because he is subjugated by 
a master, but because he enslaves himself.     
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Secondly, since the slave is the intermediary between himself and the living world, he no 
longer needs to contend with the independence of the thing – as Kojève (17-18) argues, the 
master need only to enjoy the thing, say, eating the food that the slave prepares for him. The 
master’s negation of the thing is a pure negation; hence, his affirmation of himself is absolute.  
 
However, Hegel shows that in both constituting elements, the self-certainty of the master is 
entirely reliant on the slave. The master is “a being-for-self which is for itself only through 
another” (Hegel: 115), in other words, he is the master only because the slave recognises him 
as such. The recognition is not, properly speaking, recognition, since there is no reciprocity – 
only a recognition that is “one-sided and unequal” (Hegel: 116). The master has won the 
recognition of a slave, i.e., he is recognised by a dependent object. The master’s self-
consciousness is flawed because the consciousness of the slave is so degraded. Since self-
consciousness emerges from the reciprocated recognition of two independent 
consciousnesses, the master-slave relationship does not provide the master with the mediation 
necessary to bring about his self-consciousness.  
 
Now, Kojève (19) concedes that the relationship between master and slave is “not recognition 
properly so-called.” He describes the master’s perspective as an “existential impasse”: The 
precondition of mastery is anthropogenetic desire, a desire not directed at a thing but toward 
another desire. However, as master, his desire is directed at a thing, for this is what he has 
made the slave: he is “recognised” by a thing. The “tragedy” of his situation is that he has 
“fought and risked his life for a recognition without value to him.” Mastery is self-subverting. 
To subjugate the other for personal glory is self-subverting. As a means of obtaining self-
certainty, coerced recognition is worthless.  
 
Crucially, instead of relating what is tragic about the master’s situation to Hegel’s 
precondition of mutuality for genuine recognition, Kojève, as Lynch (2001: 43) correctly 
points out, “infers that society (as well as self-consciousness) is not founded upon recognition 
but rather upon force, hierarchy, and slavery.” Thus, consider these passages:  
The master, therefore, was on the wrong track. After the fight that made him a Master, he 
is not what he wanted to be in starting that fight: a man recognised by another man. 
Therefore: if man can be satisfied only by recognition, the man who behaves as a Master 
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will never be satisfied. And since – in the beginning – man is either Master or Slave, the 
satisfied man will necessarily be a Slave; or more exactly, the man who has been a Slave, 
who has passed through Slavery, who has ‘dialectically overcome’ his slavery.  
(Kojève: 19-20) 
 
Man was born and History began with the first Fight that ended in the appearance of a 
Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man – at his origin – is always either Master or 
Slave; and that true Man can exist only where there is a Master and a Slave.  
(43)  
According to these citations, man, the social animal, finds his humanity only in the 
necessarily conflictual interplay among men. Furthermore, for man to be truly human, to have 
self-consciousness, he must first pass through the phase of servile consciousness. The 
opposition of master and slave is absolute and, as such, becomes the basis of Kojève’s 
philosophical anthropology. In this account, the “oppressed and overworked masses become 
the engine for historical progress” (Lynch 2001: 44). In other words, what is at stake for 
Kojève is a class struggle from which the slave emerges as victor. 
 
Regarding Hegel’s position vis-à-vis the master-slave dialectic, it is doubtful that he affords 
mastery and bondage more significance than a contingent condition, one that must be 
transcended if the subjects are going to gain genuine recognition, or perhaps, more precisely, 
a moment that should be avoided since it is, by definition, unequal and one-sided. 
Furthermore, it must be recalled that the master-slave dialectic emerges in the wake of the 
struggle for self-recognition, the “bloody wars” for the sake of pure self-affirmation. Perhaps 
then, the assumption that “the life and death struggle is a universal, necessary stage in the 
development of mutual recognition and freedom” (Williams: 380) is equally suspect. I would 
submit that, with every off-shoot of the self-other relationship, Hegel strives to show that self-
certainty cannot be gained through acts of violence, exclusion and domination. Thus, he posits 
a consciousness that must learn this lesson, over and over again. With every dialectical 
movement, consciousness comes closer to learning this truth because it is demonstrated in 
increasingly concrete terms. From merely abstracting otherness, consciousness in the life and 
death struggle, that is, flesh and blood man, is confronted by another living man. The acts of 
negation are palpable, and, from an anthropocentric point of view, more devastating. We 
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move from attempts to annihilate the concept of otherness, to savaging nature and, in the 
incarnation of the life and death struggle, killing human beings. Since, for Hegel, the journey 
to Absolute Truth is progressively more concrete, there is an imperative to show the failings 
of this struggle for recognition. For the consciousness that partakes of this voyage of self-
discovery, the life and death struggle cannot be necessary, since, by definition, this would 
imply that there is no other way to be.  
 
Even Kojève would have to admit that the slave, i.e., the self-consciousness that makes the 
conscious decision not to satisfy his desire for desire, in other words, not to engage in the 
struggle for recognition, disproves the necessity of that struggle. In fact, towards the end of 
his text, Kojève (224-225) goes one step further: 
[Mastery] and Slavery are not given or innate characteristics. … Man is not born slave or 
free, but creates himself as one or the other through free and voluntary action. … Mastery 
and Slavery have no “cause”; they are not “determined” by any given; they can not be 
“deduced” or foreseen from the past which preceded them: they result from a free Act 
(Tat). 
In this regard, Kojève distinguishes between Aristotle’s assumption that man is necessarily 
either master or slave, a claim that we have seen Kojève himself makes, and Hegel’s version 
of this relationship, which is always off-set by the “dialecticity of human existence”. In the 
Politics, Aristotle distinguishes between “conventional” slaves, i.e., the “spoils” of war and 
“natural” slaves. A natural slave has many of the characteristics of the slave in Kojève’s 
master-slave dialectic. A natural slave is one whose body rules over his soul, he is ruled by 
his instincts or passions and not by reason and intellect. Aristotle (2000: 34) asserts: “For he 
who can be, and therefore is another’s … is a slave by nature.” A master, on the other hand, 
can never be someone else’s possession – he rules because his mind rules. For Aristotle, the 
slave is an “instrument of action” (31), he is not merely a given possession but one who 
arranges the master’s world in a way that enables him to engage only in politics and 
philosophy. Unlike Aristotle, Kojève does not consider the slave’s work as degrading – in 
fact, as I will show, it is this very activity that will allow Kojève’s slave to overcome his 
subjugation, whereas Aristotle’s natural slave will always remain a slave. 
 
 85
At any rate, the fact that the slave in the master-slave dialectic decides not to fight for self-
recognition indicates that the struggle is always a possibility. However, for Kojève, the 
struggle is not merely a possibility; it is the essence of man’s being.27   
 
Commentators tend to commend Kojève for highlighting the intersubjectivity at play in 
Hegel’s text. I agree with Williams (366) that, for Kojève and his disciples, “the paradigm of 
intersubjectivity is conflict”, with mutual force and domination the only form of “reciprocity” 
to mark the relationship between men. This is especially apparent in Kojève’s depiction of the 
servile consciousness’ rise to freedom. In my opinion, this aspect of Kojève’s analysis, with 
its emphasis on the meaning of labour, is his most significant contribution to the French 
appropriation of Hegel.                     
 
 
 
c.4) Fear, Service and Formative Activity 
 
 
When Hegel turns his discussion to the servile consciousness, he reminds us that, just like the 
master, the slave is also a self-consciousness. Initially, the slave has the master for his 
essential reality. The independent consciousness that is for-itself is for the slave the truth, but 
he does not find this truth of the master in himself. In himself, the slave is “submerged in 
animal life … which for a self-consciousness is always being-other” (Hyppolite: 174). For 
him, the master has the truth of pure negativity because he did not retreat in the face of death. 
Hegel (117) continues: 
[This servile] consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at 
odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread. In that experience it has 
                                                 
27 Like Kojève, Hyppolite believes that human history is based on the life and death struggle for 
recognition, that the human world as such starts with the fight to prove to oneself and to everyone else 
that one is an independent self-consciousness. Hence, Hyppolite (169-170) suggests that all historical 
conflict is underpinned by the conflict for recognition, that it is essentially the human condition. 
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been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and 
stable has been shaken to its foundations.         
The slave fears death – the “absolute master” (Kojève: 21, Hyppolite: 175) – and for this 
reason relinquishes the desire for self-recognition. He experiences his entire existence in 
anxiety; he is shaken in his core. Through death anxiety, argues Kojève (47-48), the slave 
“experienced the dread or the Terror (Furcht) of Nothingness, of his nothingness, … [he] 
grasps the (human) Nothingness that is at the foundation of his (natural) Being”.28  
 
The slave is “the man with the most exact awareness of the human situation” (Merleau-Ponty 
1964: 68), he grasps better than the master what it means to be “man”. Thus, according to 
Kojève (47), his fear of death “conditions the slave’s superiority to the master.” On the 
surface, the slave’s fear of death signifies his dependence on the natural and, by implication, 
his dependence on the master who triumphs over physical life. In actuality, the slave comes to 
understand that man “is” not a givenness of the order of natural things, but a nothingness that 
negates or transforms the given. In the service of another, through work, the slave “becomes 
conscious of what he truly is” (Hegel: 118). Man “is” according to Kojève (38), “negating 
Action, which transforms given Being and, by transforming it, transforms itself”. In short, 
man “is” what he does.29  
 
In this regard, Kojève (24 –25) asserts: 
                                                 
28 Williams (64, footnote 33) points out that Kojève deftly shows Hegel’s anticipation of Heidegger’s 
analysis of being-towards-death. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1978: 241) announces: “Dying is not 
an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood existentially”. Anxiety in the face of death is not the 
same thing as “fear in the face of one’s demise” (295); instead, it refers to a disposition that reveals 
that Dasein is “thrown” into the possibility of death, “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
Dasein” (294). When Dasein is confronted with the potentiality of death, a possibility that, not only 
cannot be surpassed – it is certain, but also, is possible at any moment – he is faced with the 
fundamental question: Why is there anything at all, rather than nothing? Dasein suffers the crisis of his 
existence, the fact that his being is predicated on his not-being; but, in so doing, reaffirms himself as 
an “I”.            
29 See also Heidegger (1974: 283).  
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The man who wants to work – or who must work – must repress the instinct that drives 
him ‘to consume’ ‘immediately’ the ‘raw’ object. And the Slave can work for the Master 
– that is, for another than himself – only by repressing his own desires. Hence, he 
transcends himself by working – or, perhaps better, he educates himself, he ‘cultivates’ 
and ‘sublimates’ his instincts by repressing them. On the other hand, he does not destroy 
the thing as it is given. He postpones the destruction of the thing by first trans-forming it 
through work; he prepares it for consumption – that is to say, he ‘forms’ it. In his work, 
he trans-forms things and trans-forms himself at the same time: he forms things and the 
World by transforming himself, by educating himself; and he educates himself, he forms 
himself, by transforming things and the world.    
The master does not work; he merely consumes the products of his slave’s forced labour. His 
“idle enjoyment” remains purely subjective inasmuch as it is derived from the “immediate” 
satisfaction of desire. In a sense, the master is consumed by his animal desire. Hegel (118) 
points out that the satisfaction achieved from the pure negation of the object is fleeting “for it 
lacks the side of objectivity and permanence”: the independence of the object is not 
acknowledged; accordingly, the independence of the subject has not been confirmed.  
 
Confirming Kojève’s interpretation up to a point, Hegel describes work as “desire held in 
check, fleetingness staved off”. Through his labour, by transforming and reshaping nature, 
whose independence he has affirmed, the slave gains recognition of his subjectivity directly 
from aufgehobene nature. Through his action, the slave cultivates nature – he creates culture, 
put differently, he humanises nature. In this process, his own humanity, recently degraded 
when he lost the fight for recognition, is elevated. The servile consciousness, argues Hegel 
(118), discovers its own independence – its being-for-self – in the independent being of the 
object, “and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his own account.” Hyppolite 
(176) points out that “not only does the slave shape himself by shaping things; he also 
imprints the form of self-consciousness on being … in the product of his work, he finds 
himself.” Thus, the self-consciousness gained is not the abstract being-for-itself of the master, 
which is attained only by ridding the self of the external. 
 
Regarding the slave’s being-for-self, Hegel (118) writes: “The shape does not become 
something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape 
that is his pure being-for-self.” In the labouring slave, Hegel posits a consciousness in which 
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being-for-itself and being-in-itself are reconciled. However, this reconciliation is at this stage 
an abstract thought, there is still a long road ahead before self-consciousness is actualised. 
Hegel (118-119) notes: “Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the slave realises 
that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he 
requires a mind of his own.” Having a mind of one’s own does not correspond to actual 
freedom; it is “self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude.” The master-slave 
dialectic, it must be remembered, is for Hegel an illustration of one-sided, therefore, illusory 
or incomplete recognition. The slave cannot will himself out of slavery, only reciprocal 
recognition can ensure his freedom. 
 
To his credit, Kojève understands that the meaning Hegel attaches to servile labour stretches 
beyond a simple instrumental value, whereby, for instance, “raw materials” are manufactured 
for consumption, technological advances unlock the frontiers of old, and wealth gets 
accumulated. Work has intrinsic value insofar as the process itself, the “forming activity of 
work” (Kojève: 25), generates consciousness of the self. However, by interpreting the slave’s 
recovery of himself as the cue to “take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that 
he refused in the beginning for fear of death” (29-30), the significance of the slave’s labour 
takes on the proportions that transform Hegel into a Marxist phenomenologist. Riley (1981: 
17), Matthews (1996: 112) and Lynch (2001: 44) concur, the latter suggesting a correlation 
between Kojève’s emphasis on the master-slave struggle – an account that leads to a 
liberating revolution – and a Marxist commitment to a revolutionary social vision.  
 
Permit me to cite the core of Kojève’s reasoning over several pages:  
Through his work, therefore, the Slave comes to the same result to which the Master 
comes by risking his life in the Fight: he no longer depends on the given, natural 
conditions of existence; he modifies them, starting from the idea he has of himself. In 
becoming conscious of this fact, therefore, he becomes conscious of his freedom 
(Freiheit), his autonomy (Selbständigkeit). … To be sure, in the Slave properly so-called, 
this notion of Freedom does not yet correspond to a true reality. He frees himself 
mentally only thanks to forced work, only because he is the Slave of a Master. … 
However, the insufficiency of the Slave is at the same time his  perfection: this is because 
he is not actually free, because he has an idea of Freedom, an idea that is not realised but 
that can be realised by the conscious and voluntary transformation of given existence, by 
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the active abolition of Slavery. … Now, my freedom ceases to be a dream, an illusion, an 
abstract idea, only to the extent that it is universally recognised by those whom I consider 
as worthy of recognising it. And this is precisely what the Master can never obtain. … On 
the other hand, if – at the start – the Slave’s freedom is recognised by no one but himself, 
if, consequently, it is purely abstract, it can end in being realised and in being realised in 
its perfection. For the Slave recognises the human reality and dignity of the Master. 
Therefore, it is sufficient for him to impose his liberty on the Master in order to attain the 
definitive Satisfaction that mutual Recognition gives and thus to stop the historical 
progress. Of course, to do this, he must fight against the Master ... A liberation without a 
bloody Fight, therefore, is metaphysically impossible. 
(49-56)      
For Kojève, work is synonymous with Bildung: not only does it form and transform the world 
to better serve man’s needs, but, additionally, it forms and transforms man to become fully 
human. Through his negating action, or, more precisely, his “revolutionary overcoming” (29) 
of nature (or the world, the thing, the object), the slave transforms nature and also his own 
nature. Thus, Kojève (51) infers: “Where there is Work, then, there is necessarily change, 
progress, historical evolution” and slavery “is the source of all human, social, historical 
progress” (20). The slave also “transforms the world in which it lives according to projects 
that cannot be explained by the given conditions of its real existence in this world” (226), for 
instance, he builds submarines and spacecraft, thus, through his projects, he actually expands 
his grasp upon his reality. The slave, driven initially by his animal desire for preservation, was 
enslaved by nature but, in the process of mastering nature through his labour, frees himself 
from (his) nature. While his labour does not release him from his concrete bondage, it does 
provide him with an identity – to be sure, the identity of a slave, but at least one that is 
generated through his own activity rather than a passive submission to the given.  
 
In contrast to the slave’s burgeoning freedom, the master can never attain “the freedom that 
would raise him above the given world”, since he transcends this world “only in and by the 
risk of his life” (29). Put differently, only when he dies can the master be free. In idle 
enjoyment of the fruits of the slave’s labour, the master does not evolve beyond the point of 
the abstraction I = I. Indeed, Kojève (248) goes so far as to describe the master’s existence as 
a “deferred death” on account of his indolence. By not acknowledging his mortality in the 
fight, by not looking death in the eye, the master exists only in a biological sense. His 
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inactivity amounts to a living death. Death is the end of potential; thus, the master lives as a 
“given”. Insofar as man’s freedom is the “actual negation by him of his own given ‘nature’” 
(Kojève: 250), the master, who seemed to have realised “his freedom by surmounting his 
instinct to live in the Fight” (49) is actually unfree. This second definition of freedom posited 
by Kojève – the first having been analysed as the liberation from otherness – is clearly a nod 
to Heidegger. In this regard, Kojève (247) writes: “Therefore Death and Freedom are but two 
(‘phenomenological’) aspects of one and the same thing, so that to say ‘mortal’ is to say 
‘free’, and inversely.” In both instances freedom is associated with negation: negating self-
externality in the first instance and givenness in the second; indeed, Kojève (222) insists: 
“Freedom can be and exist only as negation.”  
 
Only the slave has the opportunity to actualise freedom in the given world. The condition for 
attaining this “perfect freedom”, according to Kojève, is to re-enter the struggle for 
recognition!  
 
The slave already acknowledges the master, but this recognition must be reciprocated. In 
another revealing passage Kojève (21) writes: “In order that mutual and reciprocal 
recognition, which alone can fully and definitively realise and satisfy man, be established, it 
suffices for the Slave to impose himself on the Master and be recognised by him.” It may 
seem that Kojève, who had hitherto omitted the significance that reciprocity holds for Hegel’s 
account of the process of recognition, here acknowledges that importance. However, the basis 
of Hegel’s call for reciprocity is for both parties to renounce the domination and oppression of 
the other. According to Kojève, reciprocity is achieved when the slave “imposes himself” on 
the master – one may add – “just as the master had done to the slave” (Lynch 2000: 44).  
 
Thus, Kojève is clearly not referring to reciprocal recognition, but merely to a recycling of the 
power relation, with the roles between master and slave now reversed, since the slave, in 
Kojève’s (23) own words, “rules – or, at least will one day rule –as absolute Master”. Given 
Kojève’s previous dismissal of mastery as self-subverting, the “victory” of the slave will once 
again result in the incomplete and illusory self-consciousness of the oppressing and 
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dominating master.30 Hence, the conquering slave will not actually have made any progress 
and, more fundamentally; otherness, difference, is reduced to sameness.  
 
Let us review now what Kojève’s reading of the first part of Phenomenology of Spirit means 
vis-à-vis the “French Hegel”. Firstly, Kojève has no interest in interpreting Phenomenology of 
Spirit as an introduction to the system of philosophy that Hegel will explicate in his later 
texts.31 Since, for him, the theme of the struggle for recognition with a concomitant emphasis 
on the master-slave dialectic is central, it is as anthropology that Kojève appropriates 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 
Secondly, Kojève omits the first dialectical movement in which the subject learns the futility 
of positing itself to the exclusion of everything else. He shows his impatience to get the story 
of the struggle for domination underway by immediately introducing the theme of desire. In 
the process, he loses sight of the extent to which Hegel describes a journey that begins with 
the “natural solipsism of the self” and progressively becomes “a story of self-overcoming” 
(Williams 1997: 47-50). With desire as his starting point, Kojève narrates a story of 
otherness-overcoming.   
 
                                                 
30 Reminiscent of Foucault, Williams (62) makes the very interesting point that while the master-slave 
dialectic signifies “a cultural development away from sheer savagery and violence … it also 
institutionalises violence.” Violence, writes Williams, is aufgehoben inasmuch as it is not completely 
overcome but preserved in the inequality of the recognition between master and slave. Williams’ use 
of the term aufgehoben is in my opinion a perversion of Hegel. What Williams is describing is a 
violence sustained through becoming more insidious, less overt. For Hegel, the moment of aufheben is 
preceded by an acknowledgment of the shortcomings of the previous movement, so, the life and death 
struggle is aufgehoben when the mutually essential being of life (the other) and freedom (self-
consciousness) is recognised – when violence is renounced. 
31 None of the commentators of Phenomenology of Spirit whom I have encountered, including Jean 
Hyppolite, reads it as an introduction to The Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences. At most, they (e.g. Hyppolite: 3-4 and Solomon: 238) consider only Hegel’s 
Preface to serve this function.   
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Thirdly, Kojève’s analysis holds interest insofar as it postulates the enduring notion that we 
attach our identities and worth to our work. In Part 3 I return to this topic. 
 
Lastly, Kojève glosses over the significance of desire as a double movement; hence, his 
reading disregards the central motif of reciprocity in Hegel’s text. Another famous scholar of 
Hegel, Frantz Fanon (1970: 154), notes: “At the foundation of Hegelian dialectic there is an 
absolute reciprocity which must be emphasised … [because if] I close the circuit, if I prevent 
the accomplishment of movement in two directions, I keep the other within himself.” Thus, 
Fanon understands that Hegel advocates the respect and safeguarding of difference. At the 
start of his analysis, Kojève puts the subject in the context of the social, which could be read 
by us as a portrayal of Hegel as an antidote to Cartesianism. However, the society envisioned 
by Kojève is one in which “each person’s own sense of identity, is founded upon domination 
and submission; and one’s best hope – itself a tragic one – is to rise through work to the 
position of mastery” (Lynch: 45). In this regard, I am left with the impression that Kojève 
himself never really leaves the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm of the Subject, and, by 
implication, Hegel is received as simply continuing the tradition of German idealism. 
 
Next, I turn to Jean Hyppolite for a brief reflection on the aftermath of the master-slave 
dialectic. I have suggested that, despite its reputation for being as impartial a rendering of 
Hegel as was available to French scholars of the 1940s and 1950s, Hyppolite’s Genesis and 
Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit resembles Kojève’s analysis in significant 
ways.32 Hyppolite’s treatment of “unhappy consciousness” as the fundamental theme of 
Phenomenology of Spirit offers further evidence of his adherence to the conventional 
interpretation of Hegel.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See also Heckman (in Hyppolite 1964: xxxvi).  
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d) Hyppolite and the Unhappy Consciousness  
 
Recall that, for servile consciousness, the master’s consciousness represents the essential, 
which means that the slave considers being-for-itself to be external to him. What he will 
discover is his self-consciousness through formative activity. Put differently, the form that he 
imprints on independent objects is his own essential being-for-itself. Moreover, his self-
consciousness is a being-for-itself-in-itself: “self-consciousness and being-in-itself are not 
separate” (Hyppolite 180). The master tried vainly to posit a “pure I” through the exclusion by 
itself of the being of life. Since it made living consciousness the absolute other, its own 
unmediated self-consciousness was only an abstraction. The “I” of servile consciousness is, 
for itself, an object precisely because the object of the slave’s formative activity – the being of 
life – is not “an absolute other, but is itself” (180). The slave succeeds where the master has 
failed insofar as he is a subject who is for himself an object, he is the “immediate unity” 
(Hegel: 120) of being and consciousness.  
 
When the master-slave dialectic is resolved, self-consciousness takes on “a new shape, a 
consciousness which … is aware of itself as essential being, a being which thinks or is a free-
self-consciousness” (Hegel: 120). Thought indicates freedom. Hegel (120) explains: “In 
thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in communion 
with myself, and the object, which is for me the essential being, is in undivided unity my 
being-for-myself; and my activity in conceptual thinking is a movement within myself.” This 
phase of consciousness is Stoicism. 
 
Stoicism is based on the assumption that “consciousness is a being that thinks, and that 
consciousness holds something to be essentially important, or true and good only in so far as 
it thinks it to be such” (Hegel: 121). Freedom is not an action; it is a disposition, a state of 
mind.33 Otherness disappears, for it is merely what is postulated by thought and, as the 
thought of consciousness-for-itself-in-itself, not distinct from the self. For the Stoic, freedom 
is to be rid of difference: “to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws 
from the bustle of existence,” regardless of “whether on the throne or in chains” (121). Since 
                                                 
33 See Hyppolite (182) for an elaboration on the effects of the Stoic position. 
 94
the freedom of self-consciousness is indifferent to concrete existence, it actually affirms, 
rather than negates, the independence of existence; consequently, it “has only pure thought as 
its truth, a truth lacking in the fullness of life”. Stoicism is nothing more than the “Notion of 
freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself” (122).  
 
Hegel (123) continues: “Scepticism is the realisation of that of which Stoicism was only the 
Notion, and is the actual experience of what the freedom of thought is.” Scepticism “causes to 
vanish … not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it” and, through this 
absolute negation of all otherness, “procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom” 
(124). In previous phases, the movement of dialectic “appears to consciousness as something 
which it has at its mercy” – a movement external to consciousness. However, in scepticism, 
“consciousness itself is the dialectical unrest” (124): consciousness itself will annihilate the 
objective other. Hyppolite (187) concludes: “Thus nothing subsists except absolute self-
certainty.” However, self-certainty comes from the negation of the other; thus, sceptical 
consciousness is in fact bound to otherness: “It lets the unessential content in its thinking 
vanish; but just in doing so it is the consciousness of something unessential” (Hegel: 125). 
Sceptical consciousness is a dual consciousness. As such, it oscillates between, on the one 
hand, suspending the world and transcending all the forms of being that it constitutes, and, on 
the other, being “caught in this world of which it is only a contingent fragment” (Hyppolite: 
189). Sceptical consciousness “keeps the poles of its self-contradiction apart” (Hegel (125).  
 
Then again, as Russon (2004: 115) notes, Hegel generally does not allow for any dualism to 
be left unreconciled; thus, “scepticism’s lack of thought about itself must vanish because it is 
in fact one consciousness which contains within itself two modes” (Hegel: 126). From 
sceptical consciousness emerges a consciousness, one that “knows it is the dual consciousness 
of itself, as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical, and as self-bewildering and self-
perverting, and it is the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself” (126). This new 
consciousness of the self as a duality is “unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness”.  
 
Hegel (126) continues: “The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the gazing of one self-
consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its essential nature 
… [but] it is not as yet explicitly aware that this is its essential nature, or that it is the unity of 
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both.” Since unhappy consciousness has not yet reflected on itself as the unity of self and 
other, Hegel (126-127) refers to this movement as only the “immediate unity of the two”. As 
such, unhappy consciousness views the self and other posited by sceptical consciousness only 
as opposites that are alien to one another, to wit, the “simple Unchangeable”; or, as Hyppolite 
(204) translates, “an immutable, a universal, which, by definition, lacks nothing and is both 
in-itself and for-itself”, which it considers to be essential, and the “protean Changeable”, a 
merely particular individual, that it takes to be “unessential”. Hegel (127) submits that, since 
unhappy consciousness “is itself the consciousness of this contradiction, it identifies itself 
with the changeable consciousness, and takes itself to be the unessential Being.” However, 
since unhappy consciousness is also consciousness of unchangeableness, “it must at the same 
time set about freeing itself from the unessential, i.e. from itself” (127). 
 
Neither unchangeable consciousness, nor changeable consciousness, can posit themselves 
without the other. What we discover in this movement is that the being of changeable 
consciousness, the particular individual, is entrenched in universal being, but, equally, 
universality is encoded in the particular individual. Hegel (128) suggests that “first, the 
Unchangeable is opposed to individuality in general; then, being itself an individual, it is 
opposed to another individual; and finally, it is one with it.” Through the movement of the 
unhappy consciousness, we, once again, catch a glimpse of Spirit, here defined as the 
universal individual. For Hegel (128), the union of the particular with the universal, that is, 
consciousness’ discovery that “I” is also “we” is a joyful moment, rather than a disquieting 
identity crisis.  
 
By contrast, Hyppolite (196) describes the meeting between self-consciousnesses as “the most 
disturbing fact of existence.” For Hyppolite (190), consciousness “is in principle always 
unhappy consciousness” and a “happy consciousness” is more likely “a naïve consciousness 
which is not yet aware of its misfortune”. Effectively, Hyppolite suggests that, rather than 
being an aufgehobene self, consciousness as being-for-itself-in-itself is always naïve 
consciousness, which implies that consciousness never overcomes its solipsism. If he seems 
to appreciate that, for Hegel, “otherness does not disappear” (168), he considers this only as 
the “misfortune of consciousness” (194).  
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According to Hyppolite (204-205), critics “generally prefer what Hegel calls ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ to what he calls ‘spirit’.” Notwithstanding his insistence that his own 
commentary will only elucidate, and not evaluate, Hegel’s position, Hyppolite leans towards a 
reading in which the attainment of Spirit, “the union of unity and duality” (196) is not only 
deferred, but should, in fact, be avoided. He privileges “unhappy consciousness” over Spirit 
because such an interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit complements his vision of Hegel 
as an “existentialist”. In Studies on Marx and Hegel, Hyppolite (1969: 23-24) proposes: 
What interests us is to reveal in Hegel, as we find him in his early works and in the 
Phenomenology, a philosopher much closer to Kierkegaard than might seem credible. … 
We shall ignore the fact that the Phenomenology, which describes the itinerary of 
consciousness, or the cultural adventure of human consciousness in search of a final 
concord and reconciliation, culminates in Absolute Knowledge, that is to say, in a system 
which transcends diverse world visions. Instead we shall inquire whether there is not in 
this work a conception of existence which is kin to certain contemporary existentialist 
notions. The Phenomenology possesses such a wealth, and often such an obscurity, that 
we must confine ourselves to choosing certain aspects which illustrate in a special way 
what one could already describe as a concept of existence. In the final paragraph of his 
analysis of self-consciousness Hegel writes: “Consciousness of life, of its existence and 
action, is merely pain and sorrow over this existence and activity.” The consciousness of 
himself that man realises, and which as we shall show, is consciousness of life too, results 
in the unhappy consciousness.  
There is an internal contradiction in Hyppolite’s reading of Phenomenology of Spirit. On the 
one hand, he praises Hegel for portraying the movements of consciousness and self-
consciousness separately, thus, underscoring the importance of being-with-the other. On the 
other hand, he tacitly criticises Hegel for the attempt to reconcile the self and other. Thus, in a 
1946 lecture, Hyppolite (cited by Kruks 1981: 26-27) declares that “in spite of the 
‘existentialism’ of its early chapters, Hegel’s Phenomenology finally ended up by 
subordinating individual existence to the Universal, in the form of the march of history 
towards Absolute Knowledge.” It is disingenuous to berate Hegel for not remaining 
“existentialist” when he has been appropriated by Hyppolite to fit into the mould of 
“existentialism”. Hyppolite’s fidelity to “certain contemporary existentialist notions” includes 
an emphasis on duality and separation, disquiet and the hostility that marks consciousness’ 
relationship with others. In short, his commentary is firmly entrenched in the conventional 
interpretation of Hegel.  
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The lingering Cartesianism suggested by his and Kojève’s analyses is explicitly endorsed by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, in his assessment of Hegel, his postulation of freedom and his depiction of 
self-other relationships in Being and Nothingness. It is to these themes that I now turn.    
 
 
 
e) The Cartesian ghost in Sartre’s ontology 
 
 
In my opinion, Riley (1981: 20-21) correctly argues that Sartre’s text “was more the attempt 
of Cartesian rationalism to defend itself in the face of the dissolution of the individual subject 
into historical social being”. Sartre’s account of self-consciousness does not form the bridge 
to the social being, which Riley finds in Kojève’s account of the development of self-
consciousness. To be sure, we have seen how Kojève, at the start of his analysis, ties the 
struggle for recognition to the social; however, I have suggested a latent Cartesianism in 
Kojève’s appropriation of Phenomenology of Spirit. Hence, the following section will show 
the important ways in which the Kojèvean and Sartrean accounts of Hegel converge.34 
 
                                                 
34 Tellingly, Sartre had not actually read Phenomenology of Spirit, so he would have had to rely on 
second-hand analyses on which he based his rejection of Hegel. In an interview, Sartre (quoted in 
Williams 1997: 373, footnote 31) confirms that he became acquainted with Hegel’s thought “through 
seminars and lectures, but [he] didn’t study him until much later, around 1945”. Presumably, these 
lectures would include those of Kojève, which I have shown is the assumption of most commentators 
on French phenomenology. In History and the Dialectic of Violence: an analysis of Sartre’s Critique 
de la raison dialectique (1975), Raymond Aron, who famously introduced Sartre to the central ideas 
of Husserlian phenomenology, insists that Sartre never attended Kojève’s classes. (Aron 1975: iv) In 
keeping with the conventional interpretation of Being and Nothingness, Aron (1969: 9) notes: “Sartre, 
in spite of everything, never transcended the Cartesian duality as reinterpreted by Husserl.” While I 
agree with his assessment of Sartre, I disagree with Aron’s insinuation that Kojève overcomes 
Cartesianism.            
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In Being and Nothingness, Sartre (1956: 26) sharply opposes “two regions of being that are 
without communication”; to wit, l’être-en-soi, or being-in-itself, which is the being of 
phenomena or the object, thing or world and l’être-pour-soi, or being-for-itself, which is self-
consciousness or “human reality” – his translation of Dasein.  
 
Being-in-itself is “uncreated”, “neither passivity nor activity”, “equally beyond negation as 
beyond affirmation”, “an immanence which cannot realise itself” (27), contingent, opaque, 
“has no within which is opposed to a without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a 
consciousness of itself”, “solid”, “the synthesis of itself with itself” (28), “superfluous” (de 
trop), “full positivity”, it “knows no otherness” and “it is what it is” (29). Sartre’s being-in-
itself, is non-conscious being, in other words, it is a realm in which the subject is entirely 
absorbed in the world of phenomena without having a sense of self. 
 
Contrastingly, being-for-itself is “empty distance”, “fissure” (125), “supported and 
conditioned by transcendence” (50), which is “the pro-ject of self beyond” (52), it “does not 
coincide with itself in full equivalence” (120), in other words, the “being” of consciousness is 
always in question, “it is a decompression of being” (121), a “nothingness” that “is not”, it is 
“made to be” (125), a nothingness that is a “hole in being” (126), an expanding de-structuring 
of the in-itself” (133), “perpetually determining itself not to be the in-itself” (134), “it exists 
as the disengagement from a certain existing given and as an engagement toward a certain not 
yet existing end” (615). The “for-itself must perpetually constitute itself as in withdrawal in 
relation to itself; that is, it must leave itself behind as a datum which it no longer is” so it 
“finds no help, no pillar of support in what it was” and, thus, it is “free and can cause there to 
be a world because the for-itself is the being which has to be what it was in the light of what it 
will be” (616). In arguably one of the most famous lines of his text, Sartre (100) describes 
human reality as “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”35  
 
                                                 
35 Incidentally, Hyppolite (1974: 150) gives a verbatim description of the existent, although he does 
not credit Sartre, whose text was published three years before Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit.    
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Like Kojève, he describes man, or more precisely, the existent, as negating activity, a lack, 
which reveals self-consciousness’ “being” as becoming, or, used more often by Sartre, 
transcendence. Furthermore, like Kojève, Sartre assumes that consciousness already implies 
self-consciousness; thus, self-consciousness is not based on a mutually dependent relationship 
with the world.36 However, unlike Kojève, Sartre is forthright about his Cartesianism: he 
postulates that “the only point of departure possible is the Cartesian cogito” (338), or, more 
specifically, “the interiority of the cogito” (329). Taking his cue from Descartes, for whom 
certainty is situated in the ego and the self “becomes the hub of reality” (Steiner 1987: 36), he 
demonstrates how little his account of self-recognition has in common with that of Hegel. 
 
Sartre (327-328) contends 
According to Hegel the Other is an object, and I apprehend myself as an object in the 
Other. But one of these affirmations destroys the other. In order for me to be able to 
appear to myself as an object in the Other, I would have to apprehend the Other as 
                                                 
36 Although Sartre in his later writings is considered to be more explicitly materialist (Moran 2000: 
357), from certain segments in Being and Nothingness, for example, “consciousness is its own 
foundation” (Sartre: 130) and “[the] existence of consciousness comes from consciousness itself” (18), 
one gathers that he is describing a self-positing consciousness. Certainly, his critique of Hegel gives 
credence to such a reading of Sartre’s notion of self-consciousness. Yet, Sartre (408) also argues that 
“the for-itself is not its own foundation.” As we have seen, he says of the in-itself and for-itself that 
they are “two regions without communication”. At the same time, Sartre (405) notes: “We know that 
there is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world on the other as two closed entities for which we 
must subsequently seek some explanation as to how they communicate.” Moran (387) infers: “Sartre 
has a peculiar and entirely unexplained view of self-creating consciousness emerging at the heart of a 
brute being” and any attempt to find in his work a resolution of this contradiction will succeed only in 
“multiplying the assertions – one will not find an argument.” Thus, the problem is the Cartesian 
dilemma of having to connect the notion of a self-positing consciousness with its location in a body. 
Sartre’s former teacher, Jean Wahl (1969: 44), views this problem as such: If he gives primacy to the 
in-itself and maintains that the for-itself is merely a sort of gap in the in-itself, Sartre would be 
committing himself to realism. If he prioritises the for-itself, he would be embracing idealism. Of 
course there is the possibility that what is being interpreted as “contradictory” could point to the 
“ambiguity” of human existence, but, in my opinion, this would be an over-estimation of Being and 
Nothingness.             
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subject; that is, to apprehend him in his interiority. But in so far as the Other appears to 
me as object, my objectivity for him can not appear to me.  
His analysis is based on the assumption that subjectivity = interiority, i.e., my subjectivity is 
unmediated. Indeed, Sartre (366) writes that “I am my own mediator between Me and Me, all 
objectivity disappears.” Hence, “the problem of the Other is a false problem” (330) and 
“between the Other-as-object and Me-as-subject there is no common measure, no more than 
between self-consciousness and consciousness of the Other” (328). It seems that, not only is 
there no interdependent relationship between the subject and the world, but, moreover, a 
relationship between self-consciousnesses is inherently impossible.   
 
Sartre’s (321-323) rejection of the mutually mediated self and other in Phenomenology of 
Spirit is worth noting:   
Hegel’s brilliant intuition is to make me depend on the Other in my being. I am, [Hegel] 
said, a being for-itself which is for-itself only through another. Therefore the Other 
penetrates me to the heart. I cannot doubt him without doubting myself … [thus] 
solipsism seems to be put out of the picture once and for all. … Yet in spite of the wide 
scope of this solution, in spite of the richness and profundity of the detailed insights with 
which the theory of the Master and Slave is filled to overflowing, can we be satisfied with 
it? To be sure, Hegel has posed the question of the being of consciousnesses. It is being-
for-itself and being-for-others which he is studying … [Nevertheless] it is certain that this 
ontological problem remains everywhere formulated in terms of knowledge. The 
mainspring of the conflict of consciousnesses is the effort of each one to transform his 
self-certitude into truth. And we know that this truth can be attained only in so far as my 
consciousness becomes an object for the Other at the same time as the Other becomes an 
object for my consciousness. … [However] there is a truth of consciousness which does 
not depend on the Other; rather the very being of consciousness, since it is independent of 
knowledge, pre-exists its truth.       
For Sartre, knowledge is a substance. Recall that, in Hegel’s account, knowledge of the True 
is both substance and subject. Given that Absolute Knowledge is self-knowledge, and that the 
self remains unconfirmed outside the meeting with the other, “the truth” of the individual’s 
existence is wrapped up in his relationships with others. Sartre assumes that the being of 
consciousness can be reached through some kind of transcendental reflection: since the 
existent is distinguished from the phenomenal world by the very fact that he asks the 
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Seinsfrage, “the truth” of his existence is already confirmed. Put differently, I think, therefore, 
I am. 
 
Sartre (324) continues his dismissal of Hegel’s call for intersubjectivity with the offhand 
remark: “Here as everywhere we ought to oppose to Hegel Kierkegaard, who represents the 
claims of the individual as such.”37 Nonetheless, he does introduce into subjectivity “the 
deepest intersubjective structure of the mit-sein” (92) that “presupposes my existence, the 
existence of the Other, my existence for the Other, and the existence of the Other for me” 
(88). Moreover, he writes that this consciousness of being an object “can be produced only in 
and through the existence of the Other”; thus, “Hegel was right” (363). Yet, Sartre dismisses 
the notion of a being for-itself which is for-itself only through another. Instead, he contends 
that “we encounter the Other, we do not constitute him” (336); thus, Hegel was wrong. 
However, Sartre (376) concedes that “human-reality must of necessity be simultaneously for-
itself and for-others” but does not seek to explicate the implications of this since his “present 
investigation does not aim at constituting an anthropology.” 
 
Heidegger, too, was wrong: the foundation of the relations between consciousnesses is not the 
Mitsein, it is conflict. (475; 555) The source of this conflict is Sartre’s (401-404) distinction 
between two “incommunicable levels of being”, to wit, “my body for-me” and my “body for-
others”. For Sartre, the “object which the Other is for me and this object which I am for him 
are manifested each as a body” (399). There is no link between what the subject’s body is for 
himself (consciousness) and what it is for the Other (objectivity). Sartre (403) submits: “Of 
course, the discovery of my body as an object is indeed a revelation of its being … [but] the 
being which is thus revealed to me is its being-for-others.” According to this perspective, my 
“being-for-others” is the equivalent of “me-as-object”. I cannot be an object for myself 
because “the object is that which is not my consciousness” (365). Even if I attempted to make 
myself an object, “I would already be myself at the heart of that object which I am; and at the 
very centre of that object I should have to be the subject who is looking at it” (326).  
                                                 
37 Sartre is over-stating his allegiance to Kierkegaard. In total, there are only four cursory references 
made to Kierkegaard and these, it seems, come from reading Jean Wahl’s account of Kierkegaard (see, 
for example, Sartre: 65, footnote 18). 
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While I can on principle not be an object for myself (345), I am an object for the Other, that 
is, “the being through whom I gain my objectness” (361). Specifically, the “I” is an object by 
virtue of the Other’s “look”: “If someone looks at me, I am conscious of being an object” 
(363). The world is my world, everything exists for me, until an other appears, and by virtue 
of seeing what I see, he has “stolen the world from me” (343) and made it “alien to me” (350). 
Moreover, my being-seen-by-another is the alienation of myself, since the apprehension of 
myself as seen is “to apprehend myself as seen in the world and from the standpoint of the 
world” (353). I am alienated from my possibilities and cast into the “in-itself”, into “thisness”: 
“for the Other I have stripped myself of transcendence” (352). Put differently, the other is the 
“death of my possibilities” (354). 
 
From the point of having his being “outside”, the being-for-others feels shame. “Shame”, 
writes Sartre (384), “is the feeling of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have 
committed this or that particular fault, but simply that I have “fallen” into the world38 in the 
midst of things and that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am.” For Sartre 
(358), “my defenceless being for [another’s] freedom” is what is meant by slavery. I am 
enslaved, not on the basis of some historical event, but inasmuch as “my being is dependent at 
the centre of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being.”  
 
Thus, contrary to Hegel’s appeal to intersubjectivity as a precondition for freedom, Sartre 
offers a view of intersubjectivity as the cause of slavery. Sartre (475) argues that this slavery 
“by no means [suggests that we are] dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, 
but with reciprocal and moving relations.” Just as the other attempts to enslave me, I seek to 
enslave him: “conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others”. As we saw with Kojève, 
Sartre equates intersubjectivity with conflict and domination and reciprocity with reactionary 
violence.  
 
                                                 
38 Nonetheless, “human-reality” is at bottom not “worldly”: self-consciousness resides in the for-itself 
and being-for-others “is not an ontological structure of the For-itself” (Sartre: 376). 
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Sartre’s concept of freedom is also derived from Descartes.39 According to Sartre (567, 623), I 
am “condemned to be free”, my freedom is absolute. Thus, I “can not be sometimes slave and 
sometimes free” (569); “I am absolutely responsible for my situation” (653) and “even torture 
does not dispossess us of our freedom; when we give in, we do so freely” (672). The 
implication is, as Moran (2000: 358) correctly infers, that freedom “resides in the intellect”; 
that freedom is “a stance of consciousness, in fact the fundamental stance”. Freedom is 
associated with the for-itself. Sartre (658) argues that “the being which is what it is [in other 
words, being-in-itself] can not be free,” thus, “freedom is not a being; it is the being of man” 
(569). From this, Sartre (571) submits the “false choice” (Merleau-Ponty: 1964: 72) that 
“either man is wholly determined (which is inadmissible, especially because a determined 
consciousness, i.e., a consciousness externally motivated – becomes itself pure exteriority and 
ceases to be consciousness) or else man is wholly free.”  
 
Sartre’s underlying idealism reveals itself in his lack of concern for what he calls “the 
empirical and popular concept of ‘freedom’ which has been produced by historical, political, 
and moral circumstances” (621-622). To be sure, Sartre (619-707) identifies the relationship 
between freedom and “situation”. He may concede that human beings are always situated; 
nonetheless, Sartre does not take seriously the limits that one’s situation or facticity places on 
one’s freedom.40 Thus, he argues that success, in other words, “to obtain what one wishes”, is 
                                                 
39 In Existentialism and Humanism, the text that was supposed to expand on the topic of ethics, to 
which Sartre alludes towards the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre (1966: 44) proclaims his sine 
qua non; to wit: “Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual, and that for 
strictly philosophic reasons … we seek to base our teaching upon the truth, and not upon a collection 
of fine theories, full of hope but lacking real foundations. And at the point of departure there cannot be 
any other truth than this, I think, therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it 
attains to itself.” Dermot Moran (2000: 358) observes: “For Sartre, Descartes had claimed that no one 
can do my thinking for me: ‘In the end we must say yes or no and decide alone, for the entire universe, 
on what is true’. Sartre agrees with Descartes’ optimistic view that humans make themselves through 
their use of what they have been given, and most humans possess more or less the same abilities.”  
40 A number of more recent publications offer more sympathetic interpretations of Sartre’s text; for 
example, Chris Falzon (2003: 132) points to a “double movement” in Sartre’s thought; to wit: “the 
attempt to locate human freedom, to make it more concrete, embodied, and situated, and at the same 
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not important to freedom. (621) Instead, he emphasises the autonomy of choice, i.e., self-
determination. Yet again we observe the appeal to a self-positing consciousness. Once more, 
we are confronted with the heroic, entirely self-reliant individual who transcends his concrete 
existence, including his relationships with others, in order to become “truly” himself.  
 
I have shown that, for Hegel, intersubjectivity is a precondition for freedom. Hegel links 
intersubjectivity to mutuality and reciprocity – to a generosity of spirit – among individuals 
vying for self-recognition. Generosity signifies a mutual release of the other, in other words, 
“letting the other be” by not imposing the self onto the other. Both selves decide to cease their 
domination over one another. Thus, Hegel connects freedom to the reciprocal giving back and 
receiving of one another. Freedom is described, not in terms of conflict but, rather, as the 
renunciation of violence.  
 
An important implication of this notion of freedom as an act of generosity is that the other is 
not a threat to my freedom; on the contrary, freedom is dependent on an affirmation of 
otherness. Put differently, if freedom equals identity and otherness equals difference, identity 
is not degraded or threatened by difference, on the contrary, difference is the precondition for 
identity. I can only be free if the other is free, that is to say, if the other remains other. Judith 
Butler (in Salih and Butler 2004: 48) argues that the notion of difference as it is encountered 
by the Hegelian subject “is misunderstood … as contained within or by the subject”, that 
difference is not resolved into identity, i.e., the subject does not assimilate the other’s 
otherness. It is certainly possible to argue that the independence of the other, which Hegel 
insists upon at the resolution of every dialectical turn, serves as a bulwark against 
assimilation. Recall that the fight to the death of the other is the self’s attempt to rid himself 
of otherness, so that he can once again be self-equal, unmediated and independent. Crucially, 
however, if the self releases the other, that other “is affirmed, not simply in its identity, but 
also in its difference” (Williams: 56).  Generosity – the safeguarding of otherness – opens up 
the opportunity for friendship between subjects.41  
                                                                                                                                                        
time a reduction of situation to a function of freedom in order to preserve the latter’s absoluteness.” 
Nevertheless, Falzon concludes that, in Sartre’s account, situation becomes subordinated by freedom.         
41 However, as I show during the course of Part 3: “Despite taking difference seriously, Hegel views 
human progress in general and the development of rational subjectivity in particular, as an overcoming 
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Consider, by contrast, Sartre’s perspective on generosity, as recounted by Merleau-Ponty 
(1964: 74): 
The very decision to respect the other smacks of selfishness, for it is still my generosity to 
which the other owes my recognition of him and about which I am self-satisfied. “To give 
is to obligate.”  
For Sartre, then, generosity is merely veiled self-interest. Like Kojève and Hyppolite, Sartre 
portrays the world as a hostile environment that threatens to usurp the subject’s existence or 
freedom. Consequently, the exponents of early French phenomenology lose sight of the 
possibility of friendship in Hegel’s account of the relationship between the self and the other.    
 
Now, following a line of reasoning that Nietzsche employs in his re-evaluation of mercy,42 
one could ask if generosity, defined by Hegel as the overcoming of domination, remains the 
privilege of the most dominant. Let us take into account that Hegel describes the release of the 
other as a double movement, so the self and other are equals insofar as they need each other 
equally to freely recognise them as individuals. When both parties deny their equal and 
essential need for each other, they engage in the life and death struggle; when only one party 
denies this need he becomes the deluded and self-subverting master. What Hegel does not 
seem to take into account with his insistence on a double movement is a scenario where the 
self-other relationship is from the outset unequal, where there exists a prior asymmetrical 
power relationship. This shortcoming in Hegel’s analysis of self-other relationships will 
become one of the central problems discussed in Part 3.       
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of differences” (Diprose 1994: 38-39). The Absolute is a universal subject, in other words, an identity 
without difference. Diprose (41) elaborates: “Beneath differences there is a deeper identity, the ground 
or the unity of identity and difference, towards which the dialectic proceeds … [but] what will be 
exposed is that the unity of identity and difference is impossible. Within Hegel’s own terms there will 
always be an excess operating which mitigates against unity and sameness.” The concept of excess 
will be one of the central themes of Part 3.    
42 See Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo 
(1989), particularly page 73).         
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Summary  
 
 
One of the defining features of early French phenomenology is a resurgence of interest in the 
earlier texts of GWF Hegel, principally, Phenomenology of Spirit. Both architects of this 
movement, Kojève and Hyppolite, underscore the importance of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s 
text. However, at the heart of their respective analyses of the dialectical movements that lead 
up to Absolute Spirit, together with the analyses of some of their famous students, like Sartre, 
is a belief in the inevitable, even necessary, violence of intersubjectivity. The emphasis on 
conflict aids Kojève in the justification of his Marxist agenda; Sartre in his defence of 
Cartesian rationalism and Hyppolite in his privileging of the movement of unhappy 
consciousness over the dialectic of universal individuality.  
 
While Hegel shows that conflict is always a risk in the struggle for recognition, with 
enslavement and even death the possible outcomes of such violence, his appeal to reciprocal 
recognition and generosity opens up the possibility of friendship between subjects. Hegel’s 
call for reciprocity must not be confused with the reactionary violence that Kojève describes 
in his account of the first meeting between two consciousnesses. Retaliation indicates the 
action of a single consciousness, rather than the double movement between consciousnesses 
that Hegel depicts. For Hegel, reciprocity refers to a mutual respect for and safeguarding of 
the other’s otherness. By overlooking the importance of mutuality in Hegel’s account, early 
French phenomenology has the tendency to view self-other relationships from the point of 
view of the solitary individual, which reinforces the conventional estimation of Hegel as a 
disciple of German idealism.                     
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Part 3 “Simone de Beauvoir’s Hegel”  
 
 
 
Thus, I’m living not exactly cocooned in philosophical optimism – for my ideas aren’t 
clear enough – but at least on a philosophical plane such that optimism is possible. I so 
wish we could make a comparison between your ideas on nothingness, the in-itself, and 
the for-itself, and the ideas of Hegel. For there are many analogies – although Hegel turns 
into joy that which for you is instead gloomy and despairing. It seems to me that both are 
true, and I’d like to find a point of equilibrium. 
Beauvoir (1991: 335-336)1  
 
I have described how this book was first conceived: almost by chance. Wanting to talk 
about myself, I became aware that to do so I should first have to describe the condition of 
woman in general; first I considered the myths that men have forged about her through all 
their cosmologies, religions, superstitions, ideologies and literature.  
Beauvoir (1968: 195)2 
                                                 
1 This extract from a letter to Sartre, dated 19 July 1940, provides some important clues regarding 
Beauvoir’s critical engagement with Hegel at the birth of French phenomenology. Certainly, The 
Second Sex (1997) can be read as an attempt to reconcile Hegel’s distinction between consciousness 
and self-consciousness with Sartre’s distinction between l’être-en-soi and l’être-pour-soi. However, 
part of the problem of such reconciliation is already revealed in Beauvoir’s letter. The “philosophical 
optimism” to which she refers corresponds to what Sartre rejects as Hegel’s “epistemological 
optimism” in favour of an unmediated self-consciousness. In addition, it will become clear that 
Beauvoir neither retains Sartre’s meaning of being-in-itself and being-for-itself, nor does she maintain 
the distinction consistently; indeed, at various points in her text she suspends it. Finally, the themes of 
joy and friendship, which Beauvoir finds in Hegel’s philosophy, not only reverberate through The 
Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) and The Second Sex, but will be crucial to our understanding of her 
departure from the approach to self-other relationships advanced by early French phenomenology.     
2 See Tidd (2004: 49-50) for an overview of the oppressive situation of women in France until the 
1970s and Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 11-22) for details regarding the status of French women during 
the inter-war years. In her memoirs, Beauvoir (e.g. 1963: 291 and 1968: 199) points out that her status 
as a woman made her an anomaly in the world of writers, while her status as a writer made her an 
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a) Spectres of Hegel in Beauvoir’s moral period 
 
 
In The Prime of Life, Simone de Beauvoir (1963: 359-369) recalls the start of the “moral 
period” of her writing career:3 
It is impossible to assign a particular day, week, or even month to the conversion that 
took place in me about this time. But there is no doubt that the spring of 1939 marked a 
watershed in my life. I renounced my individualistic, anti-humanist way of life. I learned 
the value of solidarity. … History took hold of me, and never let go thereafter; and I 
threw myself totally and permanently into a life of literature. … Hitherto my sole concern 
had been to enrich my personal life and learn the art of converting it into words. Little by 
little I had abandoned the quasi-solipsism and illusory autonomy I cherished as a girl of 
twenty; though I had come to recognise the fact of other people’s existence, it was still 
my individual relationships with separate people that mattered most to me, and I still 
yearned fiercely for happiness. Then, suddenly, History burst over me, and I dissolved 
into fragments. I woke to find myself scattered over the four quarters of the globe, linked 
by every nerve in me to each and every individual. All my ideas were turned upside 
down; even the pursuit of happiness lost its importance. 
The onset of World War Two and the Nazi Occupation precipitated among French 
intellectuals the need to unshackle themselves from the confines of Cartesian and Kantian 
rationalism and bourgeois individualism. Like her contemporaries, Beauvoir links this 
conversion, both intellectual and moral, to the revival of interest in Hegel.4 Her initial 
                                                                                                                                                        
atypical woman. What interests her is not how the many ways in which she herself had been oppressed 
coincides with woman’s general oppression, as Rosi Braidotti (1991: 158) ventures; rather, the extent 
to which her sense of self does, in fact, not coincide with a general condition. Her concern is this: how 
it is possible to be an anomaly, to deviate from the norm? I believe what Beauvoir is hinting at when 
she refers to the origin of The Second Sex, and will become the underlying theme of that text, is the 
intuition of a gap between a specific woman’s experience of herself and being-a-woman. 
3 See Arp (2001: 9-19) for a discussion of the ways in which Beauvoir’s personal situation informs her 
writing. 
4 From The Prime of Life, we can trace the beginning of Beauvoir’s reading of Hegel, in the original 
German, at the Bibliothèque Nationale, to July 6, 1940, shortly after the capitulation of the French 
Army at the hands of the Nazis. Beauvoir (1963: 363) writes: “I have embarked upon Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit; at present can scarcely make head or tail of a word of it.” In one of her 
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reaction to Hegel’s text is buoyant; indeed, his “amplitude of detail dazzled [Beauvoir], and 
his system as a whole made [her] feel giddy” (372).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
In the citation, Beauvoir’s conversion is marked by her vivid portrayal of the displacement 
and rupture of the Cartesian ego: the pure, naively solipsistic I is forced to become concretely 
aware of the indubitable bond between the individual, the social and history.5 Her 
preoccupation with personal autonomy is replaced with an emphasis on solidarity, 
intersubjectivity, collectivity. Even the watery imagery suggested by ‘burst’ and ‘dissolved’ is 
apt considering that fluidity is, as we have seen, one of the recurring themes of 
Phenomenology of Spirit.   
 
Let us for a moment consider the situation in which Beauvoir subsequently turns away from 
Hegel. In Occupied France, she was living the life of a survivor.6 She was neither active in the 
letters to Sartre, Beauvoir (1991: 326) describes her deciphering of Hegel’s text with the help of Jean 
Wahl’s Le Malheur de la conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel, only to come to the conclusion 
that “he [Wahl] makes clear at length how he understands nothing.”    
5 Earlier in The Prime of Life, Beauvoir (1963: 105-106) is more candid about her complicity to the 
narcissism and isolationism encouraged by her bourgeois upbringing: “In my day-to-day life I scarcely 
ever departed from the habit of cautious isolation I habitually practised, and I refused to envisage other 
people as potential individuals, with [consciousnesses], like myself. I would not put myself in their 
shoes; … such gratuitous stupidity involved me in difficulties and ill will and errors of judgment. This 
did not stop me from picking all and sundry to pieces with Sartre till the cows came home.” 
6 In The Coming of Age (Beauvoir 1972: 440) describes a survivor as “a dead man under suspended 
sentence”, which seems an apt description of the vacuity that filled her days. Biographer Deirdre Bair 
(1990: 284) describes Beauvoir’s world during the war as “solipsistic … its boundaries were her hotel 
room and Sartre’s … [and] composed entirely of their fractious intrigues, unsatisfied appetites and 
economic insecurities.” The financial woes were alleviated by participating in broadcasts on the Nazi-
friendly Vichy state radio. (Bair: 279) The “fractious intrigues” are recounted in Beauvoir’s Letters to 
Sartre (1991). In Beauvoir’s most autobiographical novel, The Mandarins (2005), her fictional 
counterpart, Anne, still reeling from the news of Hiroshima, tries to rationalise the moral dilemma 
faced by leftists who had been pinning their hopes on the Soviet Union to deliver their world from the 
evil of capitalism, only to learn about the labour camps in Russia: “Everything passes; ‘all is vanity 
and vexation of spirit’; we’ll be past this someday. … It’s laughable, this little ephemeral life brooding 
over those camps which the future had already abolished! History takes care of itself and each of us 
into the bargain. Let’s just keep quiet, then, each in his own little hole” (Beauvoir 2003: 432) and “I 
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Resistance Movement, nor did she, or most of her countrymen, disobey Nazis commands. In 
The Prime of Life, she links this stupor to her preoccupation with Hegel’s text. Beauvoir (372-
373) remembers: 
It was, indeed tempting to abolish one’s individual self and merge with Universal Being, 
to observe one’s own life in the perspective of Historical Necessity, with a detachment 
that also carried implications concerning one’s attitude to death. How ludicrous did this 
brief instant of time then appear, viewed against the world’s long history, and how small 
a speck was this individual, myself! Why should I concern myself with my present 
surroundings, with what was happening to me now, at this present moment? But the least 
flutter of my heart gave such speculations the lie. … I turned back to Kierkegaard and 
began to read him with passionate interest. ... Neither History nor the Hegelian System 
could, any more than the Devil in person, upset the living certainty of “I am, I exist, here 
and now, I am myself.”  
Beauvoir ascribes her apathy to the horrors of war to being momentarily overwhelmed by the 
“flight into the Universal”. The Hegelian System no longer underscores her connectedness to 
the world, her solidarity with each and every individual; instead, it symbolises detachment 
and indifference. Previously, she enjoyed the world’s embrace; now, she feels engulfed by it. 
Dissolving into fragments had seemed like an overcoming of her previously solipsistic self; 
now, the disappearance of her “self” in the vastness of the history of the world is no longer 
portrayed as the birth of her ethical consciousness, but only as the death of her individuality. 
Beauvoir repeats Sartre’s rejection of Hegel in favour of Kierkegaard7 and, in the formulation 
                                                                                                                                                        
was thinking today that people are really wrong to torment themselves over anything and everything. 
Things are never as important as they seem; they change, they end, and above all, when all is said and 
done, everyone dies.” (433). Robert, Anne’s husband, replies that she, like most other witnesses to 
human suffering, takes refuge in apathy because of the feeling of powerlessness “in the face of certain 
overwhelming facts”, like the sheer number of people murdered, tortured, displaced and enslaved 
between the Nazi camps and the Russian camps. Note how Anne’s sentiments echo Beauvoir’s own 
apathy during the time when first started reading Phenomenology of Spirit.  
7See Part 2e. Coincidentally, Beauvoir, like Sartre, refers to Kierkegaard only four times in The 
Second Sex, and none of those references have any bearing on individualism, dialectics or Hegel. 
Given that Beauvoir connects her indifference to the Occupation to her reading of Phenomenology of 
Spirit, it escapes her sense of irony that she turns from the flight into the Universal only to be 
passionately absorbed by Kierkegaard. She feels no contrition for her apathy, only for having enjoyed 
Hegel.          
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“I am, I exist, here and now, I am myself”, she seems to be referring to the same unmediated 
subject of Being and Nothingness that Sartre posits as an alternative to the ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and 
‘We’ that is ‘I’. This retrospective dismissal of the Hegelian system symbolises her public 
allegiance to existentialism in general, and Sartre in particular.8  
 
It does not, however, point to an absolute disavowal of Hegel. Indeed, the very first of the 
texts produced during Beauvoir’s moral period, She Came to Stay (1949), is prefaced: “Each 
consciousness seeks the death of the other one.”9 Beauvoir (1948: 70) quotes this exact line in 
                                                 
8 At the risk of over-interpreting Beauvoir’s public rejection of Hegel at this precise moment in French 
history, I would venture that it serves as atonement for her compliance with a Nazi order to sign an 
oath that she was neither a freemason nor a Jew in order to continue teaching at the Lycée Camille-
Séc, which Sartre condemned as an act of complicity with the enemy and a betrayal of their 
philosophy (Beauvoir 1977: 369).  
9 In the dramatic conclusion of her first novel, Beauvoir (1949: 431) writes: “Xavière was there, 
existing only for herself, entirely self-centred, reducing to nothingness everything for which she had 
no use; she encompassed the whole world within her triumphant aloneness, boundlessly extending her 
influence, infinite and unique; everything that she was she drew from within herself, she barred all 
dominance over her, she was absolute separateness. And yet it was only necessary to pull down this 
lever to annihilate her. ‘Annihilate a consciousness! How can I?’ Francoise thought. But how was a 
consciousness not her own capable of existing? She repeated ‘She or I’. She pulled down the lever.” 
She Came to Stay satirises the desire for self-recognition. The first seven pages establish that 
Françoise, Beauvoir’s heroine, suffers from the naïve solipsism of the consciousness asserting itself at 
the cost of everything else. When she is confronted by Xavière, an equally narcissistic young woman 
who resists being assimilated by Françoise, and threatens to disrupt the world that the latter had 
created for herself, she sees no alternative but to murder this rival consciousness and in so doing, re-
assert her freedom. In short, the novel begins with Françoise embodying the “I = I” of naïve 
consciousness in the first movement of the dialectic and ends with Françoise once again embodying 
the “I = I” after defeating the other. Such an interpretation of freedom corresponds to Kojève’s 
perspective regarding the struggle for recognition. In the final passage, Beauvoir (431) writes: “No one 
could condemn or absolve her. Her act was her very own.” Françoise’s act is beyond judgment 
precisely because it is her act. Within the framework of radical individualism evident in Being and 
Nothingness and posing as Marxist phenomenology in Kojève’s lectures, there is no possibility of 
judging actions beyond ascertaining whether or not they are expressions of freedom, i.e., whether or 
not they are self-serving. Thus, Françoise’s murderous act is consistent with a view of the struggle for 
recognition as the annihilation of otherness. It is rather curious that the two combatants in She Came to 
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The Ethics of Ambiguity. Furthermore, the text that signifies the culmination of this period, 
The Second Sex, takes the dialectic of recognition as its point of departure. Many of 
Beauvoir’s texts suggest a preoccupation with the meaning of mortality and, to varying 
degrees, all of these texts are concerned with the relationship between the individual and the 
social, responsibility and the problem of identity: Hegel is invoked, by name or by 
association, in all of them.10 Thus, despite her professed disenchantment with the Hegelian 
system after her initially positive reception of Phenomenology of Spirit, Beauvoir’s moral 
period is marked by a recurrent engagement with Hegel. 
 
Most recent Beauvoir scholars remark on the textual tensions in her work. They distinguish 
between the “dominant voice” in Beauvoir’s work, which is most often associated with Sartre 
and, a “marginal voice” with less certain origins, which supposedly subverts the main 
argument.11 Michèle le Dœuff (in Simons 1995: 63) goes so far as to describe Beauvoir’s 
thought as “precariously balanced between that which she really seeks to think and the 
doctrinal line that she receives ready-made … [by] the readers of Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
… [and] the image she leaves us is that of a woman entangled in these references imposed by 
the times, neither truly gypped nor truly destroyed, but trapped, at least halfway, obliging 
herself to embrace a doctrinal framework with which, finally, she had little to do, and 
abandoning what she found in grappling with the arduous reading of Hegel.” While I agree 
with Le Dœuff’s insight that “Hegel” is at the heart of what seems muddled and contradictory 
in Beauvoir’s thought, her assessment needs to be qualified. During the course of Part 3, I 
show that Beauvoir “embraces” Marxist phenomenological existentialism, which Le Dœuff 
(1991: 107) traces back to Kojève, only insofar as she includes, but does not accept as dogma, 
this doctrine in her critical analysis of the dialectic of recognition. Ultimately, “Beauvoir’s 
Hegel” is strikingly different from the incarnation of Hegel advanced by early French 
                                                                                                                                                        
Stay are women, given, as I will show, Beauvoir’s suggestion in The Second Sex that participation in 
the life and death struggle is the sole prerogative of males. For further discussion, see Simons (in Card 
2003: 112-128) and Sirridge (in Card 2003: 138-141). 
10 For discussions centered on some of the texts that precede The Ethics of Ambiguity, see Sirridge (in 
Card 2003: 143-145), Schott (in Card 2003: 233-239), Arp (2001: 21-46), Tidd (1999: 17-24), Barnes 
(in Fallaize 1998: 157-170), Bergoffen (1997: 45-66) and Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 152-164).  
11 Debra Bergoffen, in The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic 
Generosities (1997), is one of the noted Beauvoir scholars to draw her distinction between what she 
refers to as Beauvoir’s dominant and “muted” voice.      
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phenomenology. I now turn to an important precursor to Beauvoir’s reinterpretation of the 
dialectic of recognition, The Ethics of Ambiguity.  
 
 
 
b) The Ethics of Ambiguity: freedom, power and the bond  
 
 
b.1) Ambiguity versus absurdity  
 
 
Beauvoir (1948: 7-9) begins with an appeal to a fundamental ambiguity that signifies human 
existence: 
As long as there have been men and they have lived, they have felt this tragic ambiguity 
of their condition, but as long as there have been philosophers and they have thought, 
most of them have tried to mask it. … And the ethics which they have proposed to their 
disciples has always pursued the same goal. It has been a matter of eliminating the 
ambiguity by making oneself pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the 
external world or by being engulfed in it, by yielding to eternity or enclosing oneself in 
the pure moment. Hegel, with more ingenuity, tried to reject none of the aspects of man’s 
condition and to reconcile them all. According to his system, the moment is preserved in 
the development of time, Nature asserts itself in the face of Spirit which denies it while 
assuming it; the individual is again found in the collectivity within which he is lost; and 
each man’s death is fulfilled by being cancelled out into the Life of Mankind. One can 
thus repose in a marvellous optimism where even bloody wars simply express the fertile 
restlessness of the Spirit. At the present time there still exist many doctrines which choose 
to leave in the shadow certain troubling aspects of a too complex situation. … Those 
reasonable metaphysics, those consoling ethics with which they would like to entice us 
only accentuate the disorder from which we suffer. … In spite of so many stubborn lies, 
at every moment, at every opportunity, the truth comes to light, the truth of life and death, 
of my solitude and my bond with the world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the 
insignificance and the sovereign importance of each man and all men. There was 
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Stalingrad and there was Buchenwald, and neither of the two wipes out the other. Since 
we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us therefore try to look the truth in the face.  
Many of the central tenets of Beauvoir’s philosophy emerge from these opening lines: her 
rejection of reductionist thinking and embrace of ambiguity, her rejection of ethics as a form 
of calculation and her call for an ethics that reflects the complexity of human existence, her 
simultaneous acknowledgment of Hegel’s attempt to overcome duality and rejection of his 
attempt at synthesis.     
 
The existent, argues Beauvoir, is both subject and object, materiality and consciousness, a 
separate individual within a collective.12 However, she draws a distinction between ambiguity 
and the kind of absurdity that is presupposed in Sartre’s postulation of man as a “useless 
passion”. For Beauvoir (129), to “declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be 
given meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed, that it 
must be constantly won.” Fundamentally, “it is because man’s condition is ambiguous that he 
seeks, through failure and outrageousness, to save his existence.” Beauvoir’s renunciation of 
the absurd, her insistence on the necessity of failure and outrageousness, which denotes 
indeterminacy and excess, aligns her position to the hopefulness at the core of 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, Beauvoir (10) could well be referring to Hegel’s text when 
she notes “that the most optimistic ethics have all begun by emphasising the element of 
failure involved in the condition of man; without failure, no ethics; for a being who, from the 
very start, would be an exact co-incidence with himself, in a perfect plenitude, the notion of 
having-to-be would have no meaning … [moreover,] one does not offer an ethics to a God.”  
 
The terms outrage and outrageousness feature prominently in Beauvoir’s text. By definition, 
an outrage implies the other, more particularly, violence directed at the other. For Beauvoir 
(60): “Every undertaking unfolds in a human world and affects men”. She discusses various 
attempts by the individual to deny his relationship to the world and to other individuals.13  
                                                 
12 See Langer (in Card 2003: 87-106, particularly p.89) for further analysis of the meaning of 
ambiguity in the work of Beauvoir.    
13 Prominent Beauvoir scholar, Kristana Arp, observes that, unlike Sartre, who associates bad faith 
almost exclusively with women, Beauvoir’s examples of “ethical failure” are all designated by the 
term man. According to Arp (2001: 56), Beauvoir “usually uses the term “man” to stand for all 
humans”. I will show that this is decidedly not the case in The Second Sex, where “man” refers only to 
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Firstly, the sub-man “discovers around him only an insignificant and dull world … [in which 
he] cannot prevent himself from being a presence … [but] would like to forget himself … 
[and] is thereby led to take refuge in the ready-made values of the serious world” (43-44). In 
denying consciousness and, thus, the ambiguity of being both materiality and consciousness, 
the sub-man projects his rejection of existence onto readily available opinions and labels. 
However, Beauvoir (43) counters, the existent is not merely “a datum which is passively 
suffered; the rejection of existence is still another way of existing; nobody can know the peace 
of the tomb while he is alive.” 
  
Now, earlier in her discussion, Beauvoir (10) writes: “Hegel tells us in the last part of the 
Phenomenology of Mind that moral consciousness can exist only to the extent that there is 
disagreement between nature and morality.” Describing the failure of the sub-man, who “feels 
only the facticity of his existence”, Beauvoir (44) declares: “Ethics is the triumph of freedom 
over facticity.” The suggestion here is that ethics presupposes “the relative independence of 
consciousness, its ability to transcend material conditions” (Arp 2001: 49). It is unclear how 
such a notion corresponds to Beauvoir’s appeal to ambiguity, unless one argues that the 
statement, “humans are both materiality and consciousness”, presupposes the very duality that 
it claims to surmount; that it confirms mind and matter as, first (and foremost?), two distinct 
poles that are somehow fused by superimposing “ambiguity” onto existence.14  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
men. On the topic of bad faith, note that Beauvoir never specifically refers to the types discussed 
above as examples of “bad faith”. At any rate, if she had, she would not be attaching the same 
meaning suggested by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, that is, to lie to oneself about the absolute 
freedom of human existence. Instead, she would define bad faith as an “attempt to deny our 
dependence upon others and the existence of other minds” (Simons in Card 2003: 117). Regarding the 
apparatus of limitation employed by Arp in her analysis of Beauvoir’s ethics, I would venture that 
these are propelled by her acknowledged unwillingness “to give up on the idea that all people are in 
some sense free” (Arp: 142). By “free” she means ontologically free, in other words, “the type of 
freedom that Sartre emphasises in Being and Nothingness all humans always possess” (2). Beauvoir 
herself does not refer to “ontological” or “existentialist” freedom and I intend to show that her 
postulation of freedom radically departs from the type of freedom that she associates with Sartre’s 
ontology.             
14 Arp (52) seems to reach the same conclusion.  
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Another consideration is that Heidegger himself does not offer any kind of moral imperative 
for Dasein to triumph over his facticity, thrownness or inauthenticity – these elements are 
constitutive of its ontological structure. Heidegger (1979: 223) explicitly states: “Dasein 
exists factically.” Dasein’s possibilities are factical; they are disclosed in the situation in 
which he is thrown. In the first half of The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir is inclined to oppose 
“transcendence”, “project” and “freedom” to “facticity” and, moreover, to use “facticity” and 
Sartre’s notion of “being-in-itself” interchangeably. 
 
Elsewhere in her discussion, Beauvoir (71; 100) relates facticity to “hardening”, reminiscent 
of Sartre’s description of the en-soi as solidity. Towards the end of Being and Nothingness, as 
I will show, this compressibility, now called “the slimy”, is depicted as hostile to the pour-soi 
– it threatens to devour, to congeal, transcendence. In short, for Sartre, and certainly the way 
Beauvoir uses the term on occasion, facticity equals stagnation. Such an interpretation, I 
think, stretches Heidegger’s meaning of the term. The latter draws a distinction between 
factuality and facticity. In brief, “Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is … [however] 
Dasein is never more than it factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs 
essentially” (Heidegger: 185). The “factual” refers to the given, the “factical” concerns 
projection. Thus, when Heidegger says, “Dasein exists factically”, it is “only because it is 
what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become)” (186). The corruption in meaning comes 
from ascribing a moral value to the insight:  
Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and 
is sucked into the turbulence of the “they’s” inauthenticity. Thrownness, in which 
facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein.  
(Heidegger: 223)  
However, we will see shortly how Beauvoir amends her position regarding the relationship 
between freedom and facticity when she introduces the concept of oppression. 
 
A second reaction to the lack of being is the serious man, described by Beauvoir (46), citing 
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, as one who confers an absolute status upon certain values 
and “imagines that the accession to these values likewise permanently confers value upon 
himself”. Without scruple, the serious man sacrifices others for the values to which he 
unconditionally submits, even though the “thing that matters to the serious man is not so 
much the nature of the object which he prefers to himself, but rather the fact of being able to 
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lose himself in it” (47). If the serious man manages to convince himself that he is sacrificing 
nothing, it is because, for him, the “rest of the world is a faceless desert” (51).    
 
Thirdly, “disappointed seriousness which has turned back upon itself” (52) describes the 
nihilistic attitude. The nihilist’s realisation “that the world possesses no justification and that 
he himself is nothing” coincides with “a systematic rejection of the world and man and if this 
rejection ends up in a positive desire for destruction, it then establishes a tyranny” (57).    
 
A fourth response to the absence of external justification for existence, is the “gratuitous 
display of activity” (58) of the adventurer. The adventurer “acts just for the sake of acting, for 
the sake of expending his constantly renewed energy, of expressing his vitality and the joy he 
takes in life” (Arp 2001: 60). Now, while it will become clear that Beauvoir promotes the 
notion of a joyful existence, the adventurer falls short in her estimation because he shares the 
nihilist’s contempt for other people. An adventurer, argues Beauvoir (61), “is one who 
remains indifferent … to the human meaning of his action, who thinks he can assert his own 
existence without taking into account that of others … [and] … treat them like instruments; 
… destroy them if they get in his way.”  
 
Fifthly, the passionate man imbues the object of his passion with the status of an absolute; 
however, unlike the serious man, he does not posit the object “as a thing detached from 
himself, but as a thing disclosed by his subjectivity” (64); put differently, “the passionate man 
realises that the importance of this object depends entirely on his passion” (Arp: 62). In this 
way, he “causes certain rare treasures to appear in the world, but he also depopulates it” 
(Beauvoir: 65). I return to the theme of the passionate man in the analysis of the erotic 
experience as a possible counter to the interpretation of self-other relationships mooted by 
early French phenomenology.  
 
Finally, Beauvoir (68-69) also mentions “the critic who assumes for himself independence of 
mind” and warns that this independent man “is still a man with his particular situation in the 
world” and that his “criticisms fall into the world of particular men”; that he “does not merely 
describe … [he] takes sides.” 
 
At the heart of Beauvoir’s critique of the moral failings of these self-others relationships, we 
find that, “no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself”, instead, it “appeals to 
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the existence of others” (67): those who “attempt to fulfil themselves outside of the world” 
(68) when they become “aware of the risks and the inevitable element of failure involved in 
any engagement” (67-68) are thwarted by the fact that there “is no way for a man to escape 
from this world” (69).  
 
 
 
b.2) Eating the other’s freedom 
 
 
Early in The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir (15) writes that the existent’s “original springing 
forth is a pure contingency”, which means that it can be neither foreseen nor willed: “an 
upsurging as stupid as the clinamen of the Epicurean atom which turned up at any moment 
whatsoever from any direction whatsoever” (25). At the same time, Beauvoir (25) holds that, 
“Every man is originally free, in the sense that he spontaneously casts himself into the world.” 
The suggestion of man “casting himself into the world” can be interpreted as the self-causing 
cogito of Being and Nothingness,15 particularly because Beauvoir associates this original 
                                                 
15 Hitherto, I have associated the exponents of early French phenomenology, particularly Sartre, with 
Cartesianism. However, I wish to briefly express some doubt regarding the extent to which Heidegger 
escapes the idea of a self-determining cogito. Regarding Dasein’s factical possibilities, David Couzens 
Hoy (in Guignon 1993: 178-179) contends: “Heidegger wishes to distance himself from the traditional 
idea that these possibilities should be thought of as spontaneously free choices … which is to say that 
Dasein is not some free-floating spirit that transcends its material situation.” Despite Heidegger’s 
(1978: 219-224) postulation of Dasein as vervallen, he suggests that, “Dasein projects itself and 
presents itself with possibilities” (217). Furthermore: “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its 
existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen 
these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular 
Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting” (33). If human 
existence is projection and the existent projects itself, Dasein causes itself to exist. On what basis can 
Dasein present itself with possibilities, i.e., cause those possibilities, as opposed to having possibilities 
presented to him, i.e., receive them? The former implies the action of a solitary individual; the latter a 
relationship with others. I am suggesting here that Dasein can only bestow possibilities onto itself if a 
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freedom – “natural freedom” (24) – with Sartre. In this regard, consider that contingency also 
means possibility. If Beauvoir is stating that the original surge into existence is a possibility, 
what makes such a possibility pure? After all, the contingent denotes inconsistency, 
provisionality and uncertainty. Does a “pure possibility” presume a possibility before facticity 
or a possibility before being-in-the-world-with-others, in other words, that the existent’s birth 
is some kind of perfect possibility, perhaps the possibility of perfection, which is then 
“compromised” by the factical situation in which he finds himself, or “contaminated” by his 
engagement with the world? In other words, does the notion of pure contingency indicate a 
metaphysically privileged moment when possibility falls outside the realm of the concrete? 
Certainly, this seems to be the case if Beauvoir holds the position, like Sartre, that being-with-
others signifies an alienation from the existent’s possibilities and amounts to being cast into 
the in-itself, which is, for Sartre, the world.16 The implication is that my possibility is 
independent of, even opposite to, the world, in which case Beauvoir would be describing a 
self-positing existent; thus, reaffirming Cartesian rationalism.   
 
Regarding Sartre’s idea of freedom as a purely interior stance, impervious to context, 
facticity, the subject’s relationship with the world and others, etc., Beauvoir (24), however, 
challenges: “Now Sartre declares that every man is free, that there is no way of his not being 
free … [but] does not this presence of a so to speak natural freedom contradict the notion of 
ethical freedom?” Beauvoir does not provide us with a ready-made definition of ethical 
freedom; her meaning unfolds in the second half of The Ethics of Ambiguity.   
 
Soon after she introduces the notion of ethical freedom, Beauvoir’s discussion moves away 
from the self-determining individual to the bond of each individual with all others. She 
connects the “spontaneous liberality which casts him ardently into the world” (70) to the 
naïve solipsism that Hegel posits as consciousness’ first movement. She suggests that the 
notion of unmediated subjectivity is unavoidably linked to conflict (70-71). Beauvoir (72) 
continues: 
[I]f it is true that every project emanates from subjectivity, it is also true that this 
subjective movement establishes by itself a surpassing of subjectivity. Man can find a 
                                                                                                                                                        
freedom outside Being-in-the-world is presupposed. If I am correct in this conjecture, Heidegger will 
not have succeeded in distancing himself from the tradition of the “free-floating spirit”.    
16 See Part 2e.  
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justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men. … I concern others 
and they concern me. There we have an irreducible truth. The me-others relationship is as 
indissoluble as the subject-object relationship.     
Hegel’s influence is evident. The originating subjective movement that must pass through the 
objective in order to justify his existence corresponds to Hegel’s naïve consciousness who 
becomes self-conscious only through a process of mediation that appeals to the other. Note 
how, in contrast to Sartre’s distinction between being-for-itself (project) and being-in-itself 
(the world), Beauvoir posits project in relation to, not separate from or in opposition to, 
others. Debra Bergoffen (1997: 62) counters: “So long as intersubjectivity is seen through the 
prism of the project, the other appears to me as either an obstacle, ally, or enemy … the other 
… appears to me as a freedom to be harnessed for my goals”. However, Beauvoir (153) 
anticipates this charge:  
The fact is that the man of action becomes a dictator not in respect to his ends but because 
these ends are necessarily set up through his will. Hegel, in his Phenomenology, has 
emphasised this inextricable confusion between objectivity and subjectivity. A man gives 
himself to a Cause only by making it his Cause; as he fulfils himself within it, it is also 
through him that it is expressed, and the will to power is not distinguished in such a case 
from generosity.  
Towards the end of Part 2, I considered the viewpoint that generosity is the prerogative of the 
privileged. By positing the meeting between the subject and his other as a double movement, 
Hegel himself shifts, as Beauvoir suggests, the meaning of subjectivity so that the matter of 
prerogative is much more ambiguous. Of course, in so doing, Hegel assumes that everyone is 
free and equal. Later on in the discussion, it will become apparent that The Second Sex is an 
attempt to posit the double movement of generosity in the face of asymmetrical power 
relations. For now it is crucial to note that, after this reference to Hegel’s dialectic of 
recognition, Beauvoir devotes the rest of The Ethics of Ambiguity to an analysis of the bond 
that the existent shares with the world and others.   
 
It is precisely the bond between people that makes possible the phenomenon of oppression; 
equally, this bond is the precondition for Beauvoir’s concept of “freedom”. Permit me to cite 
Beauvoir (81-83) at length:     
Perhaps it is possible to dream of a future when men will know no other use of their 
freedom than this free unfurling of itself; constructive activity would be possible for all; 
each one would be able to aim positively through the projects at his own future. … As we 
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have already seen, every man transcends himself. But it happens that this transcendence is 
condemned to fall uselessly back upon itself because it is cut off from its goals. That is 
what defines a situation of oppression. Such a situation is never natural: man is never 
oppressed by things; in any case, unless he is a naïve child who hits stones or a mad 
prince who orders the sea to be thrashed, he does not rebel against things, but only against 
other men. … Certainly, a material obstacle may cruelly stand in the way of an 
undertaking … but here we have one of the truths of Stoicism: a man must assume even 
these misfortunes. … Only man can be the enemy for man; only he can rob him of the 
meaning of his life because it also belongs only to him to confirm it in its existence, to 
recognise it in actual fact as a freedom. … One does not submit to a war or an occupation 
as he does to an earthquake: he must take sides for or against, and the foreign wills 
thereby becomes allied or hostile. It is this interdependence which explains why 
oppression is possible and why it is hateful. [It] is other men who open the future to me, it 
is they who, setting up the world of tomorrow, define my future; but if, instead of 
allowing me to participate in this constructive movement, they oblige me to consume my 
transcendence in vain, if they keep me below the level which they have conquered and on 
the basis of which new conquests will be achieved, then they are cutting me off from the 
future, they are changing me into a thing. Life is occupied in both perpetuating itself and 
in surpassing itself; if all it does is maintain itself, then living is only not dying, and 
human existence is indistinguishable from an absurd vegetation … . Oppression divides 
the world into two clans: those who enlighten mankind by thrusting it ahead of itself and 
those who are condemned to mark time hopelessly in order merely to support the 
collectivity; their life a pure repetition of mechanical gestures; their leisure is just about 
sufficient for them to regain their strength; the oppressor feeds himself on their 
transcendence and refuses to extend it by a free recognition.  
This crucial passage suggests that all humans have some kind of freedom. Having this 
freedom does not guarantee the exercise of it, since the existent’s freedom can also be “cut off 
from its goals”.  
 
It appears that the exercise of this freedom is what Aristotle posits as “purposive activity” – 
here called constructive activity – what Hegel describes as going “beyond itself” – here called 
free unfurling, transcendence and surpassing and Heidegger refers to as “projection” or 
“Being towards-possibilities” – here called project. Now, Hegel’s dialecticity of existence, 
together with Aristotle’s teleology, to which the former owes a considerable debt, presuppose 
a concept of the present as a delineation of both the past and the future. Heidegger, too, in his 
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reference to the “transcendence of time”, suggests that the “present moment goes beyond, or 
“transcends”, the merely present in the way that it, as present, is at the same time future and 
past” (Dostal in Guignon 2003: 156). Beauvoir (116) refers to Heidegger’s concept of the 
future, which she privileges over an approach, “hesitantly reflected in the systems of Hegel 
and of Comte … [in which] the Future appears as both the infinite and as Totality”.  
 
Later in the discussion, Beauvoir (105) contends that “even Hegel retreats from the idea of 
this motionless future; since Mind is restlessness, the dialectic of the struggle and conciliation 
can never be stopped: the future which it envisages is not the perpetual peace of Kant but an 
indefinite state of war.”17 Now, this allusion to the dialectic of recognition suggests that 
Beauvoir rejects the notion of Absolute Spirit and that she follows the early French 
phenomenologists in their presumption of consciousnesses as fundamentally separate, 
concomitantly, that conflict between existents is inevitable. On this topic, Beauvoir (119) 
offers: 
But the truth is that if division and violence define war, the world has always been at war 
and always will be; if man is waiting for universal peace in order to establish his 
existence validly, he will wait indefinitely: there will never be any other future. It is 
possible that some may challenge this assertion as being based upon debatable 
ontological presuppositions; it should at least be recognised that this harmonious future is 
only an uncertain dream … Our hold on the future is limited.  
Beauvoir does not rule out the possibility of friendship between existents, but she suggests 
that one can begin to entertain such a future only if there is a fundamental shift in how 
existents have heretofore related to one another. Even if such a shift can be produced, it might 
not result in peace and harmony, since no future is ever guaranteed. However, if our hold on 
the future is indeed limited, conflict among existents is no less axiomatic than friendship. 
What will become apparent during the course of this analysis is that, for Beauvoir, self-other 
relationships vacillate between friendship and hostility and this vacillating movement, or 
tension, marks the future. Thus, “man must accept the tension of the struggle … without 
aiming at an impossible state of equilibrium and rest” (Beauvoir: 96). While I will argue that 
Beauvoir does indeed argue for the perpetuity of the dialectic, it is clear that her motivation 
for rejecting the notion of a final sublation differs from the conventional approach to Hegel. 
 
                                                 
17 See also Beauvoir (117-118).         
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Insofar as there is a temporal aspect in her concept of freedom, Beauvoir asserts a particular 
concern with the future contained in the present moment: the exercise of this freedom 
discloses the future. That said, she argues also for the importance of the past. Beauvoir (92) 
observes:  
All that a stubborn optimism can claim is that the past does not concern us … and that we 
have sacrificed nothing in sacrificing it; thus, many revolutionaries consider it healthy to 
refuse any attachment to the past and to profess to scorn monuments and traditions. … To 
abandon the past to the night of facticity is a way of depopulating the world. 
She implies that the future that we aim for determines the legacy of the past we uphold in the 
present. The past, Beauvoir (93) writes, is not a “brute fact”, it does not exist somewhere 
independent of existents’ vested interests.                                   
 
Beauvoir also suggests that the failure to exercise this freedom turns man into “a thing”, “an 
absurd vegetation”, a survivor relentlessly marking time. Beauvoir adheres to the dictum that 
“we are what we do” (Moi 1999: 55).18 The kind of action Beauvoir has in mind here is 
creative (it “sets up the world of tomorrow”) dynamic (as opposed to “absurd vegetation” and 
“mechanical gestures”) and varied (as opposed to “pure repetition” and “marking time”). In 
The Second Sex, Beauvoir (1997: 609-611) describes this kind of action as “true action”, 
which she opposes to monotony and docility.19 The inability to act with creativity, dynamism 
and variety – the inability to disclose the future – degrades human existence to the extent that 
“a man no longer appears as anything more than a thing among things which can be 
subtracted from the collectivity of other things without its leaving upon the earth any trace of 
its absence” (Beauvoir 1948: 100). 
 
                                                 
18 Moi attributes this dictum to existentialism. I am loath to follow her on this point, if for no other 
reason than the fact that Sartre, who posits freedom as intentionality, is widely held to have been an 
“existentialist”. Quite likely we find the influence of Hegel in the notion that we are defined by our 
acts. Indeed, Kojève (1969: 221-222) attributes to Hegel the distinction that the “animal only lives; but 
living Man acts”, that “it is only in and by Action that he is specifically human”.      
19 Her position echoes that of Marx, as cited by Sonia Kruks (in Fallaize 1998: 56): “the realm of 
freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane 
considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material 
production.”     
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Perhaps on account of her bourgeois upbringing, or perhaps because she was one of the most 
prominent members of the French intelligentsia, Beauvoir tends to overlook the possibility 
that a factory worker or a housewife might take great professional and personal pride, even 
pleasure, in his or her work without their satisfaction being the effect of wholesale 
mystification. In this regard, she follows a tradition – dating back at least as far as Machiavelli 
and, in Beauvoir’s own context, reinforced by Alexandre Kojève’s preoccupation with 
mastership in his retelling of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition – that portrays human beings as 
fundamentally marked by a relentless ambition. Is it quite certain, however, that being human 
presupposes a desire for professional advancement or personal prestige?  
 
Furthermore, given that “the situation for most men is marked by their being compelled to 
occupy themselves only with the maintenance and preservation of their own lives and the life 
of the collective” (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996: 233), most of human existence is degraded if 
measured by Beauvoir’s standards for true action. Beauvoir posits two “clans” of people; to 
wit, those who create the future and those who maintain the present. In suggesting the pre-
eminence of the creators, Beauvoir reverts to a conception of time that ignores the extent to 
which the present implies both past and future. Moreover, she underestimates the degree to 
which the creators are dependent on the day-to-day toil of others to make possible the 
enactment of their “freedom” – what future world can there be without the maintenance of the 
present world? This is inconsistent with her viewpoint regarding the interdependency at the 
core of all self-other relationships. The implication is that it is the sole prerogative of the 
privileged to liberate the supposedly disgruntled working class from the doom of repetition 
and frustrated ambition, to ensure that the “working stiffs” may too be allowed the “element 
of novelty … [and the] creative flow” (Beauvoir 1997: 610) of true action. 
 
In accordance with Arp (122), we gather that, for Beauvoir, “a distinctively human existence 
requires something over and above the continued existence as a material thing in the world.” 
This higher existence presupposes at least a certain level of material comfort; indeed, in an 
earlier text, Pyrrhus et Cinéas, Beauvoir (cited by Arp: 122) asserts: “I demand for men 
health, knowledge, well-being, leisure in order that their freedom does not consume itself in 
fighting sickness, ignorance and misery.” A lack of material well-being certainly contributes 
to the degradation of existence inasmuch as it absorbs those who suffer the shortage primarily 
in matters of survival. However, in itself, the material well-being of the existent is no 
guarantee of the exercise of his freedom.           
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In the passage under the discussion, Beauvoir notes that certain “material obstacles” or forces 
of nature, such as an earthquake, may seem to hinder the existent’s activity. However, he 
cannot be oppressed by things and nature cannot be held accountable for whatever humans 
suffering it causes. The forces of nature do not degrade his freedom; instead, they are the 
setting for that freedom. We find in this notion of freedom a consideration of the facticity of 
human existence. If existence is factical, the existent’s freedom is enacted – and this 
“freedom” is only insofar as it acts – in factical conditions. Facticity points not to the limits of 
freedom, if by limit is meant the end of something or the beginning of something else, which, 
in turn, points to a distinction between freedom and facticity. Instead, Beauvoir evokes a 
notion of freedom that one could describe as “always already” factical. 
  
The degradation of freedom is triggered only by other existents, who either force the existent 
to “vainly consume” his freedom, or “feed” upon it themselves.20 To Beauvoir, these two 
possibilities signify oppression. While Beauvoir (7) opens The Ethics of Ambiguity with the 
paradox that the existent is “a pure internality against which no external power can take hold, 
and he also experiences himself as a thing crushed by the dark weight of other things”, she 
now insists that man can be oppressed only by man.21  
 
Oppression is a side-effect of this interdependence among existents. Importantly, this means 
that oppression is neither fundamental to, nor an inescapable aspect of, human existence. 
What is fundamental is the bond between existents. Beauvoir constantly underlines this bond: 
“Man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of other men”;22 
                                                 
20 With this suggestion of “freedom” as edible, Beauvoir contradicts Sartre’s notion of freedom. See 
also Arp (26).     
21 This insight will have important repercussions for her analysis of woman’s oppression in The 
Second Sex, particularly her often maligned suggestion that a woman’s body is one of the central 
elements in her enslavement to human society.     
22 In her effort to refute the claim that existence is absurd, Beauvoir’s main preoccupation in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity is to highlight the problem of the justification of existence. Regarding the 
“freedom” of others, Beauvoir argues that we must combat oppression in order to justify our own 
existence. Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 56) challenges this strategy of expressing the problem of 
oppression in such abstract terms. Le Dœuff (59) observes: “Later, when Beauvoir’s commitment 
becomes more concrete and less isolated, first during the Algerian war and then side by side with other 
women, she no longer asks herself what is bad about oppression; it is not necessary to prove that a 
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“Only man can be the enemy for man; only he can rob him of the meaning of his life because 
it also belongs only to him to confirm it in its existence” and “[It] is other men who open the 
future to me, it is they who, setting up the world of tomorrow, define my future.”23 The 
                                                                                                                                                        
scandal is a scandal. This development of hers is important: seeking to justify oneself in fighting 
oppression means one is still caught in the ideology which sanctions that oppression.” In Force of 
Circumstance, Beauvoir (1968: 76-77) herself explains: “[S]o soon after a war which had forced us to 
re-examine all our ideas, it was natural enough to attempt to reinvent rules and reasons. France was 
crushed between two blocs, our fate was being decided without us; this state of passivity prevented us 
from taking practice as our law; I find nothing surprising, therefore, in my concern with moral 
questions. What I find hard to understand is the idealism that blemishes these essays [The Ethics of 
Ambiguity and four articles written for Les Temps Modernes]. In reality, men defined themselves for 
me through their bodies, their needs, their work; I set no form, no value above the individual of flesh 
and blood. … But then, why did I take this circuitous route through other values besides need to justify 
the fundamental importance I assigned to need itself? Why did I write concrete liberty instead of 
bread, and subordinate the will to live to a search for the meaning of life? I never brought matters 
down to saying: People must eat because they are hungry. Yet that is what I thought. … I was – like 
Sartre – insufficiently liberated from the ideologies of my class; at the very moment I was rejecting 
them, I was still using their language to do so. That language has become hateful to me because, as I 
now know, to look for the reasons why one should not stamp on a man’s face is to accept stamping on 
it.”  
23 See also Schott (in Card 2003: 228-247), who contests what she considers as Beauvoir’s Hegel-
inspired depiction of oppression as “an expression of the interdependency” (232) between existents. 
Citing the work of Arendt and Bauman, Schott argues that the “Nazis did not derive their self-
recognition in relation to the Jews so much as detach themselves from human interaction with them.” 
Referring in particular to Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, Schott writes: “Eichmann, for example, 
may have found recognition as father and loyal bureaucrat from his family and Nazi colleagues. But 
did he seek recognition from the Jews he helped annihilate?” While I wish to avoid getting mired in 
the specifics of Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust, it must be noted that Arendt’s interpretation – that 
he was the personification of the banality of evil – does not accord with other accounts that portray 
him as not “merely” adhering to the Führerprinzip, but acting on his own anti-Semitism. 
 
At any rate, Beauvoir’s work offers possible responses to Schott’s critique. If we accept the portrayal 
of Eichmann as an “ordinary” man following orders and denying culpability, Beauvoir would refer to 
him as a sub-man. If we suggest that Eichmann committed evil unto his Jewish countrymen because 
he was anti-Semitic, Beauvoir would describe him as a serious man. We have seen that the sub-man 
works in the service of the serious and the serious presupposes that the world is a “faceless desert”. 
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individual’s actions can have no meaning, he cannot justify his own existence or create a 
future without other existents; indeed, even his sense of himself is mediated by others. Let us 
investigate in more detail how the primacy of the bond relates to Beauvoir’s notion of 
freedom. 
 
 
 
 
b.3) Power to do what we like, freedom to do what we ought  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus, Schott’s emphasis on detachment as the driving force for committing atrocity does not 
invalidate Beauvoir’s earlier arguments.  
 
When Schott suggests that Eichmann did not seek recognition from Jewish people, she misses the 
point of Beauvoir’s postulation of oppression: the oppressor refuses to acknowledge that his own sense 
of identity is enmeshed with the other – an Aryan race is posed only in opposition to a non-Aryan 
(historically, Semitic) race, the superiority of Germans can be established only on the basis of the 
inferiority of non-Germans and German Jews, etc. Furthermore, for Beauvoir, oppression, which, 
incidentally, is described in The Second Sex as an “absolute evil” (Beauvoir 1997: 29), can never be 
banal. Consider this extract from The Ethics of Ambiguity: “High as it may be, the number of victims 
is always measurable; and each one taken one by one is never anything but an individual: yet, through 
time and space, the triumph of the cause embraces the infinite, it interests the whole collectivity. In 
order to deny the outrage it is enough to deny the importance of the individual, even though it be at the 
cost of this collectivity: it is everything, he is only a zero. … [If] an individual is a pure zero, the sum 
of those zeros which make up the collectivity is also a zero: no undertaking has any importance, no 
defeat as well as no victory” (Beauvoir 1948: 100-103). Applying these words, I think that the number 
of perpetrators is equally measurable and to describe their evil as banal is to deny the importance of 
the individual’s culpability; in a sense to deny the outrage of his evil action. For Beauvoir (133), “one 
must retreat from neither the outrage of violence nor deny it, or, which amounts to the same thing, 
assume it lightly.” A position that describes evil as “banal” can too easily descend into a kind of 
relativism that somehow absolves a perpetrator or renders his actions meaningless, thereby conspiring 
in the dehumanisation of his victims. That said, Beauvoir herself addresses in The Second Sex one of 
the major shortcomings of an analysis of human conflict based on Hegel’s dialectic of recognition: the 
presumption of equality among opposing existents.                     
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The “freedom” that is degraded, fed upon or unrecognised by the other most assuredly cannot 
refer to “natural freedom”. If the world can bite into it, then it must possess a certain material 
quality – and Beauvoir (78) warns against “emptying the word freedom of its concrete 
meaning” – in contrast to the freedom that takes the Cartesian cogito as its point of departure. 
Furthermore, natural freedom presupposes that everyone – the torturer and his prisoner – is 
equally free; thus, it rules out the possibility of oppression. As it will become clear below, the 
whole rationale for Beauvoir’s postulation of ethical freedom is the fact that “whatever may 
be true ontologically, we are not … equally free in the everyday world” (Bergoffen 1997: 97).   
 
Suppose that the “freedom” that the oppressor curtails signifies the existent’s power.24 Unlike 
the kind of freedom associated with Sartre, a person’s power can be limited by factical 
conditions, by others and even by oneself. Such an interpretation resonates with Beauvoir’s 
(91) assertion that “it is not true that the recognition of the freedom of others limits my own 
freedom: to be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass 
the given toward an open future”. Recall that in the passage relating to oppression, Beauvoir 
associates “freedom” with goals, making new conquests, setting up the world of tomorrow; 
this freedom exists amidst material obstacles and can only be confirmed by other human 
beings. Recall also Thompson’s definition of power in Part 1, that is, “a socially or 
institutionally endowed capacity which enables or empowers some individuals to make 
decisions, pursue ends or realise interests”.25 To make decisions implies choice; to pursue 
ends implies future-orientated action.  
Early in her essay, Beauvoir (22) indicates that hers is a “philosophy of freedom”; as such, 
she forestalls the rejection of “the ontological possibility of a choice”. Beauvoir attributes this 
                                                 
24 I credit Kristana Arp with this suggestion. (See, in particular, Arp: 120-124; 141-142.) 
Unfortunately, Arp’s commitment to the notion that “even the most severely oppressed … always 
retain their ontological freedom” (7) leads her to abandon her brief substitution of ontological freedom 
(natural freedom) with the concept of power. Consequently, she interprets ethical freedom as the 
concrete expression of ontological freedom, rather than its contradiction.       
25 Whether one calls it freedom or power, note how in both instances the possession thereof depends 
on others – freedom must be confirmed by others and power is endowed by the social. When Beauvoir 
discusses the phenomenon of oppression, she focuses only on the process whereby the oppressor 
extends his freedom/power by feeding on the freedom/disempowering the other. What is missing from 
her analysis is the extent to which the oppressor relies on the oppressed to recognise his power. 
Beauvoir addresses this issue when she reinterprets the master-slave dialectic in The Second Sex.      
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critique specifically to a Marxist approach, by which “a man’s action seems valid only if the 
man has not helped set it going by an internal movement.” Concurring with Merleau-Ponty,26  
Beauvoir (20-21) argues: 
The very notion of action would lose all meaning if history were a mechanical unrolling 
in which man appears only as a passive conductor of outside forces. By acting, as also by 
preaching action, the Marxist revolutionary asserts himself as a veritable agent; he 
assumes himself free. … Now, neither scorn nor esteem would have any meaning if one 
regarded the acts of a man as a purely mechanical resultant. In order for men to become 
indignant or to admire, they must be conscious of their own freedom and the freedom of 
others. 
To be sure, Beauvoir does not posit a consciousness that is invulnerable to outside forces; 
after all, as I show, it can be mystified by oppressors. The antidote to mystification is 
relentless questioning fuelled by a deep suspicion27 of all human situations held to be 
“natural”.    
 
Beauvoir holds that the individual’s choices and actions ought not to be unrestrained. She 
emphasises the link between power and ethics. Every choice presupposes a limited 
perspective, “rooted in a particular situation in one point in time [and] … with an imperfect 
grasp of all the factors involved” (Arp: 131), guessing at an unforeseeable future. For 
Beauvoir (133), “morality resides in the painfulness of an indefinite questioning” – moral 
choices can not be indiscriminate. Nonetheless, Beauvoir (92) understands also that “the 
tendency of man is not to reduce himself but to increase his power”. Thus, “in the name of the 
serious or of his passions, of his will for power or of his appetites, he refuses to give up his 
privileges” (96) and “instead of accepting his limits … tries to do away with them [and] … 
aspires to act upon everything and by knowing everything” (121). If being free means 
surpassing the given toward an open future, that “openness” should not amount to unbridled 
expansionism or self-enrichment at the cost of others.  
 
                                                 
26 See Part 2c.2.              
27 The source of this suspicion is, ironically, a Marxist perspective: In The Second Sex, Beauvoir 
(1997: 84) writes: “The theory of historical materialism has brought to light some most important 
truths. Humanity is not an animal species, it is a historical reality. Human society is an antiphysis – in 
a sense it is against nature; it does not passively submit to the presence of nature but rather takes over 
the control of nature on its own behalf.” 
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The oppressor’s power is “the freedom of exploiting” (90), that is, a freedom that does not 
recognise the “freedom” of others or disempower them through force or mystification. In The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir focuses only on the power of mystification. Let us briefly 
reflect on the following two passages from the text:      
There are beings whose life slips by in an infantile world because, having been kept in a 
state of servitude and ignorance, they have no means of breaking the ceiling which is 
stretched over their heads. Like the child, they can exercise their freedom, but only within 
this universe which has been set up before them, without them. This is the case, for 
example, of slaves who have not raised themselves to the consciousness of their slavery. 
This is also the situation of women in many civilisations; they can only submit to the 
laws, the gods, the customs, and the truths created by the males. … The negro slave of the 
eighteenth century, the Mohammedan woman enclosed in a harem28 have no instrument, 
                                                 
28 Beauvoir seems to have a particular fondness for this example. In The Prime of Life, Beauvoir 
(1963: 346) recalls debating with Sartre on the relationship between freedom and situation: “I 
maintained that from the angle of freedom as Sartre defined it – that is, an active transcendence of 
some given context rather than mere stoic resignation – not every situation was equally valid: what 
sort of transcendence could a woman shut up in a harem achieve. Sartre replied that even such a 
cloistered existence could be lived in several quite different ways. I stuck to my part for a long time, 
and in the end made only a token submission. Basically I was right. But to defend my attitude I should 
have had to abandon the plane of individual, and therefore idealistic, morality on which we had set 
ourselves.” I wish to draw attention to two aspects related to this passage. Firstly, we have already 
glimpsed, if not outright abandonment, a distancing from “the plane of the individual” in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity. In an interview with Simon (in Fraser and Bartky 1992: 32), Beauvoir reinforces this 
separation from Sartre’s project: “Being and Nothingness is concerned with the individual and not so 
much with the relations among individuals. … [In] The Second Sex, I place myself much more on a 
moral plane whereas Sartre dealt with morality later on. In fact, he never exactly dealt with morality.”  
 
A second point relates to the example itself. For Beauvoir, a Mohammedan woman secluded in a 
harem presents a clear example of someone whose vulnerability to mystification absolves her from the 
charge of “bad faith” in the Sartrean sense. She says nothing specific about the oppression that this 
woman suffers, she is only a cipher for what Beauvoir deems the most repressive conditions that feeds 
upon freedom. Tellingly, she is elsewhere, screened from (Western) eyes. She is not, for instance, a 
French Muslim woman. Penelope Deutscher (2004: 663-664) criticises Beauvoir’s tendency to depict 
women as “racially and culturally homogeneous … a plurality of race and cultural differences never 
mediates or divides or fragments a subject in an on-going way. Subjects are culturally separated from 
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be it in thought or by astonishment or anger, which permits them to attack the civilisation 
which oppresses them. (37-38) 
The slave is submissive when one has succeeded in mystifying him in such a way that his 
situation does not seem to him to be imposed by men, but to be immediately given by 
nature, by the gods, by the powers against whom revolt has no meaning; thus, he does not 
accept his condition through a resignation of his freedom since he can not even dream of 
any other … (85).  
The power to mystify is the ability to oppress someone without him being aware of his 
oppression. The mystified remains disempowered, not because he flees from existential angst 
or resigns himself to submission, but simply because he knows only obedience and servility. 
Beauvoir likens the mystified to children. Both live in the world of the serious, that is, the 
world of ready-made values; this situation is imposed on them by others who demand their 
respect and obedience.  
 
Regarding the situation of children, Beauvoir (35-36) writes:  
The child’s situation is characterised by his finding himself cast in a universe which he 
has not helped to establish, which has been fashioned without him, and which appears to 
him as an absolute to which he can only submit. In his eyes, human inventions, words, 
customs, and values are given facts, as inevitable as the sky and the trees. This means that 
the world in which he lives is a serious world, since the characteristic of the spirit of 
                                                                                                                                                        
each other just as self-enclosed communities and neighbourhoods within cities and countries exist side 
by side.” The women discussed in both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex represent 
different economic classes and different age groups and even different sexual orientations. However, 
Beauvoir, for all her emphasis on the specificity of difference, ignores other indicators of difference, 
like race and religion. I return to this problem below.  
 
At this point, let it be noted that, at least as far as The Ethics of Ambiguity is concerned, Beauvoir 
reveals a propensity for exoticism in her analysis of oppression. In contradistinction, “the western 
women of today” (Beauvoir: 38) are not really oppressed; instead, they either choose the limits of their 
freedom themselves or, since they offer no resistance, they consent to the limits imposed by others. 
Arp (115) counters: “But if a woman consents to her lot, does that mean that she is not oppressed?” 
The Second Sex addresses the voluntarism implied in Beauvoir’s position. For criticism of a 
perspective that is very similar to that of Deutscher, see Moi (in Ferguson and Wicke 1994: 89, 
footnote 5).                              
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seriousness is to consider values as ready-made things. That does not mean that the child 
himself is serious. On the contrary, he is allowed to play, to expend his existence freely. 
… He feels himself happily irresponsible. … Even when the joy of existence is strongest, 
when the child abandons himself to it, he feels himself protected against the risk of 
existence by the ceiling which human generations have built over his head. And it is by 
virtue of this that the child’s condition (although it can be unhappy in other respects) is 
metaphysically privileged. Normally the child escapes the anguish of freedom. 
For Beauvoir, there is a qualitative difference in the situations of the mystified and the child. 
The oppression of the mystified occurs behind the façade of a “natural situation”, whereas 
childhood really is “a natural situation whose limits are not created by other men and which is 
thereby not comparable to a situation of oppression” (141). One does not need to look far, 
particularly in an African context, to challenge this idealisation of childhood. Be that as it 
may, Beauvoir (85) suggests that, while we may justifiably expect children to respect and 
obey their elders, the mystified individual’s “submission is not enough to justify the tyranny 
which is imposed upon him.”  
 
Regarding Beauvoir’s viewpoint, Arp (116) notes that “the slave’s assessment of his own 
position is not the ultimate criterion of whether he is oppressed or not.” At the same time, 
Beauvoir (138-139) contends that, though “the ‘enlightened elites’ strive to change the 
situation of the child, the illiterate, the primitive crushed beneath his superstitions … they 
must respect a freedom which, like theirs, is absolute … [by not] forgetting that man always 
has to decide by himself in the darkness, that he must want beyond what he knows.”      
 
While Beauvoir’s account of mystification is more nuanced in The Second Sex,29 her position 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity is, firstly, that there is a direct correlation between the level of 
economic and social constraint of an individual’s situation and his susceptibility to 
                                                 
29By documenting in The Second Sex how we, in every sphere of our lives, from the earliest days of 
our childhood, internalise certain standards of behaviour, Beauvoir demonstrates the pervasive and 
insidious nature of mystification. Arp (123) observes that the “dutiful bourgeois daughters, wives, and 
mothers whose lives Beauvoir depicts” are examples of privileged individuals who are nonetheless 
oppressed. Additionally, Beauvoir suggests that even women who grasp the power of mystification, 
personified by the Eternal Feminine, cannot, with any degree of permanency and without incurring 
heavy penalties – if they are able to do so at all – extract themselves from its clutches.   
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mystification; secondly, that one of the requirements of ethical freedom is the demystification 
of all people.    
 
Beauvoir (48) contends: “The less economic and social circumstances allow an individual to 
act upon the world, the more this world appears to him as given.” Concomitantly, those with 
access to the corridors of power have the concrete means – education, wealth, social standing, 
weaponry, etc. – to, not only grasp a situation as oppressive, but, fundamentally, to resist 
oppressors. Moreover, for Beauvoir (86), these privileged people must “furnish the ignorant 
slave with the means of transcending his situation by means of revolt, to put an end to his 
ignorance”, in other words, “freeing the slave from the powers of mystification, showing the 
slave that revolt is possible, is the responsibility of the one who is not mystified” (Bergoffen: 
88).  
 
This responsibility indicates a moral imperative: “If I want the slave to become conscious of 
his servitude, it is both in order not to be a tyrant myself – for any abstention is complicity, 
and complicity in this case is tyranny – and in order that new possibilities might be opened to 
the liberated slave and through him to all men” (Beauvoir: 86). Once more, it is clear that 
Beauvoir does not in this instance refer to “natural freedom”. The latter, we have seen, refers 
to something that is somehow self-causing, which all existents always possess, irrespective of 
the bond with others. The notion of freedom that emerges here, however, is qualified by, even 
premised on, the relationship with others: “In taking up the cause of the other’s freedom I am, 
therefore, taking up my own fight” (Bergoffen: 89). Likewise, “if the oppressor were aware of 
the demands of his own freedom, he himself should have to denounce oppression” (Beauvoir: 
96).  
 
I submit that Beauvoir’s stance reflects the perspective of the privileged. She approaches the 
problem of oppression almost exclusively from the perspective of the powerful – she views 
oppression and the triumph over oppression from the perspectives of oppressors and 
combatants, but rarely from the position of the sufferers. Elsewhere, Beauvoir (1997: 722) 
acknowledges that “to regard the universe as one’s own, to consider oneself to blame for its 
faults and to glory in its progress, one must belong to the caste of the privileged.”  
 
Now, in the citation in which she defines oppression, Beauvoir argues that the oppressor 
refuses to recognise the existence of the oppressed and changes him into a thing. An existence 
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that is degraded to the point where it is no different from “absurd vegetation”, aggravated by 
the lack of instruments of revolt, can make only a silent appeal to the powerful to recognise its 
humanity. The upshot of such an existence is that the oppressed is neither seen amidst other 
objects nor heard above the din of the oppressor’s feast. The oppressor, even if he were aware 
of the demands of his own freedom, is not likely to heed these demands, since the tendency is 
for man to extend his power. Thus, for Beauvoir, those among the privileged, who are 
outraged by the violence exerted on their fellow existents, are morally responsible for creating 
a situation in which no-one can turn a blind eye or a deaf ear to the appeals of oppressed 
people. Such a situation may require demystification or the provision of the instruments of 
revolt, be they weapons, a platform from which they can express themselves in safety, money, 
or even themselves.  
 
Another reason why Beauvoir’s stance can be interpreted as one of privilege actually has 
bearing on the oppressed person. She holds that the slave must seize the “possibility of 
liberation” (38); when he is able to see through his mystification, it is his responsibility “to 
deny the harmony of that mankind from which an attempt is made to exclude him, to prove 
that he is a man and that he is free by revolting against the tyrants” (87). The belief that the 
mystified slave can “decide positively and freely” (87) after having his consciousness raised, 
that he can transcend his enslavement through personal resolve, calls upon the traditional idea 
of the individual as an autonomous agent who wills his own subjectivity. Such self-centred 
notions appear entirely at odds with Beauvoir’s appeal to the primacy of the bond. We find in 
The Ethics of Ambiguity that Beauvoir calls upon the powerful to relinquish their power and 
authority; yet, paradoxically, she exhorts the powerless to become powerful and exercise self-
authority. Further on in this discussion, we will note Beauvoir’s argument, in The Second Sex, 
that, in a hegemony, even disenfranchised individuals oppress those who are more vulnerable 
than they. Beauvoir certainly does not urge the oppressed to become oppressors in turn. If 
Beauvoir argues for the empowerment of the oppressed, it is not in order to reassert conflict 
and domination as the fundamental basis of self-other relationships, but because she intuits a 
link between power – particularly the ability to make decisions – and ethics. After all, to ask 
the question of ethics – What ought I to do? – presupposes more than one course of action, 
which, in turn, points to choice. The possibility of choice affirms some kind of individual 
will. A truism: ethics presupposes an other. However, as Tidd (1999: 20) notes: “We cannot 
use the Other or retreat to collective identity as a means to avoid the burden of individual 
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responsibility”. Simone de Beauvoir reminds us that ethics also presupposes a subject that can 
be held accountable for his or her choices. 
 
Although The Ethics of Ambiguity espouses the perspective of the privileged, it will soon 
become apparent that Beauvoir does not place anyone, even dissidents, on the moral high 
ground. Fundamentally, everyone – including bystanders, since abstention is complicity – is 
implicated in the situation of oppression.30 For Beauvoir (89), every individual “is affected by 
                                                 
30 Indeed, Beauvoir herself does not assume “the blameless position of a political dissident” (Murphy 
in Simons 1995: 284); instead, she comes to realise that the continued commitment to the bond means 
“that a clear conscience was truly not possible” (285). Regarding Beauvoir’s guilty conscience, 
Murphy (263-297) focuses specifically on her involvement in the trial of Djamila Boupacha, a twenty-
two year old Muslim-Algerian woman who had been raped and tortured by members of the French 
Armed Forces during the Algerian War of Independence. (For her own account of her involvement in 
Boupacha’s case, see Beauvoir 1968: 513-518.) Murphy (281-282) cites a passage from an article 
relating to the case, which Beauvoir wrote in Le Monde: “For whether we choose our rulers willingly, 
or submit to them against our natural inclination, we remain their accomplices whether we like it or 
not. When the government of a country allows crimes to be committed in its name, every citizen 
thereby becomes a member of a collectively criminal nation. Can we allow our country to be so 
described? The Djamila Boupacha affair is the concern of every person in France.” Now, it would be 
easy to scoff at the nationalism revealed in these words: the “Djamila Boupacha affair” – note how 
Boupacha is represented as a case study rather than a flesh and blood woman carrying the scars of 
torture on her body – concerns the reputations of French citizens. In this regard, Frantz Fanon (cited in 
Murphy: 282) writes about French intellectuals in general: “The gravity of the tortures, the horror of 
the rape of little Algerian girls, are perceived because their existence threatens a certain idea of a 
French honour. … Such shutting out of the Algerian, such ignoring of the tortured man or of the 
massacred family, constitute a wholly original phenomenon. It belongs to that form of egocentric, 
sociocentric thinking which has become the characteristic of the French.” Given the personal and 
professional risks (for a summary, see Murphy: 279 and also Beauvoir 1968: 628-629 for a retelling of 
the threats on her life) incurred by her involvement in the “Djamila Boupacha affair”, is it reasonable 
to extend Fanon’s criticism to Beauvoir? 
 
Recall her own assertion that an individual commits to a Cause “only by making it his Cause”. This 
Hegel-inspired insight rings true in this case, particularly since “Beauvoir had never met Boupacha 
though she had countless opportunities” (Murphy: 283). Elsewhere in The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
Beauvoir (86) recognises that “there is nothing more arbitrary than intervening as a stranger in a 
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destiny which is not ours: one of the shocking things about charity – in the civic sense of the word – is 
that it is practiced from the outside, according to the caprice of the one who distributes it and who is 
detached from the object.” Intellectually, Beauvoir argues that French citizens could not simply 
distance themselves from government sponsored acts of violence, even if they were opposed to these 
acts: firstly, the bond precludes “the insulation of subjectivities from each other” (Murphy: 285), and, 
secondly, to refuse “responsibility for a government acting contrary to her wishes could only be an 
abstract refusal, a sort of good faith perhaps, in the erroneous belief that beliefs alone determine 
responsibilities” (284-285). What was needed was constructive action. However, on an intersubjective 
level, the “Djamila Boupacha” that emerges from Force of Circumstance seems more like Beauvoir’s 
own Cause than a concrete individual. Such an approach belies Beauvoir’s (106-107) declaration: “In 
order for this world to have any importance, in order for our undertaking to have any meaning and to 
be worthy of sacrifices, we must affirm the concrete and particular thickness of this world and … if 
the individual is set up as a unique and irreducible value, the word sacrifice regains all its meaning”.  
 
Now, it may be asked if this is over-stating Beauvoir’s supposed indifference to the person of Djamila 
Boupacha. It may be suggested that criticising Beauvoir for her failure to physically meet someone, 
whose plight she nevertheless helped bring to light, hints at a metaphysics of presence, that is, the 
assumption that the “immediacy” of a face-to-face meeting would affirm Boupacha in some or other 
essential way. Now, Beauvoir works from a philosophical framework that privileges Mitsein; indeed, 
The Second Sex is premised on the idea that subjectivity can only be affirmed by the mutual 
recognition of existents. Such recognition has a very strong concrete element. Specifically, Beauvoir 
critically engages with two movements of recognition – seeing-and-being-seen-by-the-other and 
touching-and-being-touched-by-the-other – both of which have a material and an ethical dimension. 
Her engagement with these phenomena challenges any rigid distinctions between proximity/distance 
and interiority/exteriority.  
 
That said, I would suggest that the “Beauvoir-Boupacha affair” can be explained in terms of the shame 
of “being-seen-by-the-other” that Sartre’s subject feels in Being and Nothingness. In the segment 
relating to “the look”, Sartre (1956: 345) submits: “‘Being-seen-by-the-Other’ is the truth of ‘seeing-
the-Other’”. Perhaps Beauvoir was not so much ignoring Boupacha as she was evading the shame of a 
face-to-face meeting with an oppressed other. The following revelations in her memoir substantiate 
such an interpretation: “I was seeing myself through the eyes of women who had been raped twenty 
times, of men with broken bones, of crazed children: a Frenchwoman” (Beauvoir 1968: 381-382) and 
“‘I’m French’. The words scalded my throat like an admission of hideous deformity. For millions of 
men and women, old men and children, I was just one of the people who were torturing them, burning 
them, machine-gunning them, slashing their throats, starving them; I deserved their hatred because I 
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could still sleep, write, enjoy a walk or a book” (396-397). Beauvoir’s self-flagellation masks the 
ethical failure of the serious (wo)man fighting for Justice by means of the faceless other. Furthermore, 
by owning up to her complicity in the oppression of Algerians without it being recognised by any 
actual Algerians, Beauvoir can also take ownership of it, thus, not risk her subjectivity – a meeting 
with Boupacha exposes the possibility of being seen as a “criminal Frenchwoman”. It reminds me of 
an exchange between Beauvoir and Sartre in Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre (Beauvoir 1984: 286-289):  
“De Beauvoir: After all, asking someone for the name of a street … is putting oneself on the plane of 
reciprocity. It is recognising him as your equal. 
Sartre: Yes, for one thing. And what is more important, I don’t much care for another’s subjectivity. 
Sartre: Although I’m neither clever nor handy, I always prefer to manage by myself rather than ask 
anyone for anything. I don’t like being helped. I find the idea quite unbearable.  
De Beauvoir: Once again I say it’s odd, this contrast between your stiffness and a welcoming attitude, 
a kindness … 
Sartre: As soon as anyone turns to me to ask for something … 
De Beauvoir: Yes, because at that moment you are acknowledged.”  
 
Using her own words, one could interpret Beauvoir’s avoidance of Djamila Boupacha as a 
circumvention of the plane of reciprocity and a failure to recognise Boupacha as an equal. Beauvoir 
responds to Boupacha’s appeal to be considered a human being, with a particular history, culture, 
belief system, body, etc., rather than a Colonised Other or a War Statistic. She does not, however, 
make the reciprocal appeal to Boupacha to acknowledge her own specificity, perhaps because she 
takes it for granted, which is inconsistent with her philosophical outlook, or perhaps out of dread, 
which is a common response to the ambiguity that marks the reception between the self and the other. 
 
Another possible explanation for Beauvoir’s attitude towards Boupacha stems from her belief that 
“there are men who expect help from certain men and not from others, and these expectations define 
privileged lines of action” (Beauvoir 1948: 144). As Tidd (2004: 42) explains: “To belong to an 
oppressed group is to have lived experience of oppression that cannot be shared by an individual who 
chooses to express solidarity with the struggle of another oppressed individual.” This stance will also 
be evident in The Second Sex, for example, in the contention that even “the most sympathetic of men 
never fully comprehend woman’s concrete situation” (Beauvoir 1997: 26), that “certain women … are 
best qualified to elucidate the situation of woman.” Significantly, Beauvoir’s entire involvement with 
Boupacha’s trial was mediated by Giséle Halimi, an activist-lawyer from Jewish and Muslim 
extraction who defended Boupacha and other members of the Algerian National Liberation Front. 
Although she earned her law degree at the University of Paris, Halimi hailed from Tunis, which had 
been occupied by the French for 75 years, until 1956. Baldly speaking, Halimi had the right “struggle 
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this struggle in so essential a way that he cannot fulfil himself morally without taking part in 
it”. The individual is, according to Beauvoir, morally obliged to participate in liberation 
struggles; his “freedom” hinges on such engagement. This is because “the existence of others 
as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom” (91).  
 
The “freedom” that is based on the recognition of the fundamental bond with the other and 
tied to moral fulfilment is what Beauvoir calls ethical freedom.  
 
Now, Arp (118) incorrectly surmises: “Freedom fighters who work with others to overcome 
their own oppression achieve the pinnacle of moral freedom31 according to [Beauvoir’s] 
view.” At various points in her text, Beauvoir shows that, even with the noblest of intentions, 
freedom fighters often perpetuate oppression. For example, there is the “question of throwing 
men in spite of themselves, under the pretext of liberation, into a new world, one which they 
have not chosen, on which they have no grip” (Beauvoir: 85); furthermore, “the oppressor has 
a good case for showing that … one can never respect all freedoms at the same time” (96); 
indeed, “the situation of the world is so complex that one can not fight everywhere at the 
same time and for everyone”(98). Another consideration is that the “struggle is not one of 
words and ideologies; it is real and concrete” (84), which amounts to being “forced to treat 
                                                                                                                                                        
credentials” to become personally involved in Boupacha’s case. Likewise, Halimi was in a position to 
collaborate with Beauvoir on an “equal” footing. Bergoffen (1997: 50) points to an important 
distinction that Beauvoir makes between “acting with the other” and “acting for the other”. Beauvoir’s 
ethics of generosity, which I will discuss in the final part of this study, concerns itself with the 
preservation of the otherness of the other. For Beauvoir, continues Bergoffen, preventing the “other’s 
strangeness from sliding into the idea of our necessary estrangement (the look)”, necessitates the 
avoidance of the “impossible intimacy” of acting for the other. The situation of Beauvoir’s complicity 
to the oppression of Algerians would have made it impossible for her to meet Boupacha as anything 
other than the dominant subject reaffirming her privilege over the subjugated other. Any actions 
relating to Beauvoir’s defence of Boupacha would thus be for her and not with her. In this respect, we 
can interpret Beauvoir’s avoidance of Boupacha and collaboration with Halimi as philosophically 
consistent.                
31 The English version of Pour une morale de L’ambiguité translates “liberté morale” as “ethical 
freedom”. Arp’s use of the term moral freedom is, by her own admission, a matter of preference. At 
any rate, Beauvoir does not draw any clear distinction between morals and ethics; throughout the text 
she refers more often to morality and morals. 
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certain men as things in order to win the freedom of all” (97). Beauvoir (99) reminds us that 
such confrontations expose the bodies of all participants to “the same brutal hazard: they will 
be wounded, killed, or starved.” In short, as Arp (128) herself perceives, for Beauvoir, “one 
must countenance political violence if one refuses to countenance oppression.” 
 
Beauvoir stops short of justifying violence. Hence: “A freedom which is occupied in denying 
freedom is itself so outrageous that the outrageousness of the violence which one practices 
against it is almost cancelled out” (97) – almost – but the indissoluble bond between the 
individual and the collective reminds us that the oppression of a single individual, even if he 
has set out to exploit or hurt others, “make[s] all humanity appear as a pure thing, and this 
negation of transcendence is the mark of failure for which there is no compensation” 
(Bergoffen 1997: 57). 
 
The Ethics of Ambiguity is remarkable for the stance it takes with regard to this failure. As 
Bergoffen (50) notes, Beauvoir considers “the failures of humanity’s history of conflict, 
oppression, and exploitation … as evidence of our mutual responsibility for each other”. Now, 
Beauvoir is neither the only, nor even the first, to suggest that human beings are 
fundamentally responsible to each other. Indeed, in one of her earliest texts, The Blood of 
Others, Beauvoir (cited by Allen in Simons 1995: 115) opens with Dostoevsky’s adage that 
“each of us is responsible for everything and to every human being”. The interesting turn in 
Beauvoir’s work is the connection of this responsibility to failure. Indeed, her ethics is 
premised on the assumption of such failure – recall Beauvoir’s principle: without failure, no 
ethics. The question of what one ought to do compromises the individual because no solution 
can ever allow one to meet one’s responsibility to everyone,32 put differently, “no action can 
be generated for man without its being immediately generated against men” (Beauvoir : 99).  
  
For Arp (50), the “surprising new angle that Beauvoir brings to existentialist thought [is that] 
my realising my freedom does not necessarily conflict with others realising their freedom.”33 
However, given her emphasis on failure, it is rather the case for Beauvoir that the individual 
can never fully attain (ethical) freedom. He can be powerful, but he can never be ethically 
                                                 
32 When I turn to the theme of generosity in Beauvoir’s work, it becomes clear that this responsibility 
refers to the protection of the otherness of the other. 
33 Murphy (in Simons 1995: 280) offers a matching perspective.  
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free, or rather, ethical freedom is an ideal to which he can – must – aspire but cannot attain as 
long as others remain oppressed. Yet, this is the kind of freedom that affirms our humanity. 
As such, it elevates existence from mechanical gestures, absurd vegetation and pure 
repetition, it creates a situation in which it is possible for every individual to freely, that is, 
without force or mystification, recognise and be recognised by others.  
 
Given that the individual’s relationship with the world is marked by failure, he is himself a 
failed human being. None of us, not only the objectified oppressed, are fully human – at best, 
we are becoming-human-beings in our endeavour to be ethically free. However, far from 
despairing of the inevitable failure of man, Beauvoir’s perspective delights in existence. 
Beauvoir (135) declares that “at every instant; the movement toward freedom assumes its real, 
flesh and blood figure in the world by thickening into pleasure, into happiness.” For Beauvoir 
(135-136), the “living joy” of existence to be found in, for example, “the satisfaction of an old 
man drinking a glass of wine” or “the laugh of a child at play” – in short, the “love [of] life on 
our own account and through others” – gives concrete meaning to the search for ethical 
freedom.  
 
Crucially, Debra Bergoffen (101) qualifies:       
None of this is sentimental. Beauvoir does not envision a humanity circled in mutual 
embrace. In the concrete world, love, though an absolute value, is also a precarious one. 
Risk is never absent. Violence is ever present. Sometimes, Beauvoir says, it cannot be 
avoided. She is under no illusions. There will always be tyrants – those who use violence 
to negate the freedom of the other. To liberate the oppressed we may have to destroy the 
tyrants. The existential will that Beauvoir invokes in defence of this violation is not a 
self-righteous will but a passionate one. It is driven by love to undertake the causes of 
liberation. In the approach that dominates The Ethics of Ambiguity, I express my love of 
the other and affirm the joy of existence through acts of recognition that enact projects of 
freedom. I accept the risk that the other is to me. Without negating the power of the other 
to violate me, I appeal to the other in the name of our freedom to recognise us as bound to 
each other.  
While I hesitate to follow Bergoffen in the precise letter of her interpretation – freedom is 
much too contentious a concept in Beauvoir’s work to use it without proviso and, as for 
Beauvoir invoking an existential will, it seems to me that The Ethics of Ambiguity has far less 
to do with affirming existentialism (at the very least it counters Sartre’s brand of 
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existentialism), than introducing the key concern of The Second Sex, namely, the self-other 
relationship – I do agree with the spirit of her reading.34  
 
Even as she reels from the horrors of Stalingrad and Buchenwald, Beauvoir maintains that 
existence is not absurd. However, if man is to justify his existence, he has to meet some 
stringent requirements. Primarily, he will have “to outdo himself at every moment” (Beauvoir 
1997: 172), which returns us to the earlier insight that man tries to save his existence through 
outrageousness and the positive assumption of his failure. Outdoing oneself means moving 
beyond solipsism, self-interest and self-satisfaction, acknowledging one’s bond with and, 
thus, dependence on the world and embracing one’s permanent responsibility to others.  
 
Importantly, Beauvoir’s emphasis on failure also indicates her alignment with Hegel. Recall 
that every movement on consciousness’ quixotic journey to the Absolute is characterised by 
failure, though no lesson (at least up to the point where one can glimpse Spirit) is ever learnt, 
since it is perpetually forgotten. There is an incorrigible optimism at play in both accounts, 
which is the result of not taking their protagonists too seriously. In my opinion, Beauvoir does 
not posit the crusading existentialist hero that, for instance, Max Deutscher (2003: 22) finds in 
her work. If anything, as will become more apparent in The Second Sex, she systematically 
strips the existent of his machismo. Already in The Ethics of Ambiguity, his constant doubt 
about the course of moral action is never assuaged by any measure of success, because he 
always fails. His entire existence, his reason for being, is wrapped up in his relationships with 
others. Love and compassion undercut his ambition and conceit. Crucially, his body, always 
already factical, is vulnerable to forces of nature as well as the violence people inflict upon 
one another. Next, I turn to The Second Sex, which concretely substantiates the ethical 
perspective that Beauvoir introduces in The Ethics of Ambiguity.  
c) Master, Slave, Woman 
 
 
The complex bond between the individual and others is once again paramount in Simone de 
Beauvoir’s reinterpretation of the dialectic of recognition – with one crucial difference: the 
bond takes on an entirely different aspect when the individual is a woman. I start my analysis 
                                                 
34 That said, Bergoffen finds the influence of Husserl in Beauvoir’s ethics (e.g. Bergoffen 1997: 205), 
whereas I suspect always the spirit of Hegel.   
 143
at Beauvoir’s own point of departure, namely, the question of woman.35 For Beauvoir, a more 
fundamental question emerges from the discourse on woman, namely, the question of 
otherness.       
 
 
 
c.1) Restating the question of woman 
       
 
Beauvoir (1997: 13) asks at the start of The Second Sex: “What is a woman?” In her opening 
remarks, she refutes a number of perspectives regarding the meaning of woman. The first of 
these is an essentialist attitude, which, we will shortly see, is encapsulated in the postulation 
of the Eternal Feminine. Beauvoir’s (31) response is a rejection of  “archetypes”, “changeless 
essence” and “eternal verities”.36 Secondly, Beauvoir (14) considers the nominalist view that 
“women … are merely the human beings arbitrarily designated by the word woman … a 
rather inadequate doctrine”. Her rejection of nominalism reflects her endeavour “to describe 
the common basis that underlies every individual feminine existence” (31). Moreover, it will 
become clear during the course of this discussion that there is nothing arbitrary about the 
designation woman, since it serves the interests of the patriarchal order, and the failure to 
conform to this designation involves serious penalties. Thirdly, she dismisses as abstract the 
humanist claim that “woman is, like man a human being”; instead, Beauvoir (14) insists “that 
every concrete human being is always a singular, separate individual.” For this reason, 
Beauvoir (124) warns that “abstract rights are not enough to define the actual concrete 
situation of woman”. The notion of humanity is an abstraction. Thus, contrary to Braidotti’s 
interpretation,37 Beauvoir would argue that “human rights” is also an abstraction that does not 
                                                 
35 See Toril Moi’s (1999: 169-250) rigorous interpretation of the opening pages of The Second Sex. 
36 Elsewhere, Beauvoir (1977: 494) tells us that she does not believe that there are “specific feminine 
qualities, values or ways of life”, since such a belief would presuppose the existence of a specifically 
female nature. 
37 See Part 1 c.      
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concern itself with the inequity and exploitation that mark the situations of specific 
individuals and groups.    
 
Next, Beauvoir (15) contends that to express the question of woman is “to suggest, at once, a 
preliminary answer.” Given that “a man would never set out to write a book on the peculiar 
situation of the human male”, the very positing of the woman question is revealing. The need 
for such a question calls attention to the common belief that there is no need for a man to 
represent himself “as an individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying that he is a man”; 
whereas, “everything about woman is a riddle” (Nietzsche 1969: 91). 
 
The presumption that a man is self-evidently male relates to the equally common belief that 
“man represents both the positive and the neutral” (Beauvoir: 15). Man signifies human 
beings in general: “humanity is male” (15). Here and throughout Beauvoir’s text, we find the 
notions that this “has always been a man’s world” (93); that “political power has always been 
in the hands of men” (102), and, moreover, that men “describe it from their own point of 
view, which they confuse with absolute truth” (175). If “representations of the world, like the 
world itself, is the work of men” (175), the implication is that men are also responsible for the 
representations of woman.     
 
Indeed, Beauvoir (16) writes that man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she 
is not regarded as an autonomous being … she is simply what man decrees.” In Part Three of 
her study, entitled Myths, Beauvoir gives a critical account of woman as “the repository of 
male fantasies” (MacDonald 1995: 105).38 She searches for manifestations of the myth of 
                                                 
38 Ursula Tidd (2004: 64) states that Beauvoir’s concept of myth takes its cue from the “Marxist notion 
of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, or beliefs which conceal the economic basis of society and the 
oppression wreaked by capitalism.” What Tidd is referring to is the epiphenomenal conception of 
ideology, although, I would argue, Beauvoir relies also on what John Thompson labels the latent 
conception of ideology when she argues that a myth cannot easily be described because “it haunts the 
human consciousness without ever appearing before it in fixed form” (Beauvoir: 175). Briefly, the 
latent conception refers to the ubiquity of symbolic constructions: symbols, slogans, customs, values 
and traditions that “move people or hold them back, propel them or constrain them … [and] are not 
swept away once and for all … they live on, they modify and transform themselves … [so that] social 
relations may be sustained and social change arrested” (Thompson 1990: 41). 
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woman, which she labels the Eternal Feminine, in sayings, religion, taboos, laws, philosophy, 
literature, popular media, symbols, fairytales, anthropology, cosmology, etc. 
 
One of the many examples that can be cited is also one of the most pervasive and enduring 
manifestations of the myth of woman; to wit, Eve in the creation story depicted in Genesis. 
Beauvoir (173) posits: 
Eve was not fashioned at the same time as the man; she was not fabricated from a 
different substance, nor of the same clay as was used to model Adam: she was taken from 
the flank of the first male. Not even her birth was independent; God did not 
spontaneously choose to create her as an end in herself and in order to be worshipped 
directly by her in return for it. She was destined by Him for man; it was to rescue Adam 
from loneliness that He gave her to him, in her mate was her origin and her purpose; she 
was his complement in the order of the inessential.   
Firstly, Eve’s creation from Adam’s rib highlights her derivative nature. The ideological 
function of woman as “by-product” is, as will become clear from Beauvoir’s analysis, to 
justify her non-participation – since it is reserved for fully-fledged subjects – in the dialectic 
of recognition. Secondly, it is also to be remembered that Eve is the woman held responsible 
for the fall of humanity; thus, she is the representation of evil.39 Thirdly, the Virgin Mary, 
also known as the “second Eve”, atones for the evil through her purity, which shows that, the 
“myth is so various, so contradictory, that at first its unity is not discerned” (Beauvoir: 175). 
During the course of her discussion, Beauvoir does detect the unambiguous agenda common 
to all these depictions, which is to attribute to woman the status of Absolute Other.      
 
Beauvoir (282-283) proposes: 
[T]he myth of woman, sublimating  an immutable aspect of the human condition – 
namely, the ‘division’ of humanity into two classes of individuals – is a static myth. It 
projects into the realm of Platonic ideas a reality that is directly experienced or is 
conceptualised on a basis of experience; in place of fact, value, significance, knowledge, 
empirical law, it substitutes a transcendental idea, timeless, unchangeable, necessary. This 
idea is indisputable because it is beyond the given: it is endowed with absolute truth. 
Thus, as against the dispersed, contingent, and multiple existences of actual women, 
mythical thought opposes the Eternal Feminine, unique and changeless. If the definition 
                                                 
39 See Robin Schott (in Card 2003: 228-247) for elaboration on Beauvoir’s discussion of the cultural 
representations of evil as “feminine”.  
 146
for this concept is contradicted by the behaviour of flesh-and-blood women, it is the latter 
who are wrong; we are told not that Femininity is a false entity, but that the women 
concerned are not feminine.  
Consider the clear distinction that Beauvoir makes between the myth of woman – the Eternal 
Feminine – and concrete women with dispersed, contingent, and multiple existences. The 
Eternal Feminine is entirely without particularity; that is, it is a givenness, beyond concrete 
existence. Since it is immutable, The Eternal Feminine is neither constituted, nor transformed, 
by facticity, historical contingency, cultural specificity, social and economic change. Rather 
than signifying flesh-and-blood women, the Eternal Feminine resembles a top-down model in 
which individual women are defined as woman to the extent that they conform to the norms of 
womanhood.  
 
In the postulation of the Eternal Feminine, women are confronted by something akin to a 
Platonic Idea, dressed up in different, seemingly contradictory, guises. Thus, before we have 
an opportunity to become disillusioned with current manifestations of the myth, new ones are 
being forged to confirm and sustain the status quo. Even when an individual is armed with 
intellectual and political tools, her efforts at debunking the myth of woman are met with harsh 
penalties; she is, according to Beauvoir (692), “still not free to do as she pleases in shaping 
the concept of femininity.” The Eternal Feminine is the normative standard of womanhood 
espoused by patriarchal culture. As such, “a woman who has no wish to shock or devaluate 
herself socially should live out her feminine situation in a feminine manner; and very often, 
for that matter, her professional success demands it.” Regardless of the factical conditions that 
delineate every existent’s situation, “the common basis that underlies every individual 
feminine existence” (31) is the requirement to obey the normative standard of womanhood. 
 
However, an individual woman’s exclusion from the human Mitsein is more or less assured 
by her adherence to the Eternal Feminine, given its ideological function of dehumanising 
women. A male-orientated society attributes to man the status of human being, with the 
concomitant qualities of subjectivity, autonomy, self-certainty, normality; to woman, the 
absence or lack of these traits. While Beauvoir acknowledges the fiction of the Eternal 
Masculine, she quite pointedly avoids the argument that both men and women are victims of 
normative constructs. Recall in The Ethics of Ambiguity that Beauvoir does not even exempt 
the dissident from moral culpability for the oppression of others. Thus, while certain males 
may not personally dominate or exploit women, while they may even be woman’s rights 
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activists, they continue to live and work in and profit from a sexist world. I return to this 
theme during the course of this analysis.  
 
Man denies all ambiguity in human existence – that is, male existence – which is precisely 
how it is possible for him to be self-evidently male. At the same time, he depicts woman as 
the embodiment40 of ambiguity, which enables him to exclude her from his definition of 
humanity. The ambiguity inscribed by patriarchal culture on woman’s body does not refer to 
the fundamental ambiguity of human existence that Beauvoir describes in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity. Indeed, the myth of woman strips women of our fundamental ambiguity by 
focusing exclusively only on the corporeal aspects of a woman’s existence, to the extent that 
“her intellect, her political, social, and economic independence are smothered in her womb” 
(Deranty 2000: 160). The ambiguity to which I refer pertains to the seemingly ambiguous 
depictions of woman as both life and death, nature and artifice, virgin and whore, evil and 
good, etc., which Beauvoir (171-229) critically analyses in the chapter entitled, Dreams, 
Fears, Idols. What she shows is that each of these expressions of the Eternal Feminine, 
regardless of whether they worship or debase woman, serve the ideological function of 
dehumanising her. In turn, as it will become clear, this dehumanising process enables man to 
turn woman into the desired intermediary between himself and nature; by implication, he 
forges the opportunity to affirm himself without having to participate in the dialectic of 
recognition.  
When a woman conforms to the Eternal Feminine, she is cut off from humanity; when a 
woman resists conformity, she faces devaluation, even expulsion, from the world of men, the 
human world.41 Excluded, she finds herself in “the infantile world of ready-made values” 
                                                 
40 Embodiment is apt, given that a common feature of the manifestations of the myth of woman “is that 
they are related more or less directly to … the female body – its functions and significance” (Arp in 
Simons 1995: 172). Fundamental to the Eternal Feminine is that she is defined entirely through her 
body. In the Introduction, Beauvoir (16) writes that woman “is called ‘the sex’, by which is meant that 
she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex – absolute sex, no less”. 
Elsewhere, Beauvoir (175) reiterates that we “sometimes say ‘the sex’ to designate woman; she is the 
flesh, its delights and dangers.”         
41 Beauvoir expresses here a line of reasoning that Thompson (1995: 210) develops in The Media and 
Modernity: a social theory of the media: “A variety of terms have been introduced, from Althusser’s 
‘interpellation’ to Foucault’s ‘techniques’ or ‘technologies’ of the self, to try to specify the ways in 
which individuals are turned into subjects who think and act in accordance with the possibilities that 
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(Beauvoir 1948: 141), a world in which the myth of woman is an absolute truth. In short, if 
woman is, like man, a vervallen existent, the situation into which she falls is always already 
set up for her to fail. She fails at forging her own identity, at developing and acting on behalf 
of her own subjectivity and agency.42 When women adhere to the myth of woman, man 
confirms his superiority; when a woman disavows the Eternal Feminine and “insinuates 
herself into a world that has doomed her to passivity” (692), when she acts like a (hu)man, 
man confirms his superiority. 
 
The concept Eternal Feminine is rarely used in The Second Sex. Occasionally, Beauvoir 
distinguishes “woman” from “women”, “we” or a specific woman; more often, the reader has 
to discern whether she is referring to an impersonal Eternal Woman or to the specific lived 
experiences of particular women. On the whole, Beauvoir uses the term “woman” to designate 
the fictional Woman invented by patriarchal culture. Thus, Beauvoir (218) plainly states that 
if woman “did not exist, men would have invented her.” The conflation between the myth of 
woman and flesh-and-blood women is, firstly, a deliberate strategy to destabilise the absolute 
status of the Eternal Feminine; secondly, to play with the notion of woman as pure ambiguity.  
 
Thirdly, Beauvoir (24) submits:  
[W]hen an individual (or group of individuals) is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact 
is that he is inferior. But the significance of the verb to be must be rightly understood 
here; it is in bad faith to give it a static value when it really has the dynamic Hegelian 
sense of ‘to have become’.  
To say “woman is inferior” is to express the situation of the Eternal Feminine created by 
patriarchy – one that has the appearance of absolute truth; to say “this woman is inferior” or 
“all women are inferior” is to point, not to the “natural order of things” but to a process by 
                                                                                                                                                        
are laid out in advance. Of course, the dominant symbolic systems (what some used to call 
‘ideologies’, but what many now prefer to call ‘discourses’) will not define an individual’s every 
move. Like a game of chess, the dominant system will define which moves are open to individuals and 
which are not – with the non-trivial difference that, unlike chess, social life is a game that one cannot 
choose not to play.”       
42 See also Bergoffen (1997: 169) and Le Dœuff (1991: 102-103). Of course, woman’s failure is not 
the same as the existent’s failure, described in The Ethics of Ambiguity, which denotes precisely the 
kind of indeterminacy not associated with the Eternal Feminine.      
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which individual or groups of women have been mystified, habituated or forced to assume the 
role of Eternal Feminine. The confusion over the status of “is” in assertions like “woman is 
passive”, “woman is the Other”, etc., has the effect of making Beauvoir vulnerable to assorted 
charges of determinism, radical individualism, nominalism, essentialism, misogyny and 
penis-envy. However, the sine qua non of her philosophy is that the “existent is nothing other 
than what he does” (287), or, in the case of the woman existent, what she is compelled to do. 
Since she is compelled to partake of it, the Eternal Feminine is what she “is”.43 
 
What is a woman? Beauvoir’s preliminary answer is that woman is what men have made of 
her; more precisely, woman is an expression of male privilege. Beauvoir (16) continues: 
[Woman] is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to 
her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he 
is the Absolute – she is the Other. 
This passage heralds Beauvoir’s foray into Hegelian dialectics. It is supplemented by a highly 
significant, but often overlooked, footnote in which she singles out Emmanuel Levinas’ essay, 
Temps et l’Autre (1948), as an expression of male privilege.44    
 
Let us consider some of the assertions in Time and the Other that pique Beauvoir: 
Does a situation exist where the alterity of the other appears in its purity? … I think the 
absolutely contrary contrary [le contraire absolutement contraire], whose contrariety is in 
no way affected by the relationship between it and its correlative, the contrariety that 
permits its terms to remain absolutely other, is the feminine. … Sex is not some specific 
difference. … [The] difference between the sexes [is not] a contradiction. … Neither is 
the difference between the sexes the duality of two complimentary terms, for 
complementary terms presuppose a pre-existing whole. … The other as other is not here 
                                                 
43 For a similar argument, see Kruks (1995: 87). It must be stressed that distinguishing between a 
particular individual woman and the universal Eternal Feminine does not amount to a sex-gender 
distinction: i.e., there is no pre-social moment in which the body and/or consciousness of an individual 
female is somehow “pure”, that is, not subjected to and situated within the laws, conventions, myths, 
taboos and representations of the world. This is, the mistake made by, for instance, Judith Butler (in 
Fallaize 1998: 29-42) in her interpretation of Beauvoir’s famous line “One is not born, but rather 
becomes, a woman”, which, for Butler, amounts to the ability to “choose” to be a woman.   
44 Among scholars, Beauvoir’s reference to Levinas is seldom mentioned, with the notable exception 
of Sara Heinämaa (e.g. in Card 2003: 72, 85). 
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an object that becomes ours or becomes us; to the contrary, it withdraws into its mystery. 
Neither does this mystery of the feminine – the feminine: essentially other – refer to any 
romantic notions of the mysterious, unknown, or misunderstood woman. … The Other is 
not a being we encounter that menaces us or wants to lay hold of us. The feat of being 
refractory to our power is not a power greater than ours. Alterity makes for all its power. 
Its mystery constitutes its alterity. In positing the Other’s alterity as mystery, itself 
defined by modesty, I do not posit it as a freedom identical to and at grips with mine; I do 
not posit another existent in front of me, I posit alterity. Just as with death, I am not 
concerned with an existent, but with the event of alterity, with alienation. The existent is 
accomplished in the “subjective” and in “consciousness”, alterity is accomplished in the 
feminine. … The transcendence of the feminine consists in withdrawing elsewhere, which 
is a movement opposed to the movement of consciousness. But this does not make it 
unconscious or subconscious, and I see no other possibility than to call it mystery. 
(Levinas 1987:85-88) 
While Levinas insists that “the feminine” does not “refer to any romantic notions of the 
mysterious, unknown, or misunderstood woman”; instead, it is “a movement opposed to the 
movement of consciousness”, it should be noted that, in French, féminine denotes “female”, 
féminin denotes “feminine” and féminité denotes “womanhood”; thus, it would be 
disingenuous to claim that the feminine has no relation to woman. There is something suspect 
in co-opting a term that signifies woman to symbolise absence, mystery, non-being, modesty, 
concealment, indeterminacy, etc. – by way of a textual “sleight of hand, woman is assimilated 
to the feminine” (Braidotti 1991:124). Certainly, Beauvoir reads Levinas’ statements about 
“the feminine” as statements about woman.45  
Beauvoir (16, footnote 1) notes:   
But it is striking that [Levinas] deliberately takes a man’s point of view, disregarding the 
reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes that woman is mystery, he implies that 
she is a mystery for man. Thus his description, which is intended to be objective, is in fact 
an assertion of male privilege. 
                                                 
45In the Preface to this later edition of Time and The Other, Levinas (1987: 39) amends his position 
regarding the supposed sex-neutrality of the feminine: “[T]he differences between the sexes in general 
– appeared to me as a difference contrasting strongly with other differences, not merely as a quality 
different from all others, but as the very quality of difference.” Although he wrote these words thirty 
years after Le Deuxième Sexe was published, they convey the reason why, of all self-other 
relationships, Beauvoir focuses on the relationship between man and woman.  
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A sympathetic reading of Time and the Other would undoubtedly point out that, for Levinas, 
the feminine is a privileged concept – the feminine as ‘absolute other’ serves (always in the 
service of some master, even when he is trying to renounce his mastership) as the 
counterpoint to Unity, the Ideal, Truth and the Rational Subject. The feminine, Levinas 
suggests, is not an existent, but “the event of alterity”. For Hanssen (2000: 292, footnote 9), 
Levinas’ “discourse on “the feminine” elevates women to a transcendental position, stripping 
them of actional subjecthood.” This is precisely what Beauvoir objects to in Levinas’ 
postulation of the feminine as the opposite of consciousness and subjectivity, as mystery, 
modesty and alienation, as the absolutely or essentially other. His representation of the 
feminine conveys the idea that, more than the peculiarities that mark the distance between 
each and every subject, woman’s separation extends even further to an exclusion from the 
“human Mitsein” (Beauvoir 102, footnote 2). If the feminine is the opposite of consciousness 
and subjectivity, it is also, within the phenomenological framework, the opposite of being 
human. Thus, notwithstanding his veneration of the feminine, Levinas reinforces the 
patriarchal standard of the Eternal Feminine.  
 
Note Beauvoir’s response to Levinas’ suggestion that woman represents mystery. In the 
chapter, Myth and Reality, she expands on the theme of woman as the symbol of mystery. 
Regarding symbolism, Beauvoir (79) asserts that it “did not come down from subterranean 
depths – it has been elaborated, like language, by that human reality which is at once Mitsein 
and separation”. Quite pointedly, she links the use of symbols – including, one may suppose, 
the Eternal Feminine – to the tradition of phenomenology. While Beauvoir finds the myth of 
woman in numerous discourses, she never loses sight of the ways in which philosophy, 
specifically, a movement that takes Hegel, Heidegger and Husserl as its point of departure, a 
movement that extends to Levinas, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, conspires to women’s 
oppression.   
 
Beauvoir (285-286) submits:  
Few myths have been more advantageous to the ruling caste than the myth of woman: it 
justifies all privileges and even authorises their abuse. … Of all these myths, none is more 
firmly anchored in masculine hearts than that of the feminine ‘mystery’. It has numerous 
advantages. And first of all it permits an easy explanation of all that appears inexplicable; 
the man who ‘does not understand’ a woman is happy to substitute an objective resistance 
for a subjective deficiency of mind; instead of admitting his ignorance, he perceives the 
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presence of a ‘mystery’ outside himself: an alibi, indeed, that flatters laziness and vanity 
at once. … Surely woman is, in a sense, mysterious, ‘mysterious as is all the world’, 
according to Maeterlinck. [F]rom this point of view the other is always a mystery. … The 
truth is that there is mystery on both sides … [but] in accordance with the universal rule I 
have stated, the categories in which men think of the world are established from their 
point of view, as absolute: they misconceive reciprocity, here as everywhere. A mystery 
for man, woman is considered to be mysterious in essence. 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir (1948: 67) suggests that “it is only as something strange 
… that the other is revealed as an other”, in other words, what makes the other other is that he 
or she is strange, that is, different, unfamiliar, mysterious. From the point of view that regards 
recognition as the double movement of two subjects “othering” one another, everyone is 
strange, different, mysterious. What Beauvoir argues in the passage regarding “the myth of 
woman” is that the man-woman relationship does not typify this reciprocal exchange between 
strangers. Instead, the othering of woman by man resembles the naïvely solipsistic stance of 
the subject who posits himself through the exclusion of everything else. Beauvoir (289) 
suggests that “woman does not always ‘understand’ man; but there is no such thing as a 
masculine mystery”; that man is “on the Master side and that Mystery belongs to the slave.”  
 
She links the male prerogative to posit “woman as Mystery” to the solipsistic viewpoint of the 
master in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. In this context, she shows that, since the man-master 
forgets his own ambiguity and posits himself as Subject, he recognises only that which 
coincides with himself, he recognises sameness; the woman-other’s difference, those aspects 
that point to her independence from this Master-Subject, is labeled by him as Mystery. Her 
difference estranges her from man and, by implication, humanity. Since there is no reciprocity 
in the exchange between her and man, woman is the absolute stranger. Thus, she belongs on 
the outside; she is cast outside of humanity.  
 
Through an expression of male privilege, as the example of Time and the Other shows, man is 
posited as the Absolute Subject and woman as the Absolute Other. From this point, 
Beauvoir’s discussion unfurls on two different albeit connected levels: a general analysis of 
the concepts subjectivity and otherness and an intimate examination of the othering of 
women. Her starting point is a review of the dialectic of recognition.  
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c.2) The subject, his other and the Other  
 
 
Beauvoir introduces the theme of subjectivity in terms of the self’s relationship with the other. 
She proposes that a subject can be posited only by distinguishing itself from an “other”. Of 
the categorisation of “the Other”, Beauvoir (16-17) writes that it is “as primordial as 
consciousness itself” and that “Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought.”  
 
Furthermore, she links the process of othering to the experience of oppression. In her attempt 
to understand the origin of oppression, Beauvoir (17) turns to Hegel:  
If three travellers chance to occupy the same compartment, that is enough to make 
vaguely hostile ‘others’ out of all the rest of the passengers on the train. In small-town 
eyes all persons not belonging to the village are ‘strangers’ and suspect; to the native of a 
country all who inhabit other countries are ‘foreigners’; Jews are ‘different’ for the anti-
Semite, Negroes [sic] are ‘inferior’ for American racists, aborigines are ‘natives’ for 
colonists, proletarians are the ‘lower class’ for the privileged. … These phenomena would 
be incomprehensible if in fact human society were simply a Mitsein or fellowship based 
on solidarity and friendliness. Things become clear, on the contrary, if, following Hegel, 
we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; 
the subject can be posed only in being opposed – he sets himself as the essential, as 
opposed to the other, the inessential, the object. But the other consciousness, the other 
ego, sets up a reciprocal claim … [which] tend to deprive the concept of Other of its 
absolute sense and to make manifest its relativity; willy-nilly, individuals and groups are 
forced to realise the reciprocity of their relations.   
She sets aside the possibility of human society based on “solidarity and friendliness”. It is 
important to note Beauvoir’s mention of reciprocity, which, I will show, punctuates every 
reference to the dialectic of recognition in The Second Sex. She reserves the possibility of 
friendship. Conflict is not, as Kojève and indeed Sartre suppose, the inevitable outcome of the 
existent’s meeting with other existents. In Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir’s ‘The 
Second Sex’,46 which is a highly regarded addition to the scholarship on Beauvoir, Eva 
Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 171) notes this reciprocity and finds it “the point of departure for a 
                                                 
46 Henceforth abbreviated to Sex and Existence.               
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possible identification with the other – something that would have been inconceivable, 
however, were man’s relation with the other exclusively one of hostility and conflict.” The 
problem with this assessment is revealed in the manner in which Lundgren-Gothlin (171) 
describes what Beauvoir calls a reciprocal claim, to wit: “Beauvoir emphasises that the other 
group or the other consciousness immediately reacts with similar behaviour”. Lundgren-
Gothlin understands the meeting of consciousnesses in the manner described by Kojève, that 
is, the movement of a solitary individual searching for self-certainty, instead of the double 
movement of two consciousnesses posited by Hegel. We saw how Kojève’s focus on the 
single subject mastering the world leads to an account of reactionary violence – that 
reciprocity in Kojève’s account means “retaliation”, which paves the way for an endless cycle 
of conflict. Lundgren-Gothlin does not grasp the significance of the interpretation of the 
other’s behaviour as a reaction; thus, she incorrectly associates Kojève with ideas of 
friendship and generosity among existents. Moreover, Sex and Existence is premised on the 
assumption that Beauvoir’s interpretation of Hegel is substantially influenced by Kojève’s 
lectures on Phenomenology of Spirit.47  
 
Indeed, revealing the basis for the apparatus of limitation that she employs in her reading of 
Beauvoir’s work, Lundgren-Gothlin (219) insists that “Beauvoir’s model is Kojèvean-Marxist 
throughout: demands for recognition, requiring participation in productive work and control 
of childbearing [thus], in Beauvoir’s philosophy, women have to adopt a male model of work 
and participation in the public sphere in order to achieve liberation.”48 Certainly, as I will 
show, on the surface one can find some parallels between Kojève’s lectures and Beauvoir’s 
engagement with the dialectic of recognition. However, I believe that Beauvoir’s initial 
engagement with Phenomenology of Spirit in 1940 yielded aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that 
                                                 
47 See Hutchings (2003: 61-63) for a similar reading of Kojève. Hutchings’ analysis follows the same 
trajectory as that of Lundgren-Gothlin: Beauvoir supposedly interprets Phenomenology of Spirit via 
Kojève, which signifies a philosophical departure from Sartre. 
48 An exhaustive investigation of Beauvoir’s memoirs yields no evidence that Beauvoir attended 
Kojève’s seminars, although it is certain that she was acquainted with his ideas (e.g., Beauvoir 1968: 
43). However, Lundgren-Gothlin (273, footnote 16) claims that, during their interview in 1985, 
Beauvoir confirmed that she had read Introduction to the Reading of Hegel and was particularly 
interested in Kojève’s interpretation of the master-slave dialectic. Given that Kojève’s text was 
published in 1947, precisely when Beauvoir was writing The Second Sex, it is possible that she read 
and was influenced by it at that time.  
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were either ignored or underdeveloped in Kojève’s lectures; thus, also by the conventional 
French approach to Hegel.  
 
In effect, Lundgren-Gothlin’s insistence on a Kojèvean influence in The Second Sex 
reinforces the idea of Beauvoir as a mere disciple of a philosophical perspective that was 
fashionable during the war years; it greatly limits the hermeneutic possibilities of her text and 
detracts from the singularity of Beauvoir’s interpretation of Hegel. Still, lest I distance 
Beauvoir too soon from the taste for conflict that defines early French phenomenology, it can 
be argued that her acknowledgement of the value of reciprocity remains at an ideal level 
inasmuch as she considers friendship and generosity to be man’s “highest achievement” 
(173). Above, she suggests that human society is not “simply” based on solidarity and 
friendship. Elsewhere, Beauvoir (88) surmises: “If the original relation between a man and his 
fellows was exclusively a relation of friendship, we could not account for any type of 
enslavement”. Friendship cannot be discounted but human relationships can also be violent 
and oppressive. Indeed, Beauvoir’s initial and, it must be said, predominant focus in her 
account of the struggle for recognition is on conflict and domination.  
 
Thus, phenomena of oppression – slavery, xenophobia, colonialism, racism, class-wars, 
cultural imperialism, etc. – must be understood in terms of a primal desire to assert oneself at 
the expense or even demise of everyone else. In Hegelian terms, this “original aspiration to 
dominate the Other” (89) refers to the first phase of the movement in which consciousnesses 
meet each other. The naïvely solipsistic desire to dominate others is linked to self-
consciousness’ point of departure, which is an awareness of a distinction between itself and 
the other (thing, nature, consciousness): the subject becomes conscious of himself as an I only 
through the consciousness of things that are not-I.49  
 
The subject’s consciousness of the not-I marks their mutual separation, e.g., I am not that tree; 
equally, that tree is not me. Prior to the first movement of consciousness, there was no 
knowledge of a distinction between them, and if there was no knowledge, then such a 
                                                 
49 Since phenomenology takes as its point of departure an I who posits the world, whose prerogative it 
is to turn everything and everyone into not-I, and since Beauvoir argues that the world is ruled, 
defined and evaluated by and for men, she effectively attributes “maleness” to this phenomenological 
I. 
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distinction could exist only to those studying the movements of consciousness. Now that there 
has been consciousness of the tree as not-I, the subject has won its independence from the 
tree, but, of course, the tree has won its independence from the subject. Through 
consciousness’ negating action, the difference that had always existed between the subject and 
the tree is affirmed. Consciousness of the not-I takes away something that had never belonged 
to the subject and, at the same time, gives him the experience of that not-I in its newly 
affirmed independence. 
 
However, through separation anxiety, through disquiet, the subject might desire, either to 
forfeit his own independence, in other words, the subject might wish to become once again 
(at) one with the tree, which is , “the dream of an inhuman objectivity” (Beauvoir 1948: 14), 
the dream of “wanting to be” (12); alternatively, the subject might refuse to acknowledge the 
independence of the tree, yet still insist upon his own, which is, as we have learnt from The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, what Beauvoir means by oppression.50  
 
Beauvoir considers another approach to the subject’s disquiet: to prevent the distance that 
defines the relationship with the other from becoming the justification for exploitation and 
domination, which is the moral responsibility of the existent to affirm the bond. In The 
Second Sex, the opening remarks concerning the dialectic of recognition that I have cited, 
above; specifically, Beauvoir’s emphasis on the relativity of otherness, paves the way for a 
position that belies the assumed inevitability of domination and reasserts her ethical 
perspective.           
 
The example of the fellow train-travellers shows that the othering of the rest of the passengers 
is based on a random and short-lived proximity. Distance can have the same effect, e.g., the 
citizen of a country who considers those who live in other countries as “foreigners”, finds to 
his dismay when travelling abroad that he is now “regarded as a ‘stranger’ by the natives of 
neighbouring countries” (Beauvoir 1997: 17). Beauvoir (18) acknowledges that there are 
instances in the history of human society “in which a certain category has been able to 
dominate another completely for a time”, where, for instance, “the majority imposes its rule 
                                                 
50 In The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir (1948: 12) describes these scenarios thus: “I should like to be 
the landscape which I am contemplating, I should like this sky, this quiet water to think themselves 
within me, that it might be I whom they express in flesh and bone, and I remain at a distance.”  
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upon the minority or persecutes it”. However, these instances of subjugation are based on 
specific historical events, such as the “scattering of the Jews, the introduction to slavery into 
America, the conquests of imperialism” (18). Often the oppressors and the oppressed had 
formerly been independent and perhaps they had recognised each other’s autonomy, or, in 
some cases, they had previously not even known of each other’s existence. In many instances, 
the two groups had “possessed in common a past, a tradition, sometimes a religion or a 
culture” (18). The point is that “otherness” takes on many different guises depending on the 
particular context – in some cases it lasts as long as a journey on a train and in other instances 
it is used to justify the oppression of a group over many lifetimes. 
 
Beauvoir understands that otherness is a relative term precisely because it signifies a mutually 
constituting relationship between two (or more) consciousnesses. By this reasoning, there can 
be no “Pure Subject”, no unmediated I = I, and, crucially, no “Absolute Other”.51 The 
relativity of the concept of otherness paradoxically demonstrates its ubiquity – everyone is 
always already in multiple ways “other”. Quite clearly, this signifies a departure from early 
French phenomenology. Recall that, for Sartre, the existent is a subject without mediation. 
Additionally, both Sartre and Kojève define freedom in terms of ridding the self of otherness, 
and, while Hyppolite more readily grants the significance of otherness in Hegel’s dialectic, it 
only leads him to over-emphasise the “unhappy consciousness”.  
  
Now, Susan James (in Card 2003: 149) suggests that, from the perspective of the relativity of 
otherness, every form of subjugation or discrimination is to be expected “since it exemplifies 
a universal disposition”, i.e., the “fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness”. 
If otherness is a relative term, if the process of othering is ubiquitous, her argument goes, one 
can deduce that everyone is predisposed to be racist, ethnocentric, classist, etc. Penelope 
Deutscher (2004: 656-671) follows this line of reasoning in her article, Enemies and 
Reciprocities. Deutscher (660-661) claims: 
                                                 
51 Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 108) reaches the same conclusion. Problematically, she adds: “However 
there is one exception to this rule: between the sexes there is no reciprocity … because women have 
not (yet) done the same back to those who set them up as others.” Like Lundgren-Gothlin and 
Hutchings, Le Dœuff interprets Beauvoir’s use of reciprocity in the Kojèvean sense of reactionary 
violence.     
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Though it is not the case made overall by The Second Sex, she seems to be on the brink of 
claiming that racism is inevitable. … Beauvoir almost naturalises both othering and 
racism, and it is this banalisation that grounds her turn to ethics. 
Neither James, nor Deutscher, take into account that, if Beauvoir is following Hegel, to be 
conscious of the other as other and the desire to assimilate otherness, which is what 
domination means in Hegel’s account, are two separate movements of consciousness. For 
Hegel, the othering process is marked by its immediacy, and it is dialectically overcome upon 
the reflection that the movement of the subject to set himself as “I” is in fact the double 
movement of the self and the other subject. At best, consciousness will come to understand 
that difference is a precondition for identity. At worst, the master-subject will refuse to 
acknowledge the independence, and thus difference, of his adversary. In Hegel’s account, the 
recognition of difference is something positive, in fact, it is the opposite of domination. The 
reason for Hegel’s stance may well be that the differences that he has in mind do not relate to 
such peculiarities as skin colour, sex, sexual orientation, religion, etc.; certainly, as I will 
show, Beauvoir challenges this shortcoming in his dialectic of recognition.  
 
However, even without the benefit of a cursory understanding of Hegel’s dialectics, the 
assertion that Beauvoir’s “naturalisation of racism grounds her turn to ethics” – 
notwithstanding fact that the only form of imperialism that she focuses on in The Second Sex 
is the problem of sexism – would imply a number of things that are the exact opposite of the 
arguments that Beauvoir has already put forward in The Ethics of Ambiguity: that no-one is 
truly oppressed, that the creation of identity is the prerogative of the self, that none of the 
phenomena of oppression can in reality evoke the outrage that Beauvoir’s ethics takes as its 
point of departure. 
 
The Second Sex employs two conceptions of otherness.52 Firstly, there is, as I have just noted, 
the relative otherness that is the upshot of the dialectic of recognition. The second conception 
is of an Other with a capital “O”, that is, the notion of an “absolute” or “pure” other. Beauvoir 
departs from both Hegel and the exponents of early French phenomenology in arguing that 
there is a particular self-other relationship in which “one of the contrasting terms is set up as 
the sole essential, denying any relativity in regard to its correlative and defining the latter as 
                                                 
52 See also Hutchings (2003: 67-69).  
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pure otherness” (17-18). This “primordial Mitsein” (19, 67) is the relationship between man 
and woman.   
 
Recall that Hegel suggests three possible outcomes to the confrontation between 
consciousnesses engaged in the dialectic of recognition, namely, death, the bondage of one 
party or, ideally, reciprocity and mutuality. Beauvoir proposes a fourth possibility: woman 
represents “a means for escaping that implacable dialectic of master and slave” (172), she 
provides man an opportunity to elude it. Let us follow the line of reasoning that brings 
Beauvoir to this twist. 
  
In the first few paragraphs of the third part of her text, Beauvoir (171-172), gives an account 
of the dialectic in terms that will seem familiar:  
It is the existence of other men that tears each man out of his immanence and enables him 
to fulfil the truth of his being, to complete himself through transcendence, through escape 
towards some objective, through enterprise. But this liberty not my own, while assuring 
mine, also conflicts with it: there is the tragedy of the unfortunate human consciousness; 
each separate conscious being aspires to set himself up alone as sovereign subject. Each 
tries to fulfil himself by reducing the other to slavery. But the slave, though he works and 
fears, senses himself somehow as the essential; and, by a dialectical inversion, it is the 
master who seems to be the inessential.  
Here we find the Kojèvean mixture of Marxism and existentialism, with references to 
intersubjectivity based on conflict, the master-slave dialectic and the eventual victory of the 
slave through labour;53 the immanence-transcendence opposition of Sartre; even a reference 
to the unhappy consciousness that preoccupies Hyppolite and Jean Wahl.  
                                                 
53 Beauvoir’s chapter on the perspective of historical materialism shows some similarities to Kojève’s 
appropriation of Hegel. Following the same path as Kojève, she casts the human I as an active and 
negating I; to wit, “it does not passively submit to the presence of nature but rather takes over the 
control of nature on its own behalf”, which is accomplished “objectively in practical action” rather 
than through “an inward, subjective operation” (84). To be considered fully human presupposes a 
separation: “the original condition of the existent … [is] an inclination … to think of himself as 
basically individual, to assert the autonomy and separateness of his existence” (87). To extend his 
grasp upon the world, man is always armed. However, argues Beauvoir (87-88), man’s tools alone 
cannot explain what it is about his nature that would bring about an interest in the enslavement of 
others. Thus, like Kojève, she finds the Marxist analysis of the foundation of oppression superficial; 
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Now, it must be noted that Beauvoir uses the term “immanence” interchangeably with 
“passivity” or “inertia”, “facticity”, “corporeality”, “objectivity”, “animality”, “givenness” 
and “preservation” or “maintenance”. When Beauvoir assumes the language of the 
phenomenological tradition, as she does in the citation under discussion, she opposes 
immanence to “transcendence”. Within the phenomenological framework, transcendence is 
the mark of surpassing activity, creativity, humanity, subjectivity and consciousness. 
 
However, very early in her discussion it becomes clear that Beauvoir’s distinction between 
transcendence and immanence does not follow the l’être-pour-soi-l’être-en-soi dichotomy of 
Being and Nothingness. Beauvoir (29) contends:  
Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a degradation of 
existence into the ‘en-soi’ – the brutish life of subjection to given conditions – and of 
liberty into constraint and contingence. This downfall represents a moral fault if the 
subject consents to it; if it is inflicted upon him, it spells frustration and oppression. In 
both cases it in an absolute evil.  
Recall that, for Sartre, the pour-soi (existence) and en-soi (being) are regions without 
communication. As Kruks (1987: 115) correctly surmises: “For Sartre, either the ‘for-itself’, 
the uncaused upsurge of freedom, exists whatever the constraining facticities of the situation, 
or else it does not exist [and] one is dealing with the realm of inert being.” The “degradation” 
or “downfall” of the for-itself would, in Sartrean terms, mean the end of human existence. 
Since, for Sartre, human existence cannot “fall back into immanence”, what can be construed 
as the subject’s consent cannot in reality bring about such a downfall. Bad faith, to which this 
“moral fault of consent” presumably refers, signifies the existent’s desire for mere being, 
which causes him to deny – futilely – “the indestructible upsurge of ‘being-for-itself’” (Kruks: 
113). Moreover, the notion of oppression – that the existent can be compelled to fall into 
immanence – is not in accordance with a version of freedom that is entirely unconnected to 
self-other relationships, the factical situation and power relations. Thus, the notion of “falling 
back into immanence” expresses a possibility beyond the ontological framework set out in 
Being and Nothingness.  
                                                                                                                                                        
moreover, she also implies that the Marxist perspective ought to be supplemented by Hegel’s account 
of the struggle for self-recognition. Thus, according to Beauvoir (89), the foundation for oppression is 
an “imperialism of the human consciousness … an original aspiration to dominate the Other”.    
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Beauvoir (172) resumes her account of the dialectic of recognition: 
It is possible to rise above this conflict if each individual freely recognises himself and 
the other simultaneously as object and subject in a reciprocal manner. But friendship and 
generosity, which alone permit in actuality this recognition of free beings, are not facile 
virtues; they are assuredly man’s highest achievement, and through that achievement he is 
to be found in his true nature. But this true nature is that of a struggle unceasingly begun, 
unceasingly abolished; it requires man to outdo himself at every moment. We might put it 
in other words and say that man attains an authentically moral attitude when he renounces 
mere being to assume his position as existent; through this transformation also he 
renounces all possession, for possession is one way of seeking mere being; but the 
transformation through which he attains true wisdom is never done, it is necessary to 
make it without ceasing, it demands a constant tension.    
Of the numerous references to the struggle for recognition in her work, this passage most 
clearly shows Beauvoir’s nod to the version of the dialectic excluded from the “French 
Hegel”. Beauvoir posits reciprocal recognition as an alternative to conflict and domination. 
Here, reciprocity refers, not to the reactionary violence that we found in the conventional 
interpretation of the dialectic, but to the double movement of two consciousnesses that Hegel 
presents in Phenomenology of Spirit. Both subjects are simultaneously subject-and-object, 
same-and-other, identity-and-difference, I-and-We.  
 
I have argued that the generous subject, in Hegel’s account, lets the other be, that is, 
recognises the other as a separate, not-to-be-assimilated, individual, in short, recognises the 
otherness of the other. In this passage, Beauvoir considers such generosity to constitute what 
it truly means to be human. Given that we are failed human beings, as she argues in The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, generosity is an ideal to which we aspire. More often than not, as failed 
humans, we are prone to possessiveness. I return to the topic of possession later. Regarding 
Beauvoir’s use of the term in this citation, suffice it to say that it designates the violence that 
occurs, as Hegel has shown, when one party, the naïvely solipsistic consciousness, who 
becomes the master, acknowledges only one of the two mutually constituting aspects of his 
and others’ subjectivities. In brief, he posits himself as purely subject-same-identity-I and the 
other as purely object-other-difference-We. The difference of the other is defined by the 
master as “different-from-me”, not as different-in-him/herself. Hence, the master takes 
possession of the independence, the individuality, the otherness of the other.  
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However, Beauvoir will not follow Hegel to the final resolution of all the dialectic 
movements, to Absolute Spirit; instead, the struggle is unceasingly begun, unceasingly 
abolished. For Beauvoir, the spirit of generosity is absent from the Absolute. In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, Beauvoir (1948: 104-105) declares: 
The essential moment of Hegelian ethics is the moment when consciousnesses recognise 
one another; in this operation the other is recognised as identical with me, which means 
that in myself it is the universal truth of my self which alone is recognised; so 
individuality is denied, and it can no longer reappear except on the natural and contingent 
plane; moral salvation will lie in my surpassing toward the other who is equal to myself 
and who in turn will surpass himself toward another. …  The Mind [Spirit] is a subject; 
but who is a subject?  
Recall that Hegel’s system is predicated on the expression of Spirit not only as substance but 
also as subject. The dialectical movements towards Spirit are supposed to become 
increasingly concrete, but, as Beauvoir argues in this citation, this concreteness does not 
extend to the individual, the peculiar, the different. Hegel himself shows that friendship is 
impossible without generosity, that is, the recognition of difference. For Beauvoir (1997: 93), 
the relationship between individuals is “sometimes in enmity, sometimes in amity, always in a 
state of tension.” Only this constant tension, upheld by the recognition of the otherness of 
both individuals, ensures that their relationship does not become one of possession.   
 
Having prepared us for a departure from Hegel, Beauvoir (172) continues:           
And so, quite unable to fulfil himself in solitude, man is incessantly in danger in his 
relations with his fellows: his life is a difficult enterprise with success never assured. But 
he does not like difficulty; he is afraid of danger. He aspires in contradictory fashion both 
to life and to repose, to existence and to merely being; he knows full well that ‘trouble of 
the spirit’ is the price of development, that his distance from the object is the price of his 
nearness to himself; but he dreams of quiet in disquiet and of an opaque plenitude that 
nevertheless would be endowed with consciousness. This dream incarnated is precisely 
woman; she is the wished-for intermediary between nature, the stranger to man, and the 
fellow being who is too closely identical. She opposes him with neither the hostile silence 
of nature nor the hard requirement of a reciprocal relation; through a unique privilege she 
is a conscious being and yet it seems possible to possess her in the flesh.         
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We have seen that man’s life is a ceaseless, perhaps foolish, struggle for self-mastery. Indeed, 
the struggle for recognition is a life and death struggle. As Lundgren-Gothlin (in Fallaize 
1998: 98) explains, “man hopes to avoid … the constant tension and conflict in the human 
relationship, the need of others and the concomitant risk of being subordinated.”  
 
The reason why man believes that he can avoid the struggle through his relationship with 
woman is the fact that “woman has always been man’s dependant, if not his slave; the two 
sexes have never shared the world in equality” (Beauvoir: 20). Later, Beauvoir (25-26) 
qualifies:  
[T]he vast majority of men … do not postulate woman as inferior, for today they are too 
thoroughly imbued with the ideal of democracy not to recognise all human beings as 
equals. … When he is in a co-operative and benevolent relation with woman, his theme is 
the principle of abstract equality, and he does not base his attitude upon such inequality as 
may exist.    
Put differently: “De jure women are men’s equals, de facto they are not” (Deranty 2000: 156). 
 
Whatever the risks of participating in the dialectic of recognition, whatever the outcome, 
consciousnesses enter the dialectic as independent54 equals. Since woman is not the equal of 
man, since she “finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of 
the Other … [where] they propose to stabilise her as object and to doom her to immanence” 
(29), she has lost the battle for recognition even before its commencement. Beauvoir (102) 
affirms: “For the male it is always another male who is the fellow being, the other who is also 
the same, with whom reciprocal relations are established.” 
 
Accordingly, Rosalyn Diprose (1994: 47) proposes that the “struggle for mutual recognition is 
not the battle between the sexes but a battle between two equal self-consciousnesses, both of 
whom have negated the significance of their embodiment – they have negated their 
differences.” Indeed, the notion of a battle of the sexes is a myth: women’s combat “has never 
                                                 
54 A contentious concept, since one of the fundamental ambiguities of human existence is the 
individual’s “solitude and bond with the world” (Beauvoir 1948: 9); since man is defined by 
interdependence (82); and since human reality “is at once Mitsein and separation” (Beauvoir 1997: 
79). 
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been anything more than a symbolic agitation [since] they have gained only what men have 
been willing to grant” (Beauvoir: 19).55  
 
One cannot simply draw parallels between women’s oppression and “other cases in which a 
certain category has been able to dominate another completely for a time” (18).  Unlike cases 
where “the majority imposes its rule upon the minority or persecutes it” (18), women make up 
half of the world’s population. Nor is the subordination of women “the result of a historical 
event or a social change – it was not something that occurred” (18). Consequently, though she 
describes the struggle for self-certainty in terms of the master-slave dialectic, Beauvoir (20, 
173) does not simply equate woman with slave.  
 
Beauvoir (96) does note in the chapter entitled, The Nomads: 
Certain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining the relation of master to 
slave apply much better to the relation of man to woman. The advantage of the master, he 
says, comes from his affirmation of Spirit as against Life through the fact that he risks his 
own life; but in fact the conquered slave has known the same risk. Whereas woman is 
basically an existent who gives Life and does not risk her life; between her and the male 
there has been no combat. 
She likens the relationship between man and woman to the first phase of the master-slave 
dialectic, where the master is the consciousness that dares to face death for the sake of 
something higher – self-recognition – and the slave is the consciousness that turns himself 
into a “thing” for the sake of survival. She suggests that both the slave and woman embody 
the principle of Life as opposed to Spirit.  
 
                                                 
55 Beauvoir (160) expands: “Feminism itself was never an autonomous movement: it was in part an 
instrument in the hands of politicians, in part an epiphenomenon reflecting a deeper social drama. 
Never have women constituted a separate caste, nor in truth have they ever as a sex sought to play a 
historic role. The doctrines that object to the advent of woman considered as flesh, life, immanence, 
the Other, are masculine ideologies in no way expressing feminine aspirations. The majority of women 
resign themselves to their lot without attempting to take any action; those who have tried to change it 
have intended not to be confined within the limits of their peculiarity and cause it to triumph, but to 
rise above it. When they have intervened in the course of world affairs, it has been in accord with men, 
in masculine perspectives. This intervention, in general, has been secondary and episodic.”    
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Throughout The Nomads, she brings into play – play being the operative word – the 
distinction, central in Kojève’s understanding of the dialectic of recognition, between the 
animal desire for self-preservation (Life) and a higher degree of consciousness above and 
beyond nature, which is associated with risking one’s life in order to affirm one’s humanity 
(Spirit). Recall that the appropriation of Hegel by early French phenomenology is defined by 
its preoccupation with the life and death struggle and the subsequent portrayal of the dialectic 
of recognition as inexorably violent. Thus, Kojève (1969: 41) maintains:  
Therefore, human, historical, self-conscious existence is possible only where there are, or 
– at least – where there have been, bloody fights, wars for prestige. And thus it was the 
sounds of one of these Fights that Hegel heard while finishing his Phenomenology, in 
which he became conscious of himself by answering his question “What am I?” 
 
Additionally, Kojève (226-227) argues:  
No animal commits suicide out of simple shame or pure vanity … no animal risks its life 
to capture or recapture a flag, to win officer’s stripes, or to be decorated; animals never 
have bloody fights for pure prestige, for which the only reward is the resulting glory and 
which can be explained neither by the instinct of preservation (defence of life or search 
for food) nor by that of reproduction; no animal has ever fought a dual to pay back an 
insult that harmed none of its vital interests, just as no female has died “defending her 
honour” against a male. Therefore it is by negating acts of this kind that Man realises and 
manifests his freedom – that is, the humanity which distinguishes him from the animals. 
In these citations I find the most obvious support for Eva Lundgren-Gothlin’s hypothesis of a 
Kojèvean influence in The Second Sex. Beauvoir seems to have Kojève’s words in mind when 
she shows, in The Nomads, that “being human” implies the opposite of preserving, caring and 
nursing; that “humans” are reactionaries, pillagers, warmongers and rapists, driven by 
ambition and self-importance. At bottom, “being human” also implies not being “woman”. 
Kojève would argue that, by avoiding combat, woman has not acted upon the anthropogenetic 
desire that would confirm her human status. 
 
Imitating Kojève, Beauvoir (95-96) asserts: 
The warrior put his life in jeopardy to elevate the prestige of the horde, the clan to which 
he belonged. And in this he proved dramatically that life is not the supreme value for 
man, but on the contrary that it should be made to serve ends more important than itself. 
The worst curse that was laid upon woman was that she should be excluded from these 
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warlike forays. For it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the 
animal; that is why superiority has been accorded in humanity not to the sex that brings 
forth but to that which kills.   
Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 78) infers: “Since Beauvoir, like Kojève, sees risking one’s life as 
basic to the appearance of humanity, to belong to the sex whose biological orientation is 
towards giving birth, towards representing the re-creation and preservation of life, rather than 
the sex that puts life at risk in the struggle for recognition, is a ‘curse’.” Persuaded by a 
recurring, seemingly negative attitude towards motherhood in The Second Sex,56 she 
incorrectly interprets this passage, indeed, the entire chapter, as Beauvoir’s veneration of 
violence.57  
 
In this context, Lundgren-Gothlin (in Fallaize 1998: 99) concludes that the unique nature of 
woman’s oppression – that she is the Other who remains other – emerges from her non-
participation in the process of self-recognition. Since there is no combat between the sexes, 
since woman ostensibly does not participate in the life and death struggle for recognition, the 
relationship between man and woman is non-dialectical. The lack of dialecticity explains the 
unique nature of woman’s oppression, i.e., her status as Absolute Other. Lundgren-Gothlin 
reads The Second Sex as an appeal for woman to enter the dialectic of recognition in order to 
affirm her humanity and attain full subjectivity. In short, the solution to the oppressive 
relationship between man and woman will resemble the resolution to Kojève’s master-slave 
dialectic: woman’s release from enslavement comes from her becoming like the man-master.  
 
What Lundgren-Gothlin might also have put forward, if we were to follow her line of 
argumentation, is the charge of voluntarism in Beauvoir’s supposed stance that woman’s 
subjugation results from her failure to participate in the dialectic of recognition.58 After all, it 
                                                 
56 See, in particular, Lundgren-Gothlin (in Fallaize 1998: 105) and Lundgren-Gothlin (1996: 80). 
Beauvoir’s stance regarding motherhood will be discussed in more detail in the section to follow.   
57 Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 332, footnote 107) challenges another aspect of Beauvoir’s reiteration of 
the Spirit-Life opposition: “By contrasting ‘giving life’ with ‘risking one’s life’, Beauvoir contributes 
to the social silence in which death in childbirth was, so to speak, buried. In the nineteenth century one 
birth in six ended in the death of the mother. But social thinking maintained a barrier between 
discourses of motherhood and those of death.” In truth, Beauvoir (e.g. 62; 521), acknowledges the 
dangers of childbirth, including the possibility of death. 
58 See also Heinämaa (in Card 2003: 66) and Butler (in Fallaize 1998: 34-36).   
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is not the master that enslaves his adversary; instead, the slave contrives his own bondage 
through his attachment to animal desire. Of course, before his bondage, the slave had been the 
master’s equal; whereas Beauvoir’s point of departure is that woman has never been man’s 
equal. Indeed, from a Kojèvean perspective that tends to associate the slave with the 
proletariat, Beauvoir (89) counters that “the antagonism of the sexes” cannot be reduced to 
class conflict. Firstly, “proletarians have not always existed, whereas there have always been 
women” (18). Secondly, “there were not at first free women whom the males enslaved nor 
were there even castes based on sex” (172-173). If woman is absent from the dialectic of 
recognition – irrespective of whether or not Beauvoir believes that such absence is desirable – 
it is because she does not meet the entrance requirement of equality.        
 
Given that The Nomads starts with Beauvoir’s questioning of the accuracy of historical 
accounts regarding women’s status and functions in early human societies (93); given that 
The Ethics of Ambiguity warns, firstly, against a naïve hatred that denies the primacy of the 
bond with others; secondly, against the dehumanising effect of violence; given that Beauvoir 
(45) argues, in The Second Sex, that there “are two interrelated dynamic aspects of life: it can 
be maintained only through transcending itself, and it can transcend itself only on condition 
that it is maintained”; given that, at the core of her work is the belief that combat is not the 
only and certainly not the preferable mode of intersubjectivity, it would be a mistake to 
interpret The Nomads as an endorsement of violence and/or a justification for women’s 
subjugation based on their maternal functions.59 
The recurring question of The Second Sex is: Why is woman the Other? In turn, the matter of 
woman’s “absolute otherness” forces us to ask: What, after all, does it mean to be human? I 
have shown that the answer put forward by early French phenomenology is that being human 
means being violent. Thus, Beatrice Hanssen (2000: 193) finds that “in Kojève’s highly 
anthropologised, even vitalistic reading of Hegel, the mortal combat gained immoderate 
precedence” to the extent that it becomes the “justification of an eternal human nature, 
                                                 
59 Bergoffen (1997:158-159) offers a somewhat different perspective: “Beauvoir makes it clear that 
within patriarchy the way of violence is privileged. It is identified as the only way the body expresses 
its subjectivity. Noting this patriarchal prejudice, Beauvoir insists that girls be given access to the 
ways of violence; for, so long as the prejudice of patriarchy prevails, girls must be allowed to fight 
their way out of their condition of inessential otherness. Neither the structures of patriarchy, however, 
nor the way of violence is sacrosanct. There are other ways of transcending the alienations of 
subjectivity.” 
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mapped, subsequently, onto an existentialist fold of subjecthood, or – more likely – onto a 
masculinity that masquerades as the universal mean.” In her analysis, Beauvoir exposes this 
blood-thirsty, gung-ho machismo that permeates the French turn to the dialectic of 
recognition. She also shows that, since woman is excluded from the human Mitsein, she is 
precluded from engaging in the struggle for recognition; therefore, it is “impossible to 
consider her as another subject” (102).  
 
Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 100-101) infers that Beauvoir uses subject in three ways, namely, 
“despotic subjects”, for whom the other is an inessential object; “minority subjects in struggle 
and resistance”, i.e., those who are considered as “others” but can “answer back and retain 
independence in relation to the dominator’s viewpoint because a community exists which 
make it possible to say ‘we’”; and finally, the “extinguished subject”, who is woman.       
 
The problem with these designations is that they do not sufficiently account for the divided 
existence that women lead – the same woman who is treated as the inessential on the basis of 
her sex can assert her lordship over others by way of her membership to a privileged 
economic or racial “caste”. Beauvoir (173) points out that “there were women among the 
slaves, to be sure, but there have always been free women – that is, women of religious and 
social dignity.” These women with social standing, “live dispersed among males” so that, if 
“they belong to the bourgeoisie, they feel solidarity with men of that class, not with 
proletarian women; if they are white, their allegiance is to white men” (19), etc. When a 
woman says “we” in the context of her affiliation to, for instance, an economic, religious, 
educational or racial grouping, it is not to be supposed that she is an equal member of that 
group. 
  
I am reminded of a passage in Being and Nothingness; to wit: 
The ‘we’ is experienced by a particular consciousness; it is not necessary that all the 
patrons at the café should be conscious of being ‘we’ in order for me to experience 
myself as being engaged in a ‘we’ with them. Everyone is familiar with this pattern of 
everyday dialogue: ‘We are very dissatisfied.’ ‘But no, my dear, speak for your self.’  
Sartre (1956: 536) 60 
                                                 
60 See Max Deutscher’s (2003: xxi) discussion of this passage.       
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Beauvoir’s analysis of woman as Other shows that woman never really belongs to any “we”, 
that woman is the most “profoundly alienated (her individuality the prey of outside forces)” 
(Beauvoir: 64) existent, being “the Other, she remains exterior to man’s world” (214), she “is 
outside the fray” (215). Moreover, she does not speak for herself – when she is not silenced 
through exclusion and indifference, she is silenced by men, who are endowed by the 
patriarchal order with the right to speak for her. 
   
Even as “privileged Other” (278), woman represents “pure alterity” – she is not “subject in 
her own right” (277). Notwithstanding the social standing of concrete women, the myth of 
woman symbolises the absence or lack of identity. Earlier in her text, Beauvoir (15-16) 
attributes to Aristotle the contention that the “female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of 
qualities … a natural defectiveness.” Is it not ironic that woman’s perceived lack should point 
to her non-human status? After all, within the framework of early French phenomenology, the 
existent’s “lack”, his “empty greediness”, indicates that aspect of his being that separates him 
from the world of mere objects, i.e., his “becoming” or “transcendence”. Woman’s “lack”, on 
the other hand, is used to account for and justify her dehumanisation. 
 
In the following section it will become apparent that woman’s “lack” is inexorably linked to 
patriarchal constructs of the female body, in which the fact that a woman’s body is different 
from a man’s body seems sufficient reason to cast her as the Other. 
 
       
c.3) The slimy and other fictions of woman’s body    
 
 
Early in Philosophy of Nature, Hegel (1970: 3) declares: “Nature confronts us as a riddle and 
a problem, whose solution both attracts and repels us: attracts us, because Spirit is presaged in 
Nature; repels us, because Nature seems an alien existence, in which Spirit does not find 
itself. The Second Sex shows how man transfers onto woman, specifically, her body, his 
ambivalence towards Nature. Beauvoir (175-176) submits: 
Man has his roots deep in Nature; he has been engendered like the animals and plants; he 
well knows that he exists only in so far as he lives. But since the coming of the 
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patriarchate, Life has worn in his eyes a double aspect: it is consciousness, will, 
transcendence, it is spirit; and it is matter, passivity, immanence, it is flesh.  
Beauvoir associates dichotomous thinking with the patriarchal order: the construction of 
dichotomies is an intellectual tool invented by man as a “revolt against his carnal state” (177). 
He “sees himself as a fallen god … and he finds himself shut up in a body of limited powers, 
in a place and time he never chose, where he was not called for, useless, cumbersome, 
absurd” (177). In particular, “he would sooner flee” than face up to “what is peculiar in 
death’s certainty – that it is possible at any moment” (Heidegger 1978: 302).61 Recalling 
Heidegger, Beauvoir argues that death anxiety is mirrored by man’s dread of the maternal or 
pregnant body. Consider two of the numerous passages in The Second Sex that convey this 
argument.  
 
In the first passage, Beauvoir (178) writes:  
The quivering jelly which is elaborated in the womb (the womb, secret and sealed like a 
tomb) evokes too clearly the soft viscosity of carrion for him not to be shuddering away. 
Wherever life is in the making – germination, fermentation – it arouses disgust because it 
                                                 
61 In agreement with this view, Beauvoir (1948: 127) writes that the most fundamental ambiguity of 
the human condition is “that every living movement is a sliding toward death”. Thus, death is a 
recurring theme in Beauvoir’s work. Aside from the references in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The 
Second Sex, Beauvoir’s novel, All Men are Mortal (1946), is “a cautionary tale, not about the 
awfulness of death, but about the greater peril of being unable to die” (Rose in Beauvoir 2003: vi). The 
central character, Fosca, is immortal, and as a result he “doesn’t realise that the earth is so vast and 
that life so short; he doesn’t know that other people exist” (Beauvoir 2003: 6; see also Arp (2000: 40-
44) and Marks (in Fallaize 1998: 132-154). In this novel, she suggests that ethics, law, love and 
meaning presuppose being mortal. Beauvoir does not always write about death in obviously 
existentialist terms. A Very Easy Death (1969a) is, in my opinion, one of the finest accounts of the 
phenomenon of dying ever produced. In it, Beauvoir (1969a: 92) concludes: “You do not die from 
being born, nor from having lived, nor from old age. You die from something.” The Heideggerian 
dictum that death is a phenomenon of life loses sight of the material specificity of death; it also does 
not acknowledge that the cancer-ridden body of a bourgeois woman dies an “easier” death – a death 
eased into by the finest medical care, a private room, successful children who can afford to keep vigil, 
a stately funeral, etc. – than her lower-class counterpart. Yes, “death is the external limit of my 
possibilities” (Beauvoir 1972: 441), but the meaning of that limit is inexorably tied to possibilities that 
had been available in life. See also Schott (in Card 2003: 230-231). 
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is made only in being destroyed; the slimy embryo begins the cycle that is completed in 
the putrefaction of death. 
Undoubtedly, this is a reaction to Sartre’s depiction of woman as “being-in-itself” in the final 
section of Being and Nothingness. In abbreviated form, Sartre (1969: 773-783) describes 
‘slime’ and ‘hole’ as symbols of being in which the for-itself is swallowed up by the in-itself:  
“[The slimy] teaches me about the world, that it is a leech sucking me … Throw a slimy 
substance [on the ground]; it draws itself out, it displays itself, it flattens itself out, it is 
soft; touch the slimy; it does not flee, it yields. … The slimy is compressible … it is a 
being that can be possessed … The slimy is docile. Only at the very moment when I 
believe that I possess it, behold by a curious reversal, it possesses me.  … [The] For-itself 
is suddenly compromised. I open my hands, I want to let go of the slimy and it sticks to 
me, it draws me, it sucks at me. … It is a soft, yielding action, a moist and feminine 
sucking, it lives obscurely under my fingers, and I sense it like a dizziness; it draws me to 
it as the bottom of a precipice might draw me. … The slime is like a liquid seen in a 
nightmare, where all its properties are animated by a sort of life and turn back against me. 
Slime is the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly-sweet, feminine revenge which will be 
symbolised on another level by the quality ‘sugary.’ … The obscenity of the feminine sex 
is that of everything which ‘gapes open.’ It is an appeal to being as all holes are. In 
herself woman appeals to a strange flesh which is to transform her into a fullness of being 
by penetration and dissolution. Conversely woman senses her condition as an appeal 
precisely because she is ‘in the form of a hole.’… Beyond any doubt her sex is a mouth 
and a voracious mouth which devours the penis”. 
The horror of the slimy is “the fear that facticity [here used as a synonym for being-in-itself, 
which, in turn, is symbolised by woman] might progress continually and insensibly and 
absorb the For-itself” (778). The horror of the hole is that it is an appeal to the flesh and, as 
such, “the castration of the man” (782) – an interesting formulation, given, firstly, Beauvoir’s 
notion of the penis as a symbol of transcendence, as I discuss below, and, secondly, the 
meaning of castrate as “deprive of vigour”, thus “make inert”, which is, ontologically 
speaking, man’s removal from the for-itself into the en-soi.62  
 
In the second passage, Beauvoir (197-198) writes: 
                                                 
62 See also, Deutscher (2003: 3-14, and particularly, 103-107), Midgley (2003: 98-99), Le Dœuff 
(1991: 60, 81-82).   
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The Mother dooms her son to death in giving him life; … the alliance between Woman 
and Death is confirmed […]. Thus what man cherishes and detests first of all in woman 
… is the fixed image of his animal destiny; it is the life that is necessary to his existence 
but that condemns him to the finite and to death. From the day of his birth man begins to 
die: this is the truth incarnated in the Mother.  
(197-198) 
To compensate for his mortality, to placate his angst, man posits himself as the Essential, 
imbued with all the characteristics that deny his corporeality, his animalism, his being-
towards-death. However, Beauvoir, (194), ironically appealing to Hegel, counters:  
The penis, father of generations, corresponds to the maternal womb; arising from a germ 
that grew in a woman’s body, man is himself a carrier of germs, and through the sowing 
which gives life, it is his own life that is renounced. ‘The birth of children,’ says Hegel, 
‘is the death of parents.’ The ejaculation is a promise of death; it is an assertion of the 
species against the individual.  
By setting up woman, most particularly, the mother, as the Inessential – by “dooming her to 
immanence” (Beauvoir: 29, 105, 278, 653) – man hopes to master his own nature. As Rosi 
Braidotti (1994: 152) correctly observes: “Simone de Beauvoir observed fifty years ago that 
the price men pay for representing the universal is a kind of loss of embodiment; the price 
women pay, on the other hand, is a loss of subjectivity and the confinement to the body.” 
Braidotti explains that men’s supposed “disembodiment” allows them to exclusively occupy 
the realm of transcendence and subjectivity; whereas the depiction of women as 
“overembodied” justifies their relegation to immanence.  
 
Already in her Introduction, Beauvoir (15) notes: 
Woman has ovaries, a uterus: these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity; 
circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks with 
her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as 
testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal 
connection with the world … whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a 
prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it. 
Later, in Dreams, Fears, Idols, Beauvoir portrays the sexual life of a man as far more 
complicated than the widely held assumption that “it is not in opposition to his existence as a 
person, and biologically it runs an even course, without crises and generally without mishap” 
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(64). For Beauvoir, however, the point is not to invert the sexual differentiation, but to show 
that body and consciousness are not separable, in other words, to challenge the duality.  
 
At any rate, since woman, as the incarnation of hostile Nature, must be controlled, “her body 
must present the inert and passive qualities of an object” (Beauvoir: 189). Deranty (2000: 
145-146) finds in respectively, Kant, Fichte and Hegel the assumption that “woman’s body is 
frail, made for reproduction and for use by man; woman must be passive and receptive”.   
 
Thus, Hegel (1970: 412-414) claims: 
The formation of the differentiated sexes must be different … as differentiated moments 
(Differente), they are an urge (Trieb). … [T]he same type underlies both the male and 
female genitals, only that in one or the other, one or the other part predominates: in the 
female, it is necessarily the passive moment (das Indifferente), in the male, the moment of 
duality (das Entzweite), of opposition. … Through this difference, therefore, the male is 
the active principle, and the female is the receptive, because she remains in her 
undeveloped unity. … [T]he truth is that the female contains the material element, but the 
male contains the subjectivity. … Conception, therefore, is nothing else but this, that the 
opposite moments, these abstract representations, become one. 
In the chapter, The Data of Biology, which describes the bio-scientific explanation for 
woman’s Otherness, Beauvoir questions Hegel’s insistence on the need for sexual 
differentiation in order to achieve the unity between supposedly opposite moments. Beauvoir 
(38) suggests that “one feels in it all too distinctly the predetermination to find in every 
operation the three terms of the syllogism.” It is not that she denies sexual differentiation – 
“this differentiation is characteristic of existents to such an extent that it belongs in any 
realistic definition of existence” (39). It must be said that, for Beauvoir (39), it does not fall 
outside the realm of possibility to “imagine a parthenogenetic or hermaphroditic society.” 
Recall an earlier passage cited from Beauvoir’s Introduction, where she entertains the 
possibility that bodily differences “are superficial, perhaps they are destined to disappear.” Of 
course, since writing these words, phenomena such as sex-reassignment surgery, 
intersexuality, cross-dressing and gender-bending have contested what is now considered to 
be an overly simplistic, hetero-normative sexual differentiation. At any rate, Beauvoir will 
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even accept certain “scientific facts” that demonstrate woman’s “more restricted grasp on the 
world”.63  
 
However, Beauvoir qualifies that we must view such data in the light of the existent’s entire 
situation. In this context, Beauvoir (67) argues: 
[W]henever the physiological fact (for instance, muscular inferiority) takes on meaning, 
this meaning is at once seen as dependent on a whole context; the ‘weakness’ is revealed 
as such only in the light of the ends man proposes, the instruments he has available, and 
the laws he establishes. If he does not wish to seize the world, the idea of a grasp on 
things has no sense; when in this seizure the full employment of bodily power is not 
required, above the available minimum, then differences in strength are annulled; 
wherever violence is contrary to custom, muscular force cannot be a basis for domination. 
… It has been said that the human species is anti-natural, a statement that is hardly exact, 
since man cannot deny facts; but he establishes their truth by the way in which he deals 
with them; nature has reality for him only to the extent that it is involved in his activity – 
his own nature not excepted.  
At the start of her analysis, Beauvoir (28) cautions: “The way questions are put, the points of 
view assumed, presuppose a relativity of interest; all characteristics imply values, and every 
objective description, so called, implies an ethical background.” The truth of biological facts 
can only be established by virtue of the values conferred on them. Thus, we can ask of 
Hegel’s depiction of sexual differentiation: On what basis, aside from patriarchal prejudice, 
does passivity necessarily predominate in the female? What evidence – other than men’s 
viewpoint, which they confuse with absolute truth – supports the truth that the female contains 
materiality and the male contains subjectivity?  
 
Beauvoir (40-41) suggests that Hegel’s designations merely point to his privileging of the 
masculine principle. The problem is exacerbated by Hegel’s (1967: 114) assertion, in 
Philosophy of Right, that the “difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has a 
rational basis and consequently acquires an intellectual and ethical significance”. 
Regarding the intellectual significance of his position, let us briefly reflect on Hegel’s (1967: 
263-264) proposal in Philosophy of Right:  
                                                 
63 See Beauvoir’s (66-67) inventory of such “facts”.    
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Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a 
universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms of 
artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot 
attain the ideal. § The difference between men and women is like between animals and 
plants. Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their 
development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of 
feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, 
because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary 
inclinations and opinions. Women are educated – who knows how? – as it were by 
breathing in ideas, by living rather than acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on 
the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion. 
In this passage Hegel sets up two categories, which represent two types of thinking. The first, 
men, represents activity, universality, the ideal, rigour. These traits, in turn, enable the 
acquirement of advanced science, philosophy and art. The second category, women, 
represents passivity, arbitrariness, vagueness. These traits reflect the “happy ideas” and 
particular charms with which a woman is endowed – elegance and taste – but they amount to 
merely opinions and inclinations. Hegel suggests also a further distinction: male knowledge is 
acquired and female ideas “breathed in”. Thus, Hegel proposes a separation between men and 
knowledge, and, since knowledge is attained “only by the stress of thought”, implied is a 
further separation between thought and the corporeal. The distance between knowledge and 
the subject is overcome in women insofar as their ideas are embodied; however, since women 
are depicted as plants, it is not to be supposed that, for Hegel, they symbolise the overcoming 
of the consciousness-body dichotomy. The fact is that they have no minds to speak of; they 
“are” only their bodies. That is why Hegel is at a loss to account for the process by which they 
generate ideas – perhaps he has in mind a common prejudice, imparted by Beauvoir (15) early 
in The Second Sex; to wit, a woman “thinks with her glands”. In any event, what Hegel’s 
distinction boils down to is this: man equals thought and woman equals the absence or lack of 
thought.     
 
Regarding the ethical significance of his position, consider the opposition between human and 
divine law that Hegel (1977: 266-278) sets up in Phenomenology of Spirit. In Glas, Derrida 
(1986: 140) shows how Hegel associates woman, the symbol of divine law, with singularity, 
with the natural, with the nocturnal; thus, the hidden or unknown, with absence (“singularity 
can only disappear, can posit itself as such only in death”); while man represents the 
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universal, distance from nature (human law is made by man), daylight; thus, the known, the 
public and the visible. Derrida (187) continues: 
Human law, the law of the rational community that institutes itself against the private law 
of the family, always suppresses femininity, stands up against it, girds, squeezes, curbs, 
compresses it. But the masculine power has a limit – an essential and eternal one: the 
arm, the weapon, doubtless impotent, the all-powerful weapon of impotence, the 
inalienable shot [coup], the inalienable blow [coup] of the woman, is irony. Woman, “[the 
community’s] internal enemy,” can always burst out [éclater] laughing at the last 
moment; she knows, in tears and in death, how to pervert the power that suppresses.  
This hollow victory of woman reminds me of a remark by Aristotle (2000: 52) in the Politics: 
“Silence is a woman’s glory, but this is not equally the glory of man”, which offers Aristotle 
the rationale for woman’s exclusion from the polis – the same fate that befalls Hegel’s 
woman.   
 
There is no rational basis for Hegel’s sexual differentiation. The active-male / passive-female 
opposition merely reaffirms the social hierarchy of the sexes. Beauvoir (65) infers that 
“biological considerations … are insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes; they fail 
to explain why woman is the Other; they do not condemn her to remain in this subordinate 
role for ever.”  
 
Taken out of context, certain passages in The Data of Biology, expose Beauvoir to the charges 
that she “reproduces ideas from androcentric biological science”, “accepts, for example, the 
traditional view of motherhood which associates it with incompetence and weakness” and, in 
the “tendency to employ parallels between man and animals when describing differences 
between the sexes … runs the risk of falling into the trap of a biological determinism which 
she generally rejects” (Lundgren-Gothlin in Fallaize 1998: 105).  
 
In one such passage, regarding procreation in “birds and mammals”, including humans, 
Beauvoir (53-54) writes: 
Even when she is willing, or provocative, it is unquestionably the male who takes the 
female – she is taken. Often the word applies literally, for whether by means of special 
organs or through superior strength, the male seizes her and holds her in place; he 
performs the copulatory movements; and, among insects, birds, and mammals, he 
penetrates her. In this penetration her inwardness is violated, she is like an enclosure that 
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is broken into. The male is not doing violence to the species, for the species survives only 
in being constantly renewed ... [I]n penetrating [the female body] the male finds self-
fulfilment in activity ... First violated, the female is the alienated – she becomes, in part, 
another than herself. … Tenanted by another, who battens upon her substance throughout 
the period of pregnancy, the female is at once herself and other than herself; and after the 
birth she feeds the newborn upon the milk of her breasts. Thus it is not too clear when the 
new individual is to be regarded as autonomous: at the moment of fertilisation, of birth, or 
of weaning? It is noteworthy that the more clearly the female appears to be a separate 
individual, the more imperiously the continuity of life asserts itself against her 
separateness.    
The male is associated with violent activity and creation – life springs forth from his loins. 
His is the “more transient role” (Lundgren-Gothlin in Fallaize 1998: 102) in procreation, 
which means that he can more easily recover his independence. The combination of 
separation and creation is precisely what is signified by transcendence. In the chapter, The 
Psychoanalytic Point of View, Beauvoir applies the logic of the dialectic of recognition to the 
traditional idea of the penis as incarnation of transcendence in. Beauvoir (79) observes: 
The penis is regarded by the subject as at once himself and other than himself, because 
the functions of urination and later of erection are processes midway between the 
voluntary and involuntary, and because it is a capricious and as it were a foreign source of 
pleasure that is felt subjectively. The individual’s specific transcendence takes concrete 
form in the penis and it is a source of pride. Because the phallus is thus set apart, man can 
bring into integration with his subjective individuality the life that overflows from it. It is 
easy to see, then, that the length of the penis, the force of the urinary jet, the strength of 
erection and ejaculation become for him the measure of his own worth.   
In the chapter entitled, Childhood, Beauvoir (306) formulates this idea slightly differently: 
“Because he has an alter ego in whom he sees himself, the little boy can boldly assume an 
attitude of subjectivity64; the very object into which he projects himself becomes a symbol of 
                                                 
64 Toril Moi’s (in Ferguson and Wicke 1994: 95) alternative translation more clearly shows Beauvoir’s 
appeal to the dialectic: “Because he has an alter ego in whom he recognises himself, the little boy can 
boldly assume his subjectivity”. Moi (96) replies: “To say that there is something Hegelian about 
Beauvoir’s argument here is not to claim that she is being particularly orthodox or consistent. Freely 
developing the themes of recognition and the dialectical triad, Beauvoir entirely forgets that for Hegel 
recognition presupposes the reciprocal exchange between two subjects. As far as I can see, however, 
Beauvoir never actually claims that the penis speaks back. Confronted with the alluring idea that it is 
 178
autonomy, of transcendence, of power”. In Dreams, Fears, Idols, Beauvoir (194) notes again 
how the “grown man regards his [sex] organ as a symbol of transcendence and power”, to 
which she replies: 
That organ by which he thought to assert himself does not obey him; heavy with 
unsatisfied desires, unexpectedly becoming erect, sometimes relieving itself during sleep, 
it manifests a suspect and capricious vitality. Man aspires to make Spirit triumph over 
Life, action over passivity; his consciousness keeps nature at a distance, his will shapes 
her, but in his sex organ he finds himself again beset with life, nature, and passivity. 
Here, the focus is not on the male subject who masters his own body, or turns it into an 
instrument of (sexual) power; instead, Beauvoir posits a distinctly vulnerable male at the 
mercy of his often volatile bodily functions. Instead of associating the male with 
transcendence, we find him immersed in “life, nature and passivity” – that is to say, “sunk in 
immanence”.   
 
Human existence, Beauvoir argues in the chapter on psychoanalysis, is simultaneously 
separation and Mitsein. As a separation, the subject reveals a tendency towards alienation, that 
is, he endeavours “to search for himself in things, which is a kind of flight from himself” (79). 
Put differently, alienation is an attempt by the existent “to re-establish his or her existence as 
a whole, concretised, reflected in someone or something – whether the penis, another’s gaze, 
a totem, or property” (Lundgren-Gothlin 1996: 192). To strive to transcend in the midst of 
one’s immanence, more precisely, the attempt “to recognise oneself consciously as object” 
(Beauvoir: 642), signifies the narcissist’s flight of fancy.  However, Beauvoir continues, “the 
duality is merely dreamed” – transcendence in immanence can never be realised because “it is 
impossible to be for one’s self actually an other”. Beauvoir (295) declares: “Only the 
intervention of someone else can establish an individual as an Other.” Perhaps amidst all this 
detail about the ways in which woman is othered this point has not been sufficiently stressed: 
“otherness” is conferred on someone by someone else; as such, “the other” presupposes a 
relationship. Both the subject and the other are constituted by the bond. For Beauvoir, it is the 
bond, not subjectivity or otherness, that is essential, fundamental, absolute.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
not only the little boy who must recognise himself in his penis, but the penis that must recognise itself 
in the boy, Hegel himself might have had some difficulty in recognising his own theory.” The point 
that Moi is missing is that Beauvoir is all too aware of the inconsistency.    
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The penis-totem is not “eminently detachable” (Moi in Ferguson and Wicker 1994: 95), 
therefore, it cannot enable the male to “assume his subjectivity and act authentically” (96). 
The subject can, however, use his penis as an instrument of domination. Beauvoir (77) 
asserts: 
Sexuality most certainly plays a considerable role in human life; it can be said to pervade 
life throughout. … The existent is a sexual, a sexuate body, and in his relations with other 
existents who are also sexuate bodies, sexuality is in consequence always involved. But if 
body and sexuality are concrete expressions of existence, it is with reference to this that 
their significance can be discovered.    
If subjectivity is confirmed through the domination, exploitation and objectification of other 
subjects, as Kojève and others postulate, and if the body is a concrete expression of existence, 
the body who rapes, kills, maims and exploits others is the incarnation of human 
transcendence. It is in this context that Beauvoir writes in the passage about procreation that 
the male “finds self-fulfilment” in sexually violating the female body.65                  
 
In that passage, the female embodies immanence. Firstly, her body is associated with 
submission and passivity – she cannot act but is acted upon first by the male and then by the 
growing foetus. Secondly, it is connected with “inwardness” and “enclosure” – she is 
“imprisoned” by her bodily, particularly reproductive, functions. Not only does the dominant 
male sexually possess her – practically rape her – but afterwards her body is “taken over” by 
“some sort of parasite eating into a woman’s independence” (Okely 1986: 7).   
 
In terms of the dialectic of recognition, the growing foetus resembles the rival consciousness’ 
competing for self-recognition. As “the other”, it threatens to assimilate her as it uses her as a 
“vessel”; with every passing month jostling for more space to grow. Later, while she is 
nursing, she will become a “milk factory” – further dehumanising imagery that captures her 
                                                 
65 Mary Evans (1985: 73) suggests that Beauvoir “paves the way for those feminists who see only 
constant exploitation in heterosexual relationships” by excluding the possibility that a man and woman 
may be capable of forming supportive and emotionally rewarding unions. I submit that not only is 
Evans’ response a misreading of The Data of Biology, but it is also an incomplete reading of The 
Second Sex. In the final part of my analysis, I elaborate on Beauvoir’s conception of an “authentic 
love” between the couple, including the description of an erotic relationship that affirms friendship 
and respect.   
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inability to escape her enslavement to the species. It is an “other” that tries to assert its 
dominance as it incapacitates her with pain, fatigue and numerous “maladies” (62-63) and 
threatens her with danger, including her own death. It is one that literally induces nausea – a 
response, perhaps, to Sartre’s La Nausée (1938), in which the central character’s nausea is 
triggered by his sense that the other (things, nature, other people) eats into his subjectivity.  
 
The blurring of boundaries between herself and this “other” suggests that she competes, 
phenomenologically speaking, with(in) her own body for a sense of individuality. Now, given 
this interplay between self and other, can we infer that the pregnant woman is the “true” 
symbol of transcendence? To be sure, in the chapter, The Mother, Beauvoir (513) writes: 
It is especially noteworthy that the pregnant woman feels the immanence of her body at 
just the time when it is in transcendence; it turns itself in nausea and discomfort; it has 
seized to exist for itself and thereupon becomes more sizeable than ever before. The 
transcendence of the artisan, of the man of action, contains the element of subjectivity; 
but in the mother-to-be the antithesis of subject and object ceases to exist; she and the 
child with which she is swollen make up together an equivocal pair overwhelmed by life. 
… She is no longer an object subservient to a subject; she is no longer a subject afflicted 
with the anxiety that accompanies liberty, she is one with that equivocal reality: life. Her 
body is at last her own, since it exists for the child who belongs to her. Society recognises 
her right of possession and invests it, moreover, with a sacred character. 
 Just as her reader is poised to leap to the conclusion that the mother-to-be is indeed the 
symbol of transcendence, Beauvoir (513-514) continues: 
With her ego surrendered, alienated in her body and in her social dignity, the mother 
enjoys the comforting illusion of feeling that she is a human being in herself, a value. But 
this is only an illusion. For she does not really make the baby, it makes itself within her; 
her flesh engenders flesh only, and she is quite incapable of establishing an existence that 
will have to establish itself.        
Lundgren-Gothlin (1997: 234) infers that, while woman’s “body may appear to transcend 
itself in motherhood, it is actually Nature, life itself, that does so; the woman is no more than 
a passive instrument and thus does not as subject consciously create the child, in the manner 
of a craftsman making an object.” Thus, according to Lundgren-Gothlin (234), “Beauvoir’s 
description parallels that of Marx, when he distinguishes between a bee building a hive and an 
architect designing a construction.” However, Lundgren-Gothlin is on the wrong track, 
because she is primarily responding to the assertion, in The Nomads, that “giving birth and 
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suckling are not activities, they are natural functions; no project is involved” (Beauvoir: 94). 
Within the framework of early French phenomenology, with a Marxist inflection, which, I 
believe, Beauvoir satirises in The Nomads and Early Tillers of the Soil, if maternity involves 
no project, mothers do not transcend. Thus, Lundgren-Gothlin (239), like Mary Evans (1985: 
73) and others66 criticise what they believe to be Beauvoir’s disdain of motherhood and 
domestic labour. 
 
However, The Second Sex provides a far more measured perspective on motherhood than such 
criticism suggests. When Beauvoir describes the mother’s feeling of herself as “a human 
being in herself, a value” an illusion, she implies that maternity in itself is valued – to the 
limited extent that it is valued at all – only when patriarchal society deems children desirable. 
Beauvoir (69) observes: “The close bond between mother and child will be for her a source of 
dignity or indignity according to the value placed upon the child – which is highly variable – 
and this very bond … will be recognised or not according to the presumptions of the society 
concerned.” In short, it is not the mother who is valued for having a close bond with the child 
but rather the child’s value that will determine the mother’s status.  
 
Beauvoir (538-539) argues:  
There is an extravagant fraudulence in the easy reconciliation made between the common 
attitude of contempt for women and the respect shown for mothers. It is outrageously 
paradoxical to deny woman all activity in public affairs, to shut her out of masculine 
careers, to assert her incapacity in all fields of effort, and then to entrust to her the most 
delicate and the most serious undertaking of all: the moulding of a human being. There 
are many woman whom custom and tradition still deny the education, the culture, the 
responsibilities and activities that are the privilege of men, and in whose arms, 
nevertheless, babies are put without scruple.  
To idealise house-working and child-rearing, as Andrew (1998: 295) correctly interprets, is 
“part and parcel of idealising the role of patriarchal femininity”. Ward (in Simons 1995: 236) 
offers:  
So, while some feminists charge Beauvoir with classism, it is instead the feminists who 
insist on the primary place and value of motherhood who may themselves be guilty of a 
classist assumption, one that assumes that all women are able to undertake pregnancy 
                                                 
66 See Pilardi (in Simons 1995: 34-35) for a review.       
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voluntarily, in comfortable economic situations and supportive surroundings, enjoying 
good health care throughout. Of course, as Beauvoir admits, under favourable conditions, 
children are bound to be highly positive experiences for the woman, but society can 
hardly choose to disdain women as human beings, give them no economic support for 
being mothers, exclude them from public life and then expect them to find motherhood 
rewarding. 
Furthermore, when Beauvoir suggests that there is no project involved in maternity, she 
means that children are not projects. Beauvoir (514) states: “A mother can have her reasons 
for wanting a child, but she cannot give to this independent person, who is to exist tomorrow, 
his own reasons, his justification, for existence”. In the following section I will refer to 
Beauvoir’s notion of the generous love of a mother for her child as an alternative to self-other 
relationships that operate within the “paradigm of the project” (Bergoffen 1997: 61). 
Incidentally, Lundgren-Gothlin (1997: 229) recognises Beauvoir’s appeal to the generosity of 
motherly love; however, her focus is on those passages in The Second Sex that associate 
motherhood with immanence. Moreover, Lundgren-Gothlin disregards Beauvoir’s (540) 
assertion: “In a properly organised society, where children would be largely taken in charge 
by the community and the mother cared for and helped, maternity would not be wholly 
incompatible with careers for women.” Quite clearly Beauvoir argues that motherhood is not 
necessarily in conflict with a woman’s being-towards-possibilities – this is only the case in 
societies that contrive women’s failure. 
 
According to Beauvoir’s analysis of the bio-scientific perspective, pregnancy is one of many 
bodily experiences, including menstruation, lactation, menopause, that place woman “in 
conflict” with herself. The implication is that her inability to attain subjectivity extends 
further than her non-dialectical relationship with man – even before her body is objectified 
through the gaze of another,67 she is alienated and preyed on by these “foreign forces” 
(Beauvoir: 57, 63).  
 
Sonia Kruks (in Fallaize 1998: 67) argues that Beauvoir, through her portrayal of woman’s 
body as simultaneously “self” and “alien object”, presents us with “an objectivity which is not 
                                                 
67 Recall Sartre’s distinction between my-body-for-me (my body as consciousness) and my-body-for-
others (my body as object). We saw that, for Sartre, the body as object is mediated by the Other 
through the “look”.  
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mediated by another consciousness.” Thus, suggests Kruks, woman’s body is both a body-for-
others and the en-soi, which neatly converges with the aforementioned fiction of the slimy. 
What Kruks fails to note is the significance of the missing element of woman’s experience of 
her body: my-body-for-me; that is, the subject’s body as consciousness. On one level, the 
example of the narcissist shows that the existent cannot objectify his or her body as this 
implies a body-consciousness duality that Beauvoir opposes. On another level, Beauvoir (68) 
points out that it “is not merely as a body, but rather as a body subject to taboos, to laws, that 
the subject is conscious of himself”. More specifically, “woman can be defined by her 
consciousness of her own femininity no more satisfactorily than by saying that she is a 
female, for she acquires this consciousness under circumstances dependent upon the society 
of which she is a member” (80).   
 
In truth, women’s bodies are always already encoded with the myth of woman. As Tidd 
(1999: 46) correctly surmises, “women do not choose how they experience their body because 
their relationship to their own embodiment has been pre-defined by the patriarchal society in 
which they find themselves.” Thus, Beauvoir (169) submits: “[W]hat-in-men’s-eyes-she-
seems-to-be is one of the necessary factors in [woman’s] real situation.” The actual “force” 
that alienates woman’s body is the “great force that constantly derails the line of thought of 
… philosophers … like Kant and Fichte [and] Hegel [who] cannot but interpret the otherness 
of the female body as an obstacle to female autonomy” (Deranty: 159-160). This “force” that 
pathologises, mythologises or deifies biological processes such as pregnancy and 
menstruation68 is the very same one that wishes to enclose women in their perceived 
otherness.      
                                                 
68 A recent compilation of essays by Iris Marion Young, On Female Bodily Experience: “Throwing 
Like a Girl” and Other Essays (2005), looks at the process of othering women’s bodily experiences. 
For instance, in Throwing Like a Girl, Young (2005: 42-43) writes: “Women in a sexist society are 
physically handicapped. Insofar as we learn to live out our existence in accordance with the definition 
that patriarchal culture assigns to us, we are physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified. 
… To be sure, there are actual women in contemporary society to whom all or part of the above 
description does not apply … [but only insofar as a particular woman] has escaped, through accident 
or good fortune, or, more often, as that which she has had to overcome.” In Menstrual Meditations, 
Young (106-107) submits: “On the one hand, for a culture of meritocratic achievement, menstruation 
is nothing other than a healthy biological process that should not be thought to distinguish women and 
men in our capacities and behaviour. … On the other hand, from our earliest awareness of 
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Thus, responding to Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion, in Phenomenology of Perception, that the 
subject is his body, Beauvoir (61) counters: “Woman, like man, is her body; but her body is 
something other than herself.” 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is bound up with the body and the world: the body and 
existence presuppose each other. In this respect, “the subject that I am, when taken concretely, 
is inseparable from this body and this world” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 475). “I am my body … 
yet at the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural’ subject”, contends Merleau-Ponty (231). 
We cannot reduce existence to the body or to sexuality, nor can we reduce the body or 
sexuality to existence: “the fact is that existence is not a set of facts … capable of being 
reduced to others or to which they can reduce themselves, but the ambiguous setting of their 
inter-communication” (193). The theme of ambiguity is central to Phenomenology of 
Perception: “[A]mbiguity is of the essence of human existence, and everything we live or 
think has always several meanings” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 196). “Everything is both 
manufactured and natural in man” (220), man’s body is “rooted in nature at the very moment 
when it is transformed by cultural influence, never hermetically sealed and never left behind” 
(231), Merleau-Ponty argues.  
 
Now, Beauvoir does not dispute these assertions. From The Ethics of Ambiguity, we have 
ascertained that she considers the fundamentally ambiguous human existence as at once 
consciousness and materiality, and that, try as he may, the individual cannot escape the bond 
between people, that the denial of the world is naively solipsistic. We have learnt that “the 
                                                                                                                                                        
menstruation until the day we stop, we are mindful of the imperative to conceal our menstrual 
processes. Menstruation is dirty, disgusting, defiling, and thus must be hidden. In everyday life these 
requirements of concealment create enormous anxiety and practical difficulties for women, and are a 
major source of our annoyance with the monthly event. … The message that a menstruating woman is 
perfectly normal entails that she hide the signs of menstruation.” Moreover, Young (113-114) 
contends: “Schools, workplaces, and other public institutions of bureaucratic equality assume a 
standard body with standard needs, and that body does not menstruate. This assumption of equality as 
sameness often unfairly discomforts and disadvantages menstruating women and threatens us with 
embarrassment and shame. … Disciplinary institutions nearly always restrict time in the bathroom, 
and often themselves set the time at which students or workers can use the toilet, rather than 
accommodating the needs of each body.”  
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body itself is not a brute fact”, and we have seen this claim substantiated throughout The 
Second Sex. However, Beauvoir does not agree with the idea that “the body is solidified or 
generalised existence” (Merleau-Ponty: 192, cited also by Beauvoir: 78). By treating the body 
and sexuality as “generalised”, Merleau-Ponty, as Bergoffen (1997: 23) suggests, “holds the 
thought of [sex] difference at bay”. When Merleau-Ponty (521) suggests that the other “is not 
even ever quite an object for me”, he does not take into account a particular Other whose 
absolute otherness is premised on her not having a male body. Notwithstanding his “marvel or 
taste for ambiguity” (Bergoffen: 26), the reciprocity between ambiguous subjects, on which 
he focuses, is made possible by “their shared flesh” (27); in short, “with Merleau-Ponty … we 
are still subjects of the same” (23-24).69 
 
What Beauvoir means by “her body is something other than herself” is, not that woman feels 
herself alienated by the biological processes that mark her as female; rather, that her body has 
never “belonged” to her. Even before she is created by her parents, she will have been 
conceived as the Eternal Feminine by the patriarchal order, which will have laid claim to her 
body and inscribed it with the myth of woman. Moreover, the stance that she assumes in 
relation to her Otherness – resignation, resistance, mute irony, docility, narcissism or violence 
– takes place within the very same confines of the patriarchal order. Thus, even when she is in 
the privileged position to forge for herself some kind of identity in defiance of the normative 
order, she does so with the implicit consent of her oppressors – her struggle is merely a 
symbolic agitation. 
 
To conclude this section, consider the only passage in her text that considers a definition of 
concrete, historical, individual woman. Beauvoir (83) submits: 
The psychoanalyst describes the female child, the young girl, as incited to identification 
with the mother and father, torn between ‘viriloid’ and ‘feminine’ tendencies; whereas I 
conceive her as hesitating between the role of object, Other which is offered her, and the 
assertion of her liberty. … For us woman is defined as a human being in quest of values 
in a world of values, a world of which it is indispensable to know the economic and social 
structure.  
                                                 
69 Some Beauvoir scholars, e.g., Heinämaa (in Card 2003: 66-86) and Langer (in Card 2003: 87-106) 
emphasise the philosophical connections between Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir.   
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A woman hesitates between the role of Other, between the role of the Eternal Feminine, and 
the assertion of her liberty, which can mean a number of things judging by the arguments 
advanced in The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex, including, to surpass the given 
towards an open future, thus, towards indeterminacy; or to affirm the peculiarity, the 
difference, of her identity. This process of vacillation denotes a woman’s reconsideration and 
re-evaluation of values. Certainly, as I have hoped to demonstrate, Beauvoir’s work 
exemplifies such an interrogation of the standard. Beauvoir does not ask the question of 
woman’s otherness in order to suggest ways in which women may overcome the absolute 
status of their “otherness” and become subjects who enjoy a relative otherness within the 
human Mitsein. To start with, she shows that we have to re-examine what it means to be 
human. Specifically, we have to ask if being human is inevitably tied to being violent, being 
egotistical and being the same. We need to reconsider the subject-object opposition, and 
concomitantly, re-imagine the meeting between self and other.  
 
In the final section of this study, I conjecture what Beauvoir’s alternative(s) to the traditional 
approach to the dialectic of recognition might be, based on her postulation of relationships 
defined by friendship and generosity.  
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d) Friendship and generosity 
 
 
d.1) Fraternité  
 
 
The final part of The Second Sex opens with a quote from the French poet, Jules Laforgue: 
“No, Woman is not our brother; through indolence and deceit we have made her a being apart, 
unknown, having no other weapon other than her sex, which not only means constant warfare 
but unfair warfare – adoring or hating, but never a straight friend” (Beauvoir: 725), and ends 
with the appeal “that by and through their natural differentiation men and women 
unequivocally affirm their brotherhood” (741). 
 
Why does Beauvoir, at the end of a sustained critique of patriarchy, call upon a relationship of 
brothers as an alternative to women’s oppression?70 Does this last word, brotherhood or 
fraternité, which, as an ethical imperative, is also the first word, attest to the “ameliorism” 
that contemporary critics attribute to Beauvoir?71  
 
While I maintain that Beauvoir’s philosophy is, ultimately, one of hope, her discussion does 
not shirk from recognising man’s propensity for violence, avarice, egotism. To be sure, she 
does not provide her readers with many graphic depictions of the evil that men do or of which 
they are capable. However, it does not follow that “no one is incriminated in The Second Sex 
and there is no one in the dock, [that] all evil is blamed on the situation, the set of harmful 
traditions and perverse ideologies, a nasty history without a Subject, formed of codes and 
oppressive situations [of which] the fact that some men are ‘tyrants’ or ‘boors’ is simply an 
effect” (Le Dœuff 1991: 93).  
                                                 
70Granted, the notion of an “end” in relation to the work of a writer who insists that she neither 
develops nor writes philosophical systems, is absurd; moreover, as an appeal this “ending” may be 
construed as the beginning of an approach to the primordial Mitsein of man and woman based on 
something other than violence and domination.  
71 See Part 1 c.      
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Let us not forget that representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men: 
flesh and blood men create, legitimise and uphold (through the family, media, religion, 
education, law, philosophy, etc.) the patriarchal norms that increase their power and oppress 
women. Recall Beauvoir’s contention that man is inclined “not to reduce himself but to 
increase his power”, thus, he is not likely to heed the call to renounce his privileges. 
 
Applying this outlook to the relationship between the sexes, Beauvoir (25) suggests that “men 
profit in … subtle ways from the otherness, the alterity of woman … [therefore] cannot be 
blamed for not cheerfully relinquishing all the benefits they derive from the myth”. Man’s will 
to power is more likely to outweigh any good will to promote the “amelioration of the female 
condition”. As we have seen, the supposed absolute otherness of woman enables men to 
escape the dialectic of recognition; it diverts man’s anxieties about his own ambiguity, his 
corporeality and most especially his mortality. It is “a miraculous balm” (25) for browbeaten 
men whose lives amount to the pure repetition of mechanical gestures. Beauvoir (635-636) 
recognises: 
There are many men who, like women, are restricted to the sphere of the intermediary and 
instrumental, of the inessential means. … Destined like women to the repetition of daily 
tasks, identified with ready-made values, respectful of public opinion, and seeking on 
earth nothing but a vague comfort, the employee, the merchant, the office worker, are in 
no way superior to their accompanying females. 
 
Nonetheless, Beauvoir (483-484) describes a typical situation of down-trodden husbands:  
Home for the evening after a hard day of struggle with his equals, of yielding to his 
superiors, he likes to feel himself an absolute superior and a dispenser of undeniable 
truths. … All the resentments accumulated during his childhood and his later life, those 
accumulated daily among other men whose existence means that he is browbeaten and 
injured – all this is purged from him at home as he lets loose his authority upon his wife. 
Beauvoir suggests that the struggle for recognition elicits slaves who, occupied in tedious 
drudgery and rendered “immanent” by their superiors, compensate for their lack by 
oppressing those more vulnerable than they. Additionally, Tidd (2004: 77) asserts that “even 
if men are also in certain ways victims of the patriarchal system, they nevertheless profit from 
it and internalise its ideology.” Yes, men suffer the burden of the Eternal Masculine. 
Nonetheless, conformity in the individual man holds little danger, “custom being based on his 
 189
needs as an independent and active individual” (Beauvoir: 692); indeed, “[he] is very well 
pleased to remain the sovereign subject, the absolute superior, the essential being” (726). 
 
On the other hand, “woman may fail to lay claim to the status of subject because she lacks 
definite resources, because she feels the necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of 
reciprocity, and because she is often very well pleased with her role as the Other”. The 
chapter on Childhood demonstrates how, from their infancy, women are habituated to become 
the docile and dutiful daughters of the patriarchal order: “the delights of passivity are made to 
seem desirable to the young girl by parents and teachers, books and myths, women and men; 
she is taught to enjoy them from earliest childhood; the temptation becomes more and more 
insidious; and she is the more fatally bound to yield to those delights as the flight if her 
transcendence is dashed against harsher obstacles” (325).  
 
Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 92-93) correctly observes: “In Beauvoir’s work the notion of bad 
faith is merely on the horizon, a kind of hollow mould of oppression, and it is noticeable that 
the category of ‘the bad faith of the other’ is never used, even when the context invites it.” 
Thus, for instance, when Beauvoir (641-687) discusses the narcissist, the mystic and the 
woman in love, she is careful not to describe them as models of bad faith: their actions signify 
failed attempts – one might be tempted to call them self-destructive attempts but for the fact 
that they had never possessed a sense of self that was not already decreed by the male-
dominated world – to escape the prison of immanence to which they have been doomed, put 
differently, “to survive the indignities of patriarchy” (Bergoffen 1997: 195-196). 
 
Even when a woman is wise to the insidious power of mystification, “even though women 
may try as hard as they can to individualise themselves and even though the men that they 
meet may not be ‘all the same’, it is still true that in the life of society any woman encounters 
the standard feminine position and is liable at any moment to be treated not as the individual 
she wants to be but as ‘woman’, in other words according to the average idea of what a 
woman is and should be” (Le Dœuff: 127).  
 
Does the call for a brotherhood between men and women prove Eva Lundgren-Gothlin’s 
hypothesis that The Second Sex is modelled on the conventional, particularly Kojèvean, 
interpretation of self-other relationships that hinges on the assimilation of the Other by the 
Same?  
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Certainly, Beauvoir (639) argues for an “economic evolution of woman’s condition”. In the 
chapter, The Independent Woman, Beauvoir (689) notes: “It is through gainful employment 
that woman has traversed most of the distance that separated her from the male; and nothing 
else can guarantee her liberty in practice.” However, Beauvoir (691) warns: “The woman who 
is economically emancipated from man is not for all that in a moral, social, and psychological 
situation identical with that of man … [f]or when she begins her adult life she does not have 
behind her the same past as does a boy; she is not viewed by society in the same way; the 
universe presents itself to her in a different perspective.” For these reasons, “it will be 
necessary for the woman who also is subject, activity, to insinuate herself into a world that 
has doomed her to passivity” (692).      
 
Beauvoir (727-728) suggests that reciprocal recognition between the sexes cannot be attained 
“as long as femininity is perpetuated as such” (728). Insofar as Beauvoir can be interpreted 
from a Kojèvean, thus, conventional perspective, we have come to the heart of the matter. The 
emancipated or modern woman “refuses the passivity man means to impose on her”; “she 
accepts masculine values” (727). Recall Beauvoir’s argument that “man” occupies both the 
positive, masculine pole and the human norm, whereas “woman” is defined solely in terms of 
lack and difference. Beauvoir (722) reiterates this view in The Independent Woman: “It is in 
man and not in woman that it has hitherto been possible for Man to be incarnated.” Hence, 
Gatens (in Card 2003: 278) concludes that Beauvoir’s “approval” of the emancipated 
woman’s embrace of “masculine qualities” – human qualities – reflects her call for women to 
“wrest back those values that express activity and transcendence as values that are appropriate 
to them also.”  
 
Now, if Beauvoir believes that women should “insinuate” themselves into the patriarchal 
world to achieve emancipation, she would be taking for granted that man equals 
transcendence. So, woman’s transcendence coincides with being man, put in terms of the 
dialectic, woman’s recognition hinges on the “Other” being assimilated by the “Same”. From 
this perspective, the “brotherhood” between the sexes depends on woman’s “endeavour to 
traverse the distance that separates her from the male”, and the extent to which man allows 
her to insinuate herself in his world.  
 
As we have seen, Beauvoir posits subjectivity in terms of ambiguity and rejects the Cartesian 
Subject’s disavowal of his body, of nature and the world. If women were to insinuate 
 191
themselves into the league of brothers, they would be compelled to deny their bodies. As 
such, they will not have attained what Beauvoir means by subjectivity. Moreover, the 
brotherhood has a vested interest for women to remain defined solely in terms of their bodies. 
A woman simply does not have a man’s body and, in a male-orientated world, being-
different-from-man equals being-less-than-man: “difference has been colonised by power 
relations that reduce it to inferiority, as Simone de Beauvoir pertinently put it in The Second 
Sex” (Braidotti: 147). Thus, we find that those women who manage to forge a place for 
themselves in the fraternity are constantly reminded, through sexist jokes, patronising 
attitudes, unequal pay, sexual harassment, the glass-ceiling effect, indifference in public 
workplaces to female-specific needs, such as tampon dispensers in bathrooms, etc., that they 
are other (and therefore less) than men. 
 
Perhaps Beauvoir’s postulation of a fraternité between the sexes is a veiled reference to the 
brother-sister relationship as depicted in Phenomenology of Spirit. Before “the spirit of family 
shifts into the consciousness of universality” (Hyppolite 1974: 346), Hegel posits three 
“natural” relationships – between husband and wife, parents and child and brother and sister – 
that are markedly different from the self-other relationships in the polis.72  
 
Regarding the relationship between brother and sister, Hegel (1977: 274-275) avers: 
They are the same blood which has, however in them reached a state of rest and 
equilibrium. Therefore, they do not desire one another, nor have they given to, or 
received from, one another this independent being-for-self; on the contrary, they are free 
individualities in regard to each other. Consequently, the feminine, in the form of the 
sister, has the highest intuitive awareness of what is ethical. She does not attain to 
consciousness of it, or to the objective existence of it, because the law of the Family is an 
implicit, inner essence which is not exposed to the daylight of consciousness, but remains 
an inner feeling and the divine element that is exempt from an existence in the real world. 
… The brother, however, is for the sister a passive, similar being in general; the 
recognition of herself in him is pure and unmixed with any natural desire. In this 
relationship, therefore, the indifference of the particularity, and the ethical contingency of 
the latter, are not present; but the moment of the individual self, recognising and being 
recognised, can here assert its right, because it is linked to the equilibrium of the blood 
and is a relation devoid of desire. The loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the 
                                                 
72 I will shortly return to the relationships between husband and wife and parents and child. 
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sister and her duty towards him is the highest. The relationship is at the same time the 
limit at which the self-contained life of the Family breaks up and goes beyond itself. The 
brother is the member of the Family in whom its Spirit becomes an individuality which 
turns towards another sphere, and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The 
brother leaves the immediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly speaking, negative ethical 
life of the Family, in order to acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of 
itself and actual. He passes from the divine law, within whose sphere he lived, over to 
human law. But the sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the household and 
the guardian of the divine law. In this way, the two sexes overcome their [merely] natural 
being and appear in their ethical significance, as diverse beings who share between them 
the two distinctions belonging to the ethical substance.       
We find in this interpretation of Antigone the postulation of “two single consciousnesses that, 
in the Hegelian universe, relate to each other without entering a war” (Derrida 1986: 149). 
Without having engaged each other in a life and death struggle, the brother and sister have 
“independent being-for-self”; their recognition of each other is not based on desire or on 
opposition, since they are already free individuals. Derrida suggests that the absence of desire 
points to the apparent suspension of sexual difference; yet, Hegel posits a brother-sister 
relationship, not a relationship of brothers or a relationship of sisters. Derrida (149) deduces 
that “a sexual difference is still necessary, a sexual difference posited as such and yet without 
desire.” Their sexual difference enables Hegel to posit the brother and sister as, respectively, 
the embodiments of the law of universality (human law) and the law of singularity (divine 
law). Thus, the relationship “does not lack differences, but the differences are not yet 
oppositions” (Hyppolite: 335), whereas opposition is an essential aspect of “the self-conscious 
spirit of the city” (346). The brother and sister are diverse rather than opposite beings.  
 
Yet, the brother abandons his sister. He becomes a citizen. The sister remains shut up in the 
family abode – the impotent keeper of divine law, entrusted with the “toilette of the dead” 
(Derrida: 143).   
 
In The Second Sex, even when the situation invites it – for example, the chapter on 
Patriarchal Times and Classical Antiquity – Beauvoir does not directly broach the topic of 
Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone. The clearest reference emerges in Dreams, Fears, Idols, 
where Beauvoir (212-213) observes: 
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In paintings we see her opening the door or a window upon paradise, or placing a ladder 
between the earth and the firmament. … She sways divine Justice, smilingly weighting on 
the side of charity the scales that tell the worth of souls. … Here on earth men are 
defenders of the law, of reason, of necessity; woman is aware of the original contingency 
of man himself and of this necessity in which he believes, hence come both the 
mysterious irony that flits across her lips and her pliant generosity. She heals the wounds 
of the males, she nurses the newborn, and she lays out the dead; she knows everything 
about man that attacks his pride and humiliates his self-will.  
In short, what Beauvoir shows is that the sister is once again a cipher, at once imbued with 
celestial power and excluded from humanity.  
 
Toril Moi offers another interpretation of this apparent appeal to brotherhood. Moi (in 
Fallaize 1998: 84-85) suggests: 
Rhetorically as well as thematically, the last word of The Second Sex represents 
Beauvoir’s final utopian gesture. ‘All oppression creates a state of war,’ she writes (SS, p. 
726; DS II, p. 645). Only when oppression ceases will genuine solidarity be possible 
between men and women: Beauvoir’s final fraternité must be imagined as situated in a 
space where patriarchy no longer rules, for only then can the word be given the truly 
universal meaning it ought to have had all along. In such a space the word sisterhood will 
finally be taken to be just as universal as brotherhood. There is here, of course, a 
deliberate allusion to the French Revolution: her utopia, Beauvoir is saying, would 
consist in a world in which the ideals of freedom, equality and brotherhood would finally 
be translated into reality.73 Equality here does not mean sexual sameness: hers is not a 
theory of a sexless society, in any sense of the word. For Beauvoir, political equality 
presupposes social and economic equality. Together, these three elements make up the 
sine qua non of ethical equality between the sexes. Ethical equality implies the mutual 
recognition of the other as a free, acting subject, and in The Second Sex this is usually 
called reciprocity, not brotherhood. 
In Moi’s analysis, Beauvoir rehabilitates the concept of fraternité, endows it with a post-
patriarchal meaning that recognises difference. To be sure, we can recall Beauvoir’s argument 
                                                 
73 Michèle le Dœuff (1991: 95) posits: “Let us consider, for example, the third term of the motto of the 
French Republic, ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’. ‘Fraternity’ is an alliance between brothers and this 
word implies that the Republic is not a mixed state. It should long ago have been replaced by 
‘Solidarity’.” In her essay, Moi uses fraternity and solidarity interchangeably.  
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that language “did not come down from subterranean depths”, that it is developed within “that 
human reality which is at once Mitsein and separation”: since language is constructed to 
reflect the values espoused by the language-makers, it can be constructed differently if those 
values are displaced. However, “if one wishes to give the word [brotherhood] a universal and 
absolute meaning, it is always a question of reabsorbing each man [and woman?] into the 
bosom of mankind” (Beauvoir 1948: 112).74 The problem is that mankind is once more a 
concept that designates the human and men in general. Those who engage in the mutual 
recognition of the other as a free, acting subject are, according to the arguments posited in 
The Second Sex, exclusively brothers, not sisters or brothers and sisters.75 
 
In Beauvoir’s reinterpretation of the dialectic of recognition, we have seen her rejection of the 
final sublation that realises the Universal Individual. While she follows Hegel in the emphasis 
of the bond, there is, for Beauvoir, no final reconciliation between identity and difference. 
Instead, she attributes to this relationship a tension, which is maintained as long as the 
differences between individuals – the limits that define their relationship – are reciprocally 
recognised. To this end, Beauvoir highlights the “restlessness” of Spirit and the ceaselessness 
of the dialectic of recognition. In accordance with the exponents of early French 
phenomenology, Beauvoir argues against the attainment of the Absolute. However, 
Beauvoir’s appeal to the constancy of the struggle is not a justification for positing existence 
as inevitably violent, which is, as I have shown, the conventional approach to Hegel’s 
dialectic. For Beauvoir, the dialectic must continue in order to avoid the ultimate violence: 
assimilation of otherness into the Same.             
 
This concern with preserving otherness takes on a more concrete focus in The Second Sex. 
Recall Beauvoir’s challenge to Hegel: “The Mind [Spirit] is a subject; but who is a subject?” 
This question points not only to a general focus on the loss of personal identity in the 
movement towards the Absolute. It signifies more than the concern that a part of Hegel’s 
                                                 
74 Beauvoir’s original formulation is: “But is the cause of Man that of each man? That is what 
utilitarian ethics has been striving to demonstrate since Hegel; if one wishes to give the word useful a 
universal and absolute meaning, it is always a question of reabsorbing each man into the bosom of 
mankind”.   
75 In a later text, Moi (1999: 112) qualifies: “The old choice between sameness and difference does not 
apply here [since] The Second Sex doesn’t ask us to choose between a society with or without sexual 
difference but between one with or without sex-based oppression.”  
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“progression towards the unity of identity and difference involves the dissolution of sexual 
difference” (Diprose 1994: 39), that the universal subject is progressively stripped from all 
specificity, including sex differences. Fundamentally, this question regarding the subject on 
Hegel’s journey of self-discovery introduces us to what is, ultimately, Beauvoir’s contention; 
to wit, that sexual difference was not there to begin with, that the journey towards the 
Absolute is undertaken exclusively by brothers.  
 
In The Ethics of Ambiguity, notwithstanding her privileging of the bond, Beauvoir (108) 
recoils from the notion of brotherhood: 
A collectivist conception of man does not concede a valid existence to such sentiments as 
love, tenderness, and friendship; the abstract identity of individuals merely authorises a 
comradeship between them by means of which each one is likened to each of the others. 
In marching, in choral singing, in common work and struggle, all the others appear as the 
same; nobody ever dies. On the contrary, if individuals recognise themselves in their 
differences, individual relations are established among them, and each one becomes 
irreplaceable for a few others.  
This passage conveys why, instead of exhorting women to join the brothers on the endless 
journey to the Absolute, Beauvoir focuses on various personal relationships that challenge 
both Hegel’s version of the dialectic of recognition and its perversion by early French 
phenomenology. In the same way that the intimate relationship between man and woman, 
along with the relationships between brothers and sisters and parents and children, are, for 
Hegel “the kernel and, as it were, the potentiality of this world” (Hyppolite 1974: 335), 
Beauvoir shows how maternal love, lesbian love and, most fundamentally, the authentic erotic 
experience between the heterosexual couple may offer us a glimpse of self-other relationships 
that are not based on conflict and domination, but on generosity and reciprocity. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
d.2) Possession versus erotic generosity 
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Early in The Second Sex, Beauvoir refers to the heterosexual couple as a “primordial Mitsein” 
that operates, not on the basis of a struggle for recognition in which combatants seek to 
dialectically overcome each other; instead, on man always already asserting his lordship over 
woman in the absence of combat, symbolic or otherwise. In the chapter, The Woman in Love, 
Beauvoir gives an account of “the patriarchal erotic” (Bergoffen 1997: 110) to illustrate the 
non-dialecticity of the man-woman relationship. She commences with a quote from The Gay 
Science: 
The single word love in fact signifies two different things for man and woman. What 
woman understands by love is clear enough: it is not only devotion, it is a total gift of 
body and soul, without reservation, without regard for anything whatever. This 
unconditional nature of her love is what makes it a faith, the only one she has. As for 
man, if he loves a woman, what he wants is that love from her; he is in consequence far 
from postulating the same sentiment for himself as for woman; if there should be men 
who also felt that desire for complete abandonment, upon my word, they would not be 
men. 
(Nietzsche, cited in Beauvoir 1997: 652) 
We recognise the male lover in this citation as the passionate man, critically analysed by 
Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity. The passionate man, for all his “maniacal” or “amorous 
passion”, does not love, since he “seeks possession; he seeks to attain being” (Beauvoir 1948: 
64). Taking her cue from Nietzsche, Beauvoir (1997: 652-653) writes of passionate male 
lovers that “they never abdicate completely; even on their knees before a mistress, what they 
still want is to take possession of her; at the very heart of their lives they remain sovereign 
subjects; the beloved woman is one value among others”.   
 
Notwithstanding the nod to Nietzsche, it is to Sartre that we must turn for the account of 
possession that inspires Beauvoir’s postulation of the passionate man. 
 
Towards the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre develops the idea that “sight serves the 
illusions of autonomy and self-identity and empowers the desires of the imperialist [subject]” 
(Bergoffen 1997: 34). Sartre (1956: 738) asserts: “What is seen is possessed; to see is to 
deflower.” In the following paragraphs, he puts forward a concept of epistemology based on 
sexual and alimentary metaphors: knowledge is virginity deprived (738), it is at once “a 
penetration and a superficial caress” (740) and “to know is to devour with the eyes” (739).  
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The object of the possessor’s “appropriative enjoyment” is unmistakably female. Sartre (739-
760) spells out:        
There is a movement of dissolution which passes from the object to the knowing subject. 
The known is transformed into me; it becomes my thought and thereby consents to 
receive its existence from me alone. … It is an unhappy fact – as Hegel noted – that 
desire destroys its object. In this sense, he said, desire is the desire of devouring. In 
reaction against this dialectical necessity, the For-itself dreams of an object which may be 
entirely assimilated by me, which would be me, without dissolving into me but still 
keeping the structure of the in-itself; for what I desire exactly is this object; and if I eat it, 
I do not have it any more, I find nothing remaining except myself. This impossible 
synthesis of assimilation and an assimilated which maintains its integrity has deep-rooted 
connections with the basic sexual drives. The idea of “carnal possession” offers us the 
irritating but seductive figure of a body perpetually possessed and perpetually new, on 
which possession leaves no trace. This is deeply symbolised in the quality of “smooth” or 
“polished”. What is smooth can be taken and felt but remains no less impenetrable, does 
not give way in the least beneath the appropriative caress – it is like water. This is the 
reason why erotic descriptions insist on the smooth whiteness of a woman’s body. 
Smooth – it is what re-forms itself under the caress, as water re-forms itself in its passage 
over the stone which has pierced it. … To possess means to have for myself; that is, to be 
the unique end of the existence of the object. … I possess this pen; that means that this 
pen exists for me, has been made for me. Moreover originally it is I who make for myself 
the object which I want to possess. … To have is first to create. And the bond of 
ownership which is established then is a bond of continuous creation; the object 
possessed is inserted by me into the total form of my environment; its existence is 
determined by my situation and by its integration in that same situation. … Thus to the 
extent that I appear to myself as creating objects by the sole relation of appropriation, 
these objects are myself. The pen and the pipe, the clothing, the desk, the house – are 
myself. … I am what I have. It is I myself which I touch in this cup, in this trinket. … 
Thus possession is in addition a defence against others. What is mine is myself in a non-
subjective form inasmuch as I am its free foundation. … No particular appropriation has 
any meaning outside its indefinite extensions: the pen which I possess is the same as all 
other pens; it is the class of pens which I possess in it. … Each possessed object which 
raises itself on the foundation of the world manifests the entire world, just as a beloved 
woman manifests the sky, the shore, the sea which surrounded her when she appeared.  
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To see is to possess; to possess is to create. The world revealed in Sartre’s account is in the 
mode “of serviceability, conduciveness, usability, and manipulability” (Heinämaa in Card 
2003: 78); in short, the possessor sees the world as ready-to-hand. That which the possessor 
appropriates is defined only in terms of the function it fulfils in his existence – in any other 
context, the possessed object is “radically extinguished” (Sartre: 753). On the other hand, the 
act of possessing extends the appropriator’s grip on the world: “To appropriate this object is 
then to appropriate the world symbolically” (760). The possessed object – note how Sartre 
moves, without qualification, between the image of the possessed as inanimate object (pen, 
desk, pipe, etc.) to “a beloved woman”76 – “is” the possessor in non-subjective form. To 
possess is to achieve “the project of the in-itself-for-itself” (755), in other words, “that 
impossible synthesis … that is called God” (Beauvoir 1948: 14).     
 
Sartre’s portrayal of possession serves as the template for the patriarchal erotic in The Second 
Sex. If the love of the woman in love is a religion, it is because the man “is represented to her 
as the absolute, as the essential … a god” (Beauvoir 1997: 653). She embodies the zu-handen 
quality of objects in the possessor’s world. Beauvoir (678) explains: “But most often woman 
knows herself only as different, relative; her pour-autrui … is confused with her very being; 
for her, love is not an intermediary ‘between herself and herself’ because she does not attain 
her subjective existence; she remains engulfed in this loving woman whom man has not only 
revealed, but created.” The woman’s lover “is an eye, a judge, and as soon as he looks at 
anything other than herself, he frustrates her; whatever he sees, he robs her of; away from 
him, she is dispossessed, at once of herself and of the world” (667), like the object that is 
extinguished when it is not in the possession of the appropriator. 
 
The woman in love serves the passionate man’s desire for an object that is “absolutely his and 
yet a stranger” (674), he “seeks his reflection in her … but … the loving woman’s … love 
disfigures her, destroys her; she is nothing more than this slave, this servant, this too ready 
mirror, this too faithful echo” (675). Since she is deprived of her otherness, since she is for 
her lover a mirror, the sexual act is not “an intersubjective experience in which each goes 
beyond self” (465): “It is I myself which I touch in this cup, in this trinket”, the appropriator 
remarks; likewise, the passionate man’s penetration of his lover’s body is a form of 
                                                 
76 Indeed, as Le Dœuff (1991: 82) notes, “woman … had already become an object when the object of 
knowledge (or rather ‘the thing’) was assimilated to ‘the smooth whiteness of a woman’s body’.” 
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masturbation. Beauvoir (397-419) suggests that the repulsion a woman feels towards sex is 
not necessarily symptomatic of “feminine frigidity”, but often a reaction to “the male organ 
[that] seems not to be desirous flesh but a tool skilfully used” (413), to a situation in which 
“the man confines himself to taking without giving or if he bestows pleasure without 
receiving, the woman feels that she is being manoeuvred, used; once she realises herself as the 
Other, she becomes the inessential other” (417), to the reality that the passionate man “seeks 
domination much more than fusion and reciprocity” (418). 
 
Recall, however, that the passionate man, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, fails in his attempt to 
assimilate the object of his desire. Beauvoir (1948: 66) observes that the source “of the 
passionate man’s torment is his distance from the object; but he must accept it instead of 
trying to eliminate it.” Desire does not only destroy the object, as Sartre argues via Hegel, it 
also destroys subjectivity. For there to be a self, there must be an other. The disappearance of 
otherness marks the death of the subject. As we have seen, the movement towards possessing 
the object extends to an appropriation of the world in order to achieve the synthesis of the en-
soi and pour-soi. Having set up the object as an absolute so that “nothing exists outside of his 
stubborn project”; “having involved his whole life with an external object which can 
continually escape him, [the passionate man] tragically feels his dependence”, Beauvoir (65) 
suggests.          
 
Two conceptions of desire emerge. There is erotic desire that Beauvoir associates with 
“desirous flesh”; and there is the desire of the project, which is the desire to attain self-
recognition through a movement of possessing others, and through them, the world. In his 
portrayal of “carnal possession”, Sartre seems to conflate these two desires. In reality, he 
views carnality through the lens of the project only – the man seeking to devour the female 
figure is not driven by sexual desire but by the desire to overcome her otherness and, in so 
doing, symbolically extend his grasp on the world. Thus, if the figure of woman is irritating, 
as Sartre suggests in the passage under discussion, it is because the sexual drama enacted on it 
is yet another version of the master-slave dialectic, which ends in the man-master’s 
frustration, having made his self-recognition dependent on an enslaved other. 
  
In his depiction of “carnal possession”, Sartre is once again aligned with Kojève. In 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève (1969: 6) inserts, without further elaboration, in 
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his analysis of anthropogenetic desire, the following description of the man-woman 
relationship: 
Thus, in the relationship between man and woman, for example, Desire is human only if 
the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other; if he wants “to possess” or “to 
assimilate” the Desire taken as Desire – that is to say, if he wants to be “desired” or 
“loved”, or, rather, “recognised” in his human value, in his reality as a human individual. 
Anthropogenetic desire, the desire to possess, is a human desire; sexual desire is, by 
implication, an animal desire. In agreement with Debra Bergoffen’s (1997: 180) assessment, I 
argue that, for Beauvoir, the erotic has an ethical dimension to which patriarchal culture is 
indifferent.  
 
Although she is the dominated other in the sexual drama of the patriarchal erotic, the woman 
in love is, in Hegelian terms, no less culpable of the lack of reciprocity between the lovers. In 
this context, Bergoffen (164) explains “that where man forfeits the requirements of reciprocity 
in the exercise of his transcendence, woman forfeits the requirements of reciprocity in the 
name of the bond.” Recall that, in her Introduction, Beauvoir offers woman’s commitment to 
the bond – “she feels the necessary bond that ties her to man regardless of reciprocity” – as 
one of the reasons for woman’s status as Other.  
 
The amorous woman’s sacrifice of her own subjectivity for the sake of the bond with her 
lover, does not, however, place her on a higher moral plane, since she does not love a human 
being, but worships an absolute subject. The passionate man denies the subjectivity of his 
lover, but the woman in love also renounces her subjectivity; or, rather, since her subjectivity 
has always been degraded, the woman in love vainly seeks self-recognition through the sexual 
union with her Master. Indeed, the woman in love tries to graft her entire existence onto the 
supposedly transcendent existence of her lover in the hope that she may attain transcendence 
by proxy.  
 
Thus, Beauvoir (663) observes: “The supreme happiness of the woman in love is to be 
recognised by the loved man as a part of himself; when he says ‘we’, she is associated and 
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identified with him, she shares his prestige and reigns with him over the rest of the world; she 
never tires of repeating – even to excess – this delectable ‘we’.”77  
In short, both the passionate man and the woman in love make absolutes of their others. 
Beauvoir (664) counters that an “authentic love should accept the contingence of the other 
with all his idiosyncrasies, his limitations, and his basic gratuitousness [and] not pretend to be 
a mode of salvation, but a human interrelation.” 
 
Beauvoir (418) points out that the renouncement of the passionate man’s dominion over his 
mistress “requires a great deal of love or of generosity.” Since it “is only as something 
strange, forbidden, as something free, that the other is revealed as an other” (Beauvoir 1948: 
67), all forms of Mitsein, including the sexual act between a man and a woman, operate on the 
basis of the desire of the project, which is the desire for possession, only to the detriment of 
both parties. Beauvoir (67) declares that “to love [someone] genuinely is to love him in his 
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes.” In other words, genuine love is the 
disavowal of possession. 
 
With her emphasis on generosity as the love of the other’s otherness, Beauvoir unequivocally 
departs from early French phenomenology, for which otherness is either something 
threatening that must be overcome, or something to be assimilated by the greedy nothingness 
that is man.78 
 
Consider, for example, the representation of generosity in Being and Nothingness: 
                                                 
77 Beauvoir dramatises the situation of the woman in love in her short story, The Woman Destroyed 
(1969b). The story revolves around the disarray and abject terror felt by the protagonist, Monique, 
when faced with the prospect of losing her husband, Maurice, to another woman. The following 
passage portrays the debilitating effects of Monique’s worship of her husband: “Here I am at forty-
four, empty-handed, with no occupation, no other interest in life apart from you. If you had warned me 
eight years ago I should have made an independent existence for myself and now it would be easier for 
me to accept the situation” (Beauvoir 1969b: 178-179). It is clear that Monique has defined herself 
entirely through her relationship with Maurice. Inevitably, she loses her reason for living, her identity 
and her mind when Maurice leaves her for his mistress.               
78 See also Debra Bergoffen (1997: 96), for whom “the idea of generous passion may also be seen as 
contesting the … desires of the project.”  
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Thus generosity is above all a destructive function. The craze for giving which sometimes 
seizes certain people is first and foremost a craze to destroy; it is equivalent to an attitude 
if madness, a “love” which accompanies the shattering objects. But the craze to destroy 
which is at the bottom of generosity is nothing else than a craze to possess. All which I 
abandon, all which I give, I enjoy in a higher manner through the fact that I give it away; 
giving is a keen, brief enjoyment, almost sexual. To give is to enjoy possessively the 
object which one gives; it is a destructive-appropriative contact. But at the same time the 
gift casts a spell over the recipient; it obliges him to re-create, to maintain in being by a 
continuous creation this bit of myself which I no longer want, which I have just possessed 
up to its annihilation, and which finally remains only as an image. To give is to enslave. 
Sartre (1956: 758) 
Sartre maintains the logic of possession – the gift is mine to give away and, since I am my 
possessions, I insert myself into your existence by giving you this part of me; moreover, my 
generosity obligates you to give life to the gift by taking it in your possession, by implication, 
I compel you to symbolically extend my existence. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir connects 
possessiveness to the generosity of the woman in love, who submits her entire existence to the 
gratification of her lover’s desires, both sexual and ontological.  
 
Beauvoir (666) writes:  
It is one of the curses afflicting the passionate woman that her generosity is soon 
converted into exigence. Having become identified with another, she wants to make up 
for her loss; she must take possession of that other person who has captured her. She 
gives herself to him entirely; but he must be completely available to receive this gift.  
The difference between this account and the one Sartre puts forward is this: the woman in 
love hopes that by giving herself body and soul to the man, that she may escape her Absolute 
Otherness and be positively defined by their union, that she may become the same as he; 
whereas the possessor-giver in Being and Nothingness gives in order to take away the other’s 
otherness, which is another way of saying “enslaving” the recipient.  
 
For Beauvoir, the gift is not a demand but an act of outrageousness. In the study of The Ethics 
of Ambiguity, we saw that an outrageous act moves beyond the self-interest and conceit of the 
solipsistic ego, towards a recognition of the indissoluble bond between individuals, as well as 
their mutual need for and responsibility to each other. To give generously means not to 
impose oneself on the other; indeed, it is the very movement of otherness. In its appeal to the 
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bond, it strips the giver of his or her self-centredness, and, since it makes no demands upon 
the gift-recipient – since it lets the other be – it affirms the otherness of the other.  
 
To give generously is to risk oneself. On the one hand, the giver “forgoes the securities of 
possession” (Bergoffen: 138); on the other hand, as an appeal to the bond, the giver hopes – 
and he or she can only hope, since true recognition cannot be demanded, only freely given – 
that the recipient will also recognise his or her own otherness, that the recipient will receive 
the gift generously.79  
 
The stakes are that much higher when the gift is oneself, particularly in an erotic situation.80     
 
Beauvoir turns to the erotic experience between a man and woman to challenge certain 
conventional ideas; to wit, that eroticism is part of the animal or natural order of things; that 
                                                 
79 To receive a generously given gift can create its own set of problems. Bergoffen (1997: 63) offers: 
“Fearing that they have been viewed as objects by a strange freedom, receivers of gifts, wanting only 
to believe in their own freedom, attempt to transform the giving of the gift into an economic exchange. 
They try to pay the giver back. The attempt is an insult. It may also be bad faith, for in refusing the 
gift, I insist on containing freedom within the limits of the project – on saving it from its excess. In 
refusing the gift, I refuse the otherness of the other and myself.”  
80In the chapter, The Mother, Beauvoir considers maternal love in terms of the generous gift. Citing 
Stekel, Beauvoir (537) admonishes: “Children are not substitutes for one’s disappointed love, they are 
not substitutes for one’s thwarted ideal in life, children are not mere material to fill out an empty 
existence. Children are a responsibility and an opportunity. … Children are obligations; they should be 
brought up so as to become happy human beings.” Rejecting the notion of a maternal instinct, as well 
as the notion that maternal love is “natural”, Beauvoir (538) contends that “there is nothing natural in 
such an obligation: nature can never dictate moral choice; this implies an engagement, a promise to be 
carried out.” To love a child is to assume an ethical responsibility for another. What makes such a 
responsibility an act of generosity “is the fact that it implies no reciprocity; the mother has to do not 
with a man, a hero, a demigod, but with a small, prattling soul, lost in a fragile and dependent body. 
The child is in possession of no values, he can bestow none, with him the woman remains alone, she 
expects no return for what she gives, it is for her to justify herself.” Thus, Beauvoir (537) infers: 
“[T]he child brings joy only to the woman who is capable of disinterestedly desiring the happiness of 
another, to one who without being wrapped up in self seeks to transcend her own experience.”   
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the erotic experience is based on possession and, as such, detrimental to being-for-itself, that 
women do not experience sexual desire or that female eroticism is something deviant.81  
 
In her analysis, Beauvoir confronts the erotic experience described in Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Hegel does not describe the intimate relationship between man and woman in terms of 
carnal possession. Hegel (1977: 273) writes that “the relationship of husband and wife is in 
the first place the one in which one consciousness immediately recognises itself in another, 
and in which there is knowledge of this mutual recognition.” However, for Hegel, the 
recognition between a husband and wife is “natural” rather than ethical. Self-recognition that 
is ethical belongs exclusively in the public domain; as such, it refers to “the difficult 
recognition of man by man” (Hyppolite 1974: 344). Further on in his analysis, Hegel (274-
275) claims: 
[T]he relationships of the woman are based, not on feeling, but on the universal. The 
difference between the ethical life of the woman and that of the man consists in just this, 
                                                 
81 In the chapter, The Lesbian, Beauvoir (444) suggests that “homosexuality … is one way, among 
others, in which woman solves the problems posed by her condition in general, by her erotic situation 
in particular”. She considers the possibility of lesbian relationships as a counter to “the paradigm of 
the heterosexual couple that … sustains patriarchal policies” (Bergoffen in Card 2003: 255). Beauvoir 
(436) ventures: “Between women love is contemplative; caresses are intended less to gain possession 
of the other than gradually to re-create the self through her; separateness is abolished, there is no 
struggle, no victory, no defeat; in exact reciprocity each is at once subject and object, sovereign and 
slave; duality becomes mutuality.” At the same time, Beauvoir associates lesbianism with narcissism 
(436-437). Now, the suggestion that sex between women is based on mutuality and reciprocity, and 
not, at least in some cases, on possession and struggle, stems from the assumption that women do not 
oppress each other on the basis of sex (although, as I have shown, sometimes on the basis of class, 
race, etc.). Does Beauvoir refer to concrete women or the Eternal Feminine, whose body represents 
docility, care, ambiguity, etc.? To link the lesbian erotic with “mirroring”, problematically implies that 
women’s bodies and sexual experiences are the same. Part of Beauvoir’s agenda is to show that 
Hegel’s account of reciprocity is flawed because it is ultimately based on the notion of sameness. 
How, then, can “exact reciprocity” be possible in a supposedly narcissistic relationship? When 
Beauvoir describes the “authentic” erotic experience between the heterosexual couple, it has much in 
common with lesbian love, with the crucial difference that man and woman are different, that their 
differences are used by the patriarchal order to justify woman’s inessentiality. She argues that such 
differences are the precondition for an authentically erotic experience and, more generally, the 
possibility of friendship between the sexes.  
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that in her vocation as an individual and in her pleasure; her interest is centred on the 
universal and remains alien to the particularity of desire; whereas in the husband these 
two sides are separated; and since he possesses as a citizen the self-conscious power of 
universality, he thereby acquires the right of desire and, at the same time, preserves his 
freedom in regard to it. … [T]he wife is without the moment of knowing herself as this 
particular self in the other partner.  
Findley (in Hegel 1977: 553) understands Hegel’s position on woman to be that, “as mother 
and wife there is something natural and replaceable about her, and her unequal relation to her 
husband, in which she has duties where he mainly has pleasures, means that she cannot fully 
be aware of herself in another.” In response, Beauvoir (454-455) conjectures: 
In regard to [woman’s] erotic fate, two essential consequences follow: first, she has no 
right to any sexual activity apart from marriage; sexual intercourse thus becoming an 
institution, desire and gratification are subordinated to the interest of society for both 
sexes; but man, being transcended towards the universal as worker and citizen, can enjoy 
contingent pleasure before marriage and extramaritally. … In the second place … in 
accomplishing his specific task as husband and as reproductive agent, the former is sure 
of obtaining at least some sexual pleasure; in the female, on the contrary, the reproductive 
function is very often dissociated from erotic pleasure. So that, while being supposed to 
lend ethical standing to woman’s erotic life, marriage is actually intended to suppress it. 
 
Further into her analysis, Beauvoir (624) contends: 
Man gladly accepts as his authority Hegel’s idea according to which the citizen acquires 
his ethical dignity in transcending himself towards the universal, but as a private 
individual he has a right to desire and pleasure. His relations with woman, then, lie in a 
contingent region, where morality no longer applies, where conduct is a matter of 
indifference. With other men he has relations in which values are involved; he is a free 
agent confronting other free agents under laws fully recognised by all; but with woman – 
she was invented for this purpose – he casts off his responsibility of existence, … he is ‘at 
ease’, he ‘relaxes’, in view of the rights acquired in his public life.  
Hegel posits the natural/sexual relationship between man and woman in terms of a mutual 
recognition, instead of possession. Man can indulge his sexual desire without the need to 
dominate woman. Conveniently, she does not express the desire for desire; thus, they do not 
compete with one another and he need not risk his subjectivity. Moreover, his self-
consciousness is ethically affirmed by his fellow male citizens in the polis; thus, the 
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“generosity” he shows his wife is really the condescension he feels towards a lesser being. His 
violence towards woman is not the desire to devour her, which, in its perversity, 
acknowledges her independent existence; rather, it is a complete indifference to her existence. 
 
Beauvoir takes from Hegel’s account, firstly, the idea of an erotic situation not based on the 
desire for possession and directed at the project, but sexual pleasure; however, in her 
description of a loving, consenting erotic experience, both man and woman feel sexual desire 
and pleasure. Secondly, like Hegel, Beauvoir connects familial relationships to the ethical 
order,82 although Beauvoir’s version of the ethical order does not exclude women. Thirdly, 
Beauvoir brings into play the idea, put forward by Hegel, that the family represents the 
specific, the particular, the individual.83 By emphasising the erotic relationship of the couple, 
Beauvoir ingeniously exploits Hegel’s own separation of the private and civic domains, as 
well as his acknowledgment of specificity within familial relationships, to challenge, on a 
political level, the patriarchal nation, and, on a philosophical level, universal Spirit.    
 
In the final part of her study, Beauvoir (736-737) asserts: “Virile aggressiveness seems like a 
lordly privilege only within a system that in its entirety conspires to affirm masculine 
sovereignty”. The same system treats women as sex objects and their bodies as pure matter, to 
be encoded with the Eternal Feminine, rendered docile and devoured. Beauvoir’s rejoinder is 
to call upon the fundamental ambiguity of human existence. We have seen that at the heart of 
conflict and oppression is a denial of ambiguity. Thus, writes Beauvoir (737): “In those 
combats where they think they confront one another, it is really against the self that each one 
struggles, projecting into the partner that part of the self which is repudiated; instead of living 
out the ambiguities of their situation, each tries to make the other bear the abjection and tries 
to reserve the honour for the self.” In a system that denies ambiguity, it comes as no surprise 
that the erotic experience assumes the drama of possession, of prevailing over the other, of 
extending the project.  
                                                 
82 To be sure, for Hegel (1977: 268), the family is “a natural ethical community” and “the immediate 
being of the ethical order”. In its immediacy, the family is not yet the actualised or existing ethical 
order but it is the potentiality of the ethical order.  
83 Hegel (268) suggests that the family “stands opposed to the nation itself … stands over and against 
that order which shapes and maintains itself by working for the universal; the Penates stand opposed to 
the universal Spirit.”  
 207
 
A further implication of the abjuration of ambiguity is the creation of dualisms that benefit 
men and denigrate women: man-consciousness-activity-transcendence-subjectivity versus 
woman-materiality-passivity-immanence-objectivity. Beauvoir counters that both sexes, as 
ambiguous existents, are at once consciousness and body, active and passive, subject and 
object, immanence and transcendence. That said, Beauvoir also creates the impression that 
human existence “is” neither body84, nor consciousness;85 it “is” neither passive, nor active, 
since these designations are, as Beauvoir argues in her discussion of the bio-scientific 
perspective, values created to consolidate the patriarchal order; it “is” neither to be a subject, 
nor an object, since, as we have seen in Beauvoir’s Introduction, it is man who attributes to 
himself the status of Subject, while positing woman as the Other; as a “becoming” (Beauvoir: 
66), human existence is neither immanence (the given), nor is it, as something that can “fall 
back into immanence”, that can be degraded, transcendence. 
 
I submit that Beauvoir goes one step further than appealing to ambiguity. Those concepts in 
the pairs that are traditionally ignored or disparaged, particularly materiality and passivity, are 
central to and do not have negative connotations in Beauvoir’s depiction of the erotic 
experience as a non-violent alternative to the dialectic of recognition. Thus, as Bergoffen 
(1997: 160) observes, “the erotic, ambiguous body, not the violent, transcending one … 
becomes the privileged site of subjectivity.” It is in this intimate setting that the couple can 
contest what the patriarchal world has made of them. Furthermore, this intersubjective 
situation reflects the elements of friendship to which Hegel alludes: generosity, reciprocity, 
the upholding of difference, joy, the overcoming of the solipsistic ego, the ever-present threat 
of danger, “the inextricable confusion between objectivity and subjectivity”.86 
 
Beauvoir (421-422) proposes: 
[W]hen woman finds in the male both desire and respect; if he lusts after her flesh while 
recognising her freedom, she feels herself to be the essential, her integrity remains 
                                                 
84 For instance, Beauvoir (69) argues that “woman’s body is not enough to define her as a woman”. 
85 Beauvoir (80) submits: “Woman can be defined by her consciousness of her own femininity no 
more satisfactorily than by saying that she is a female, for she acquires this consciousness under 
circumstances dependent upon the society of which she is a member.” 
86 See Part 3 b.2.     
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unimpaired the while she makes herself object; she remains free in the submission to 
which she consents. Under such conditions the lovers can enjoy a common pleasure, in 
the fashion suitable for each, the partners each feeling the pleasure of being his or her 
own but as having its source in the other. The verbs to give and to receive exchange 
meanings; joy is gratitude, pleasure is affection. Under a concrete and carnal form there is 
mutual recognition of the ego and of the other in the keenest awareness of the other and 
of the ego. Some women say that they feel the masculine sex organ in them as a part of 
their own bodies; some men feel that they are the women they penetrate. These are 
evidently inexact expressions, for the dimension, the relation of the other still exists; but 
the fact is that alterity has no longer a hostile implication, and indeed this sense of the 
union of really separate bodies is what gives its emotional character to the sexual act; and 
it is the more overwhelming as the two beings, who together in passion deny and assert 
their boundaries, are similar and yet unlike. This unlikeness, which too often isolates 
them, becomes the source of their enchantment when they do unite. … All the treasures 
of virility, of femininity, reflect each other, and thus they form an ever shifting and 
ecstatic unity. What is required for such harmony is not refinement in technique, but 
rather, on the foundation of the moment’s erotic charm, a mutual generosity of body and 
soul.  
One of the key elements missing from this rendering of the sexual drama is the devouring 
gaze elaborated by the patriarchal erotic. Seeing is possessing, Sartre writes; thus, the subject 
not only undresses the woman with his eyes, but he strips her of her otherness by making her 
his object of desire. As such, the appropriating gaze denies the idea of human reality as both 
Mitsein and separation. Instead of the visual, we find in Beauvoir’s account an emphasis on 
the tactile. Beauvoir (399) insists: “Nothing is so equivocal as a touch.” Thus, the “erotic 
experience is one that most poignantly discloses to human beings the ambiguity of their 
condition; in it they are aware of themselves as flesh and as spirit, as the other and as subject” 
(423). The gaze denies ambiguity as it turns the dispossessed other into brute facticity; 
whereas the lovers’ touch transgresses the limits between body and consciousness, between 
the self and the other.87  
 
Touching and being touched cause the lovers to become intoxicated with each other, with the 
attending quality of excess implied in such intoxification. Intoxicated, their passion denies, 
                                                 
87 See also Andrew (1998: 290-300) and Bergoffen (1997: 35).    
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conceals or shifts the boundaries between them. By implication, they forget themselves.88 We 
have seen that, for Hegel, generosity refers to the consciousnesses’ mutual release of one 
another – giving back the other’s otherness. As a loss of self-control, the sexual drama extends 
the concept of generosity also to the receiving of one’s otherness. Since Hegel does not focus 
on what the subject receives, the aspect of self-forgetfulness is missing from his account, 
which is why his account of the generosity of the subject offers “no escape from the paradox 
of self-reference” (Kolakowski 2001: 105). Tellingly, the thing that consciousness forgets at 
the beginning of every new dialectic movement is his relationship with the other. 
 
There are two implications of the idea of otherness as a gift from the other that I wish to 
introduce.  
 
The first concerns the nature of the self-other relationship in the dialectic of recognition. As I 
have argued, both Hegel and Beauvoir believe that identity and difference are inexorably 
linked. However, Beauvoir takes Hegel to task for abandoning difference in his conception of 
the Absolute. By imagining otherness as something received from another, in other words, not 
something that the subject is in possession of, Beauvoir maintains the bond between identity 
and difference. As excess, subjects can never know themselves, they are indeterminate. Their 
identities are not based on asserting their difference from one another, because they do not 
possess the self-knowledge to know how they are different. They receive their difference from 
others. For anyone to have a “complete” sense of self, to understand the full extent to which 
he or she is different, he or she would have to be engaged with all others. Thus, Beauvoir, like 
Hegel, argues that the individual is implied in the collective and the collective is implied in 
the individual.   
                                                 
88 On the topic of intoxification, consider also Beauvoir’s later criticism of the Marquis de Sade. 
Beauvoir (in Sade 1966: 21) offers: “From adolescence to prison, Sade had certainly known the 
insistent, if not obsessive, pangs of desire. There is, on the other hand, an experience which he seems 
never to have known: that of emotional intoxification. Never in his stories does sensual pleasure 
appear as self-forgetfulness, swooning, or abandon. … The male aggression of the Sadean hero is 
never softened by the usual transformation of the body into flesh. He never for an instant loses himself 
in his animal nature; he remains so lucid, so cerebral, that philosophic discourse, far from dampening 
his ardour, acts as an aphrodisiac.” See also Butler (in Card 2003: 168-188). Butler (185) also refers to 
the “necessary experience of intoxication” that she finds in Beauvoir’s postulation of eroticism, but 
she does not link the themes of self-forgetfulness, self-abandonment or intoxication to The Second Sex.         
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However, there are two crucial differences, no pun intended, in their perspectives. Firstly, for 
Beauvoir, the collective represents difference rather than universality. Secondly, as her 
portrayal of the erotic experience shows, the individuals reciprocally recognise one another as 
both self and other through giving and receiving; whereas Hegel’s generosity extends only to 
the reciprocal release of the other. Hegel’s stance is an advance from the notion of reciprocity 
advocated by early French phenomenology; to wit, both selves mutually assimilate the other’s 
otherness into their subjective being.  
 
Nonetheless, what Hegel does not sufficiently highlight in this reciprocal release is what the 
self receives in return for his giving: his own otherness. For this reason, his system continues 
on the path of the master-slave dialectic. If the subject generously receives the gift of his 
otherness from the other subject, he will recognise that he oppresses himself when he 
oppresses the other. This is precisely what Beauvoir argues in The Ethics of Ambiguity and 
what she reiterates with her description of the authentic erotic drama: touching and being 
touched make the couple aware of the permeability of their personal boundaries, so that “I 
discover that any exploitation of the other touches me” (Bergoffen: 35).  
 
This brings me to a second implication of generosity as the receiving of one’s otherness. 
Receiving is associated with two closely related qualities that are conventionally associated 
with woman’s inessentiality; to wit, vulnerability and passivity.  
 
Beauvoir’s depiction of the erotic experience as an intoxification involves the lovers’ self-
forgetfulness. Not only do the lovers let one another be, they let go of themselves within the 
passionate embrace of another. Both lovers are vulnerable inasmuch as they receive their 
otherness only through the loss of self-control. Beauvoir stresses, however, that alterity has 
no longer a hostile implication. The “self” that each abandons is the solipsistic self, that is, 
the self for whom otherness is something threatening that must be destroyed. The lovers do 
not take otherness away; they mutually receive their otherness from each other.  
 
This receiving of one’s otherness implies a certain passivity, since it is the other who acts by 
giving. Reciprocal recognition demands a certain passivity in both parties. One who gives 
without receiving is a possessor. Of course, in the context of the dialectic, givers are subjects. 
Recall how the master cannot attain self-certainty because his recognition comes from a slave, 
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a degraded subject. In the context of the sexual experience, givers have sexual agency. 
Beauvoir (400) suggests that to “make oneself an object, to make oneself passive, is a very 
different thing from being a passive object”. Only a subject can make himself or herself 
passive. The giving of otherness can be enacted in the carnal situation only if there are 
subjects to bestow this gift. Thus, Beauvoir is adamant that respecting woman’s freedom – 
that is, her difference, her otherness – must accompany the man’s sexual desire. For his 
lusting after her flesh to not be an act of aggression, he must recognise her subjectivity as well 
as the difference of her eroticism. This means that he must renounce what patriarchal society 
has made of her: Eternal Feminine. As Bergoffen (in Card 2003: 255) proposes: “Beauvoir 
sees the heterosexual couple as the site where the mystifications that position woman as the 
inessential Other can be challenged.”  
 
It is no coincidence that Beauvoir’s appeal to the preservation of otherness is framed in terms 
of the erotic. Throughout The Second Sex, Beauvoir argues that patriarchal culture reduces 
woman’s subjectivity to her flesh, particularly her ovaries, and her uterus. The erotic 
encounter between the couple can be experienced as a reaffirmation of woman’s degraded 
subjectivity and, thus, a carnal enactment of male privilege, or, it can be an opportunity to 
enjoy not only each other’s fundamental ambiguity but also the ambiguity of their 
simultaneous union and differences. The flesh-and-blood couple who experience pleasure in 
their own ambiguity, in exploring one another’s differences and being receptive to the 
possibility of having other aspects of themselves revealed by their partner, offers the hope of a 
self-other relationship based on friendship and generosity rather than combat and possession.  
 
Friendship, as we have previously gauged from Beauvoir’s ethics, does not signify the 
absence of tension. To be sure, Beauvoir describes a beautiful celebration of giving and 
receiving between generous individuals. But this erotic generosity starkly opposes her other 
depictions of the sexual experience between the couple. These are filled with indifference 
(e.g. Beauvoir: 395) and violence (e.g. 403-404). Ultimately, she believes that the couple can 
“live out their erotic drama in amity” (737). However, they both have to assume their own 
ambiguity, as well as the ambiguity of the situation, “with a clear-sighted modesty”. Such 
modesty is in stark contrast to the conceit, the macho posturing and aggression of the other-
conquering Cartesian hero-possessor. Modesty, it may be recalled, is what Levinas associates 
with the feminine, i.e., the counterpoint to Consciousness and Subjectivity. 
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Thus, with her own textual sleight of hand, Simone de Beauvoir disarms fraternal power by 
constituting an ethics of friendship and generosity as the assumption of modesty, corporeality, 
passivity and vulnerability. Beauvoir reconceptualises these traits that have traditionally been 
employed to produce, legitimise and reinforce woman’s status as the Inessential Other as the 
very characteristics that may deliver us from the tyranny of power.89  
 
89 In an interview Beauvoir (cited by Brison in Card 2003: 191) suggests: ““Precisely because they 
don’t generally have power, women don’t have the flaws that are linked to the possession of power. 
For example, they don’t demonstrate the self-importance, the fatuousness, the complacency, the spirit 
of emulation that you find in men. Women … play fewer roles, wear fewer masks, and I think the kind 
of truthfulness you find in many women is there because, in a sense, they have to have it, and that’s a 
quality they should keep and should also transmit to men. There are also qualities of devotion. 
Devotion is very dangerous because it can become a way of life and can devour people sometimes, but 
it has its good sides; if it’s what we think of as altruism. There is often, in women, a kind of caring for 
others that is inculcated in them by education, and which should be eliminated when it takes the form 
of slavery. But caring about others, the ability to give to others, to give of your time, your intelligence 
– this is something women should keep, and something that men should learn to acquire.”  
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